On June 26, Stratfor published an article predicting that regional developments were bringing Israeli and Turkish interests into greater alignment. The leading indicator behind that forecast was a secret meeting between the director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Dore Gold, and the undersecretary in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Feridun Sinirlioglu. In the past week, additional signs have indicated that the rapprochement is continuing apace.
It has long been thought that Turkey and Israel could cooperate in the energy sector. Though Israel's efforts to develop the relatively large Leviathan natural gas field have stalled as a result of domestic politics, and despite the Aug. 30 announcement of the discovery of a natural gas field even larger than Leviathan in Egyptian waters, both sides still have a great deal of political will to eventually export Israeli natural gas to Turkey. Multiple Turkish natural gas company executives, such as Nusret Comert and Batu Aksoy, have said in interviews recently that Turkey remains interested in developing and importing Israeli natural gas. Turkey wants to be the chief transit state to Europe for Eastern Mediterranean natural gas, and as a result of its fear of being excluded by Israeli, Egyptian and Cypriot understandings, it is eager to work with Israel.
For its part, Israel wants to use economic connections to repair and maintain strategic relationships in the region; its intention was to use Leviathan to do so with Jordan and Egypt. However, Egypt's natural gas discovery may actually prompt Israel to take a closer look at Turkey, assuming the Israeli parliament can agree on what to do with Leviathan's natural gas.
It also has become clear that there is an understanding between Feridun Sinirlioglu, who has been appointed foreign minister, and Gold. On his appointment, Gold sent a letter of congratulations to Sinirlioglu, and speaking to reporters in Jerusalem on Sept. 1, Gold extolled Sinirlioglu's personal qualities, calling him a "first-class diplomat" and saying Turkey was lucky to have him.
Most interesting, however, is the arrival of a Turkish business delegation in the Palestinian territories and Israel. The delegation, led by Prof. Guven Sak, the managing director of The Economic Policy Research Foundation in Turkey, is the first Turkish delegation to visit Israel since the Mavi Marmara debacle five years ago. The delegation visited Gaza on Aug. 30 and spoke of the potential for establishing an industrial zone in the Gaza Strip. The delegation met with Deputy Leader of Hamas and former Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh to discuss developing Gaza's economy. The delegation also met with Palestinian Labor Minister Mamoun Abu Shahla, who said after his meeting that Turkey had donated 20 million euros (about $22.5 million) to the Palestinian working fund.
The following day, the delegation headed to Israel, where it met with Israeli Deputy Minister of Regional Cooperation Ayoub Kara. Reportedly, Sak and his fellow Turkish business leaders are interested in developing an industrial zone in the West Bank as well, near the city of Jenin. According to Daily Sabah, the Turkish delegation communicated a desire to invest $100 million into the potential industrial zone. Palestinians have already purchased the 1,300 acres for the initialization of the project at a cost of $10 million, and the project has the support of Israel, the United States and the European Union. Kara highlighted the project's potential to help in rebuilding the fractured relationship between Ankara and Jerusalem.
The development of industrial zones in the Palestinian territories is not new. In 1974, Israel built the Erez industrial zone in the Gaza Strip. Before it fell into disuse after Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005, the zone held more than 180 different businesses that employed about 5,000 Gazans. The decision to have Israeli businesses withdraw from the Erez zone was announced in June 2004 by then-Israeli Minister of Industry and Trade and Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who would go on to serve as prime minister.
Ever since Israel withdrew from the industrial zone, Turkey has sought to resuscitate the project. At the time, Turkey was seeking to burnish its regional leadership credentials by owning the Gaza issue and being concerned for Gaza's plight. Then-Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul traveled to Israel and the Palestinian territories in January 2006, at the time hoping to sign agreements that would lead to the creation of 10,000 jobs for Palestinians. In 2007, reports surfaced about then-head of Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Bourses Rifat Hisarciklioglu meeting with then-Israeli Vice Premier Shimon Peres and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in January 2007 to discuss reviving the Erez industrial zone.
Despite these commitments, the restoration of Erez by Turkish-Israeli-Palestinian partnership was never realized. Talk of developing a new industrial zone outside of Jenin in the West Bank, which the visiting Turkish delegation seems to be most serious about, or of recovering Erez must then be taken with a grain of salt when evaluating whether the project itself will come to fruition. That multiple stakeholders are on board for the creation of the zone outside Jenin is a start, but many hurdles remain.
Still, there is a sense of deja vu surrounding these proceedings. Many of the same players who previously tried to rebuild Erez or use the industrial zone model are still around; Sak, though not leading delegations back in 2006, has always been a vocal supporter of such plans. It also harkens back to a time before the Mavi Marmara incident, when relations between Turkey and Israel were strong. Trade has continued between the two countries. Defense exports resumed as early as 2013, in part because of U.S. pressure, and the business and security establishments in both countries have continued to cooperate as much as possible while lamenting the current frayed state of national ties.
Where once Turkey's interests were in distancing itself from Israel, the countries' interests are now converging. Israel is upset with the United States about the Iran deal, and Turkey, while it is more welcoming of Iran than Israel is, still views Iran as a competitor. Furthermore, U.S. pressure on Turkey to participate in its campaign against the Islamic State has increased, as has U.S. frustration with Turkey's using the pretense of attacking the Islamic State to strike at its Kurdish problem in the southeast and its rather blunt hostility toward one of Washington's best allies against the Islamic State thus far: Syrian Kurds. The United States often has urged Turkey and Israel to make up, and reconciling means scoring an easy victory with Washington while making public cooperation that has never truly stopped behind the scenes. Turkey wants the removal of Bashar al Assad from Damascus; Israel at this point just wants an assurance that stability will reign on its northern border. Moreover, developing an understanding with Turkey as it asserts itself more in Syria will become important for an Israeli government that has become more wary of activities in Syria and on its northern border in general in recent weeks.
Turkey's and Israel's broader strategic interests are continuing to align, and smaller indicators — such as the Turkish delegation's visit concerning industrial zones, a degree of cordiality between Turkish and Israeli diplomatic officials absent in recent years and statements from business elites — all point to the relationship's continuing regeneration. Gold has been hesitant to declare an open reconciliation yet, and such a prediction would be premature, but that is ultimately less important than the reality that the two countries' underlying partnership appears to be strengthening.
