The Impact of Sweden's Next Government on NATO Accession and the EU

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While the next Swedish government is unlikely to make drastic changes in foreign policy, including the country's NATO accession, its domestic positions will result in occasional tensions with the European Union that could disrupt cooperation with the bloc. On Sept. 19, the speaker of the Swedish Parliament gave the leader of the conservative Moderate Party, Ulf Kristersson, a mandate to start negotiations with other political parties to form the country's next government. While the negotiations could take weeks, the Moderate Party is expected to reach a coalition agreement with at least two other center-right parties, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals. The main question moving forward is whether the right-wing Sweden Democrats (SD) will formally take Cabinet positions, which would result in a majority government, or only provide external support in Parliament to a minority government. In either case, the Moderate Party, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals will often need support from the SD to pass legislation, which means the party will be influential in domestic and foreign policy. The first vote to appoint the new prime minister will take place on Sept. 29.

The center-left Social Democrats party, led by outgoing Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson, received 30.3% of the vote in Sweden's Sept. 11 general election, followed by the Sweden Democrats (20.5%) and the Moderate Party (19.1%). Andersson formally resigned from her position on Sept. 14, admitting that center-left forces will not stay in power during the next legislature.
The SD was founded in the late 1980s and remained a fringe force in Swedish politics until the early 2010s, when it experienced a sudden increase in popularity thanks to nationalist and anti-immigration rhetoric and its focus on law and order issues and mild Euroscepticism. Its electoral result in 2022 was the best in the party's history. For decades, Sweden's mainstream parties have refused to enter formal coalition agreements with the SD, and its role in the new government will be one of the most contentious issues during the government formation negotiations between center-right parties.
On Sept. 19, SD leader Jimmie Akesson said he wants Sweden to have a majority government that includes his party.

The SD's heightened influence in Swedish politics will not disrupt the country's push to join NATO, but it could complicate the approval of additional rounds of sanctions against Russia. In early 2022, Sweden's center-left government made the historic decision to abandon two centuries of neutrality and formally apply for NATO membership. The new government will continue with this policy because most conservative parties and their voters support NATO membership. While the SD was skeptical of NATO membership in the past, the party now officially supports joining the alliance and increasing military spending. The SD's position on Sweden's Russia policy is more ambiguous, and center-left parties have accused SD supporters (and some party members) of disseminating Russian disinformation and propaganda. While there is a risk that the SD may resist future EU proposals to increase sanctions against Russia, especially if they negatively impact the Swedish economy, the party is unlikely to overly push for the end of sanctions because of the general support for Ukraine among Swedish voters. But in the case of a prolonged war, and especially if the Swedish economy enters a long and deep recession, SD pressure to lift sanctions would put the moderate members of the coalition government in a dilemma, as they likely could continue sanctions with the support of the opposition in Parliament, but in doing so could lose the SD's support.

On Sept. 19, Kristersson said he had asked incumbent State Secretary Oscar Stenstrom to remain as Sweden's main negotiator with NATO under the new center-right government, sending a strong signal of continuity in the accession process. The main obstacle to Sweden's NATO accession is Turkey's threat to block the process unless Stockholm extradites 73 ethnic Kurds that Ankara accuses of secessionism. While Swedish right-wing parties are more likely to support at least a handful of symbolic extraditions and make other gestures to appease Turkey than the outgoing center-left government, the issue is controversial in Sweden and may still create friction with Turkey.
On Feb. 16, Akesson caused controversy when he refused to choose between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Joe Biden in a TV interview. Akesson said he "wouldn't want either as Swedish Prime Minister" but acknowledged that the United States is a democracy and Russia is not.
On Sept. 2, former Integration and Migration Minister Anders Ygeman from the Social Democrats party stated that the SD's alleged connections to Russia "pose a security risk for Sweden." SD members denied these allegations and accused the Social Democrats party of electioneering.

The SD's nationalist positions will result in occasional clashes with the European Union and may slow down internal EU reforms, but any disputes between Stockholm and Brussels will not jeopardize Sweden's membership in the bloc. Even if the SD does not formally enter the next Swedish government, its large number of seats in Parliament will give it influence over domestic policy, which it will use to promote tougher regulations on crime and immigration. Depending on the depth and scope of these policies, it could result in criticism from the European Commission and the European Parliament that result in diplomatic tensions with Stockholm. Sweden will take over the rotating presidency of the European Union in January 2023, which the new government will probably use to promote tougher anti-immigration policies in the bloc, such as by granting additional resources to its border and coast guard agency (Frontex). Sweden will also be skeptical of measures to increase fiscal and economic integration within the European Union and will likely continue to stay out of projects such as the European banking union. Sweden is also likely to push against proposals by southern European member states to make the European Union's fiscal deficit and sovereign debt more flexible and will resist plans to permanently give the European Commission the power to issue debt on behalf of the member states. While none of these policy positions will be drastic enough to precipitate the country's exit from the European Union, they could slow down the bloc's reform process.

The Moderate Party, the Christian Democrats and the Liberal party all campaigned in favor of Sweden adopting the euro in a referendum in 2003 (the idea was eventually rejected, with 56% of voters opposing entering the eurozone). Since then, these parties have claimed that adopting the euro is not a priority and that the eurozone should develop stricter rules to ensure fiscal responsibility before Sweden can enter.