A digital illustration shows a jet overlaying the Chinese and Australian flags.
(Shutterstock)

A digital illustration shows a jet overlaying the Chinese and Australian flags.

China’s aggressive maneuvers performed while intercepting Western surveillance aircraft increase the chance of a mid-air collision and subsequent international crisis, with higher probabilities of escalation than in the past. On June 5, Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles said that a Chinese J-16 fighter jet had on May 26 intercepted an Australian P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft in international airspace over the South China Sea. According to Marles, the J-16 flew dangerously close to the P-8, deployed flares alongside it, and released aluminum chaff designed to distract radar-guided missiles in front of the aircraft. The P-8 then returned to base after its engines ingested some of the aluminum decoys. The news of this interception follows similar accusations from Canada of China breaching international air safety norms. On June 1, the Canadian armed forces said Chinese jets repeatedly flew close to a Canadian CP-140 Aurora patrol aircraft over the East China Sea between April 26 and May 26. On several of these occasions, the Aurora aircraft was reportedly forced to take evasive action to avoid a collision; and on one occasion, the Chinese jet flew close enough for the pilot to flash the middle finger hand gesture to the Canadian crew. 

  • The Canadian Aurora aircraft was conducting surveillance for Operation NEON, a U.N.-approved mission to monitor North Korean ship-to-ship transfers of fuel and other banned goods that would qualify as dodging U.N. Security Council sanctions announced between 2006 and 2017.

While in the past Western governments and China managed to resolve similar incidents through diplomacy, a modern-day aerial collision risks much greater escalation and a further deepening of the West’s strategic competition with China. The Australian and Canadian incidents are reminiscent of the April 2001 EP-3 incident, during which a Chinese F-8 fighter jet intercepted a U.S. EP-3 surveillance plane in international airspace over the South China Sea. Then-U.S. President George Bush had just taken office after campaigning on a promise to pivot toward competition with China. But following decades of positive trade engagement, U.S.-China relations were still much stronger than they are now, and the incident was resolved quickly. However, a new aerial collision today would carry a much greater risk of military escalation and widen the already growing chasm in China’s relations with the West. The political bandwidth for de-escalation and compromise is also severely circumscribed amid the current fraught geopolitical climate, with the United States, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan and the European Union all engaged to varying degrees in economic, military and ideological competition with China. In addition, China’s military has modernized greatly since 2001 as part of Beijing’s efforts to boost its regional dominance over the near seas, boosting Beijing’s confidence and the destructive potential of a military escalation.

  • In the 2001 incident, the Chinese F-8 flew dangerously close to the U.S. aircraft multiple times before colliding with it, killing the Chinese pilot and forcing the EP-3 to conduct an emergency landing on China’s Hainan Island. The 24 American crew members were detained for 11 days before China released them after receiving the United States’ “Letter of the Two Sorries.” The resolution to the crisis was viewed by both sides as a political loss; Washington appeared to apologize for the actions of a reckless Chinese pilot, while hawks in Beijing accused China of giving up the U.S. crew too readily.

These close calls suggest subtle shifts in the bounds of China’s operations in the East and South China Seas, and they highlight a potential catalyst for a conflict over Taiwan. These new aerial incidents suggest a willingness by China’s air force to defend airspace in the South and East China Seas — surrounding disputed territories — and not just in China’s littoral zone. The 2001 incident occurred 70 miles southeast of China’s Hainan island. The exact location of Australia’s P-8 incident is yet unclear. However, Vietnam maritime analyst Duan Dang claims it occurred southwest of the disputed Paracel Islands and China’s defense ministry confirmed it happened near those islands, which would put the aircraft roughly 200 miles from the nearest internationally recognized Chinese airspace. The exact location of the repeated Canadian incidents is also unclear, though China’s engagement over the East China Sea may confirm this willingness to defend China’s claims farther afield and deter Western sanctions enforcers.

  • To reinforce its position, Beijing could revive its claims of an aerial defense identification zone (ADIZ) — a zone in which a country requests aerial identification but that is relatively indefensible by international law — in the East and South China Seas, two regions through which a bulk of Asia’s trade with the world passes. Many other regional governments like Taiwan, Japan and South Korea already have such ADIZs; new Chinese ADIZs would only add to the navigational complexities of this region for military and commercial aircraft alike.
  • Aerial collisions are also a top risk for igniting a Taiwan conflict, as China’s flights into Taiwan’s ADIZ have rapidly escalated over the last two years, and are now almost a daily occurrence. With China’s aggressive pilots at the throttle, the chance of a collision with one of the many Taiwanese aircraft deployed to ward off Chinese incursions is also rising. And like a collision with Western aircraft, a Chinese collision over Taiwan could trigger heavy trade disruptions and risk military escalation in the immediate aftermath.
  • Lastly, Beijing’s efforts to bolster nationalism in the last five years amid strategic competition with the United States have, like in many countries, borne the most fruit in the military, one of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s most ardent supporters (very much by design). Thus, as China’s relations with the West continue to erode and Beijing leans further on nationalist rhetoric abroad and propaganda at home, the risky behavior of Chinese pilots looks set to escalate, further risking aerial incidents. 
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