Meng Wanzhou's release will remove an immediate barrier to Canada-China relations, but Canada's population and legislature remain thoroughly distrustful of China — as do those in the United States — given China's tacit acknowledgment of its use of hostage diplomacy tactics. Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou returned to China on Sept. 25 after reaching an agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice that ended its nearly three yearslong effort to extradite her, the BBC reported Sept. 25. The Justice Department announced Sept. 24 that it had dropped its request that Canada extradite Meng to the United States; in exchange, Meng admitted that she misled investors on Huawei and its subsidiaries' relationships with Iranian companies that had been the subject of charges related to sanctions violations. The arrangement did not require Meng to admit guilt in the more serious fraud charges she faced. About the same time that the Canadian judge allowed Meng to return to China, Chinese authorities released two Canadian nationals, Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig, who had been in Chinese detention since shortly after Meng's December 2018 arrest. Their simultaneous release essentially removed any Chinese pretense that their detention was not related to Meng.
U.S. scrutiny of Huawei and other Chinese tech firms on national security grounds will continue despite Meng's release. While Meng's admissions end her immediate legal woes, the Justice Department is continuing its broader case against Huawei — including charges of financial fraud, money laundering and sanctions violations — and Meng's admission of misleading investors almost certainly will be used to bolster the U.S. case against Huawei. The deal announced Sept. 24 was ultimately very similar to a proposed resolution leaked to The Wall Street Journal in December 2020, suggesting the sides finally reached a deal after at least 10 months of negotiations. Further details could emerge in the coming days and weeks indicating additional aspects of any deal that could benefit Canada, China or the United States. The announcement also came less than three weeks after U.S. and Chinese presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping had a phone call discussing strategic matters. Though it is unclear if the two leaders discussed Meng's case, the call still may have influenced the timing of the Sept. 24 deal.
The development will do little to improve China's relations with Canada or the United States, and Beijing's coverage of the affair may suggest domestic political turmoil as November approaches. U.S.-China relations will remain at their nadir, as China's Foreign Ministry on Sept. 25 was quick to assert its stance that the U.S. arrest of Meng represented arbitrary detention for political gain — an accusation the United States has leveled against China — and the Justice Department confirmed continued proceedings against Huawei. Canada-China relations will improve slightly, but only because the Meng detention represented a near-complete roadblock to productive diplomacy. Canadian public opinion toward China has become largely negative over the past three years, however, and Canadian analysts have already asserted that the release of the so-called "Two Michaels" represented a Chinese admission of using hostage diplomacy. Like the U.S. Congress, Canada's Parliament will remain hawkish on China for years to come, because the detention of the Two Michaels has corroded Canadian confidence in Chinese intentions regarding diplomatic and human rights issues. In both the United States and Canada, legislation on the national security risks and human rights abuses of China will proliferate. Beijing's coverage of Meng's release across state media outlets as a "victory for the motherland" while avoiding the issue of a swap for Meng meanwhile suggests Xi may need a domestic political victory amid nascent internal Party dissent from his "common prosperity" and anti-corruption campaigns ahead of the crucial Sixth Plenum meeting in November and the beginning of his third term in November 2022.
