The September U.S. aid disbursement to Egypt revealed a subtle shift in tactics that entrusts Egypt with changing its human rights behavior, ultimately continuing Washington's strategy of prioritizing strong bilateral relations with Cairo. Of a $300 million tranche of Foreign Military Financing aid due to Egypt in September, the U.S. State Department clarified to Congress on Sept. 14 that $130 million will be withheld until Egypt "affirmatively addresses specific human-rights related conditions." U.S. officials told The Washington Post earlier this week that the administration is specifically waiting for Cairo to drop charges against 16 individuals connected to civil society organizations who are part of "Case 173." 

• The $300 million is the September tranche of FY 2020 Foreign Military Financing aid. At over a billion dollars annually, Egypt's allotment of Foreign Military Financing is one of the largest in the world; much of the funds are used to purchase U.S. arms and equipment. 
• $170 million worth of the September aid tranche will be provided to Egypt without conditions for "counterterrorism, border security, and nonproliferation" uses. 
• The al-Sisi administration has allegedly imprisoned tens of thousands of political prisoners (an estimated 60,000), far exceeding longtime former President Hosni Mubarak's record. 

Keeping most aid flowing to Egypt without conditions shows that the Biden administration is approaching the bilateral relationship with Egypt in largely the same fashion as his predecessors due to the strong value Washington puts on maintaining bilateral ties with Egypt. Egypt has been a key U.S. Middle Eastern counterterrorism and diplomatic partner for decades, and the value of maintaining that pragmatic relationship will only grow as the United States draws down some of its regional military presence. By offering most of the aid tranche without conditions, and the remainder of it if Egypt fulfills some vague conditions regarding human rights — conditions reportedly communicated to the Egyptian government directly, removing some public oversight of its fulfillment of them — Washington is communicating that it doesn't want to disrupt its Egyptian partnership. 

• Aid groups, civil society groups, liberal members of Congress and activists are unhappy with the compromise given that the Egyptian government can still access funds as usual if it fulfills the State Department's opaque demands. The compromise is accentuated because during his campaign, U.S. President Joe Biden promised that he would not issue a "blank check" to President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, implying a tougher stance on human rights could be forthcoming within his administration.

Overarching policy continuity aside, by avoiding the use of an oft-implemented waiver of human rights restrictions, the Biden administration has signaled a subtle shift on how it distributes aid. This could allow for more direct engagement with Egypt, and could apply to other key strategic U.S. partners. Instead of the waiver, the State Department is relying on Egypt to communicate directly and openly with Washington that it has fulfilled the conditions set for releasing the additional aid. This places a significant amount of trust in Cairo, one reason why progressive U.S. lawmakers are disappointed in the shift.

• Congress has used the Leahy Law since 2014 to demand that a portion of aid to Egypt be withheld in the event of gross violations of human rights. The legislation also allows the State Department to waive this condition in the interests of U.S. national security, something that has repeatedly happened since the law's passage. 
• Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are two other key U.S. regional partners with mixed human rights records that do not receive significant amounts of military aid but do purchase a significant amount of U.S. military equipment, which can also be tied to human rights-related conditions. Similar to the situation with Egypt, so far the Biden administration has shown no sign of adjusting strategic relations with either country despite expectations during Biden's campaign that human rights concerns would take greater precedence in bilateral relations. 
• Other countries in the region that receive significant foreign military financing aid and that struggle with human rights concerns, including Jordan and Iraq, could also see more direct engagement and an avoidance of the use of the national security waiver if human rights violations complicate future disbursements of aid.