The United States' move to expand export controls against Huawei’s cloud-computing affiliates indicates its pressure campaign against Chinese telecommunications and internet companies is evolving to include a wider spectrum of information technologies. On Aug. 17, the U.S. Commerce Department added a total of 38 new Huawei affiliates to its entity list, which increases U.S. export controls. The added companies include 22 of Huawei’s cloud-computing subsidiaries, such as Huawei Cloud Computing Technology and Huawei Cloud France, as well as several of its OpenLab units that promote research and development collaboration overseas. 

• The U.S. Commerce Department also announced it was modifying its foreign direct product rule to expand export controls on Huawei and its affiliates for semiconductors manufactured using U.S. technology. 
• On Aug. 14, U.S. U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order requiring China's ByteDance, owner of the popular video-sharing app TikTok, to sell its U.S. operations within 90 days. The day prior, Trump warned Washington was considering imposing similar restrictions on other Chinese companies. 

Just as it has done with 5G equipment, the United States will push heavily for other countries to mirror its restrictions on Chinese tech as a part of its new "Clean Network" strategy, which aims to curb China's role in global networks based on five pillars: Clean Carrier, Clean Store, Clean Apps, Clean Cable and Clean Cloud. This five-pronged approach, which U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo unveiled on Aug. 5, enables the United States to pressure its global allies and partners to take action against China across a wider variety of sectors related to technology production and commerce. Due to the pervasive nature of U.S.-made technologies and patents in the sectors, U.S. export controls will likely be effective. This could include pressuring other countries to ban popular Chinese apps such as TikTok and potentially even WeChat, impose restrictions against Alibaba Cloud and Tencent Cloud, and ban Chinese contractors from constructing undersea data cables. 

• Using a combination of export controls and diplomatic pressure, the United States has been urging its European and other allies to stop using equipment manufactured by China's Huawei and ZTE in their 5G networks in recent years. This strategy has had some success, with both the United Kingdom and France now set to phase out the use of Huawei equipment.  
• Some of Washington's allies and partners have already taken a strong role against Chinese companies in other areas beyond 5G. Australia, for example, banned Huawei from building an undersea cable to several Pacific Islands in 2018, which ultimately forced the Chinese telecommunications giant to sell off its undersea cable business last year. Since June, India has also banned more than 100 Chinese apps in response to a series of bloody border clashes between Indian and Chinese troops.

Washington's strategy will undermine the ability of Chinese companies to compete globally with their U.S. counterparts in fintech, e-commerce, digital payments and other emerging internet spaces. It will also force global manufacturers beyond the semiconductor sector to consider setting up parallel China and U.S.-centric production lines to avoid U.S. export controls. 

• Competition between U.S. and Chinese internet companies has been fierce in Southeast Asia, where Alibaba and Tencent are expanding their own presence through mergers and acquisitions. Amazon and other U.S. retail companies, meanwhile, are also trying to maintain dominance in the Southeast Asian e-commerce market. 
• Although U.S. competitors will be the clear beneficiaries of the programs laid out in Washington's new Clean Strategy, it also means that the entire world will become more reliant on U.S. technology companies, which will fuel more international backlash against American tech firms via additional antitrust and anti-competition investigations, as well as digital services taxes, particularly in Europe and India. 
• Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, as well as countries in Southeast Asia, could see some of the biggest increases in demand for equipment exports as a result of restricted access to U.S. technology and growing pressure to remove Chinese vendors. But companies in those countries will also see significant costs associated with having to invest in Chinese and U.S. centric production lines or substantially reduce business with Chinese companies.