The Israeli assault May 30 on the aid flotilla bound for the Gaza Strip began following radio communications initiated by Israeli naval forces around 11 p.m. Naval commandos of Israel's Shayetet 13 special operations unit reportedly boarded and took control of six ships in the flotilla, which had been organized by a Turkish non-governmental organization. Though a final casualty count is not yet available and each side is presenting a very different story, between 10 and 20 people were killed in the assault, with dozens injured, including a number of Israeli commandos. Boarding operations — known in naval parlance as "visit, board, search and seizure" (VBSS) — can be challenging even in the most permissive of circumstances. Actually closing the distance to the ship and getting on deck is an extremely vulnerable period of transition. Though the aid ships were unarmed, fire hoses could have been used to repel boarders from the smaller commando watercraft. Climbing up a rope ladder from one moving ship to another and up over the side can be similarly compromising. Helicopters are often used for insertion because they can approach much faster and the assault force can "fast-rope" (a technique involving a thick, braided rope and heavy gloves but no belay device or other equipment) down to the deck in a matter of seconds. Yet this leaves the helicopter extremely vulnerable, and it still takes precious seconds to transition from the descent to bringing a weapon to bear. Because of these vulnerabilities, tactical considerations generally dictate boarding only when there are very few armed and hostile personnel above decks ("outside the skin" of the ship). The Israelis undoubtedly had the ships assembled by the Free Gaza Movement and the Turkish Insani Yardim Vakfi aid group under close surveillance for quite some time. The ships carried some 700 pro-Palestinian activists and 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid and supplies and varied considerably in size from small vessels well under 100 meters in length to the Turkish-flagged MV Mavi Marmara, a sizable passenger vessel that was nevertheless overloaded with civilians, many of whom were sleeping above decks. This meant that there was little to no opportunity for a clean insertion. The problem is not that the activists were armed with firearms (though there have been some Israeli claims about weapons and hostile gunfire), but that a VBSS team is not large, and the first individuals to fast-rope down are at a profound tactical disadvantage if numerically overwhelmed. They rely on surprise, aggression and swift, overwhelming force to subdue the crew and passengers. But establishing that sort of dominance is far more difficult with enormous numbers of civilians above decks, especially in the initial moments of the assault when the first team members have to step aboard and most of the VBSS team is still transitioning to the deck. And there are claims of resistance by the activists aboard — involving everything from marbles strewn across the deck to the use of slingshots, poles, sticks and knives. Indeed, video purportedly from the assault appears to show at least one Israeli commando struggling to bring his weapon to bear after fast-roping to the deck, and an activist using that opportunity to close in and attack him. There is every indication from video footage and from reported casualties on both sides that the commandos had difficulty establishing control over the ships. Given the basic tactical situation that the Israelis were aware of before initiating the assault, as well as Israel's long experience with pro-Palestinian activists and Palestinians themselves, it is difficult to imagine that the Israelis did not foresee this playing out as it did. There are reports of riot control agents such as tear gas being employed, which would have been intended to help manage the situation, though how extensively they were used and how effectively they were employed is unknown at this time. Ultimately, the decision to board was clearly made at the highest level and well ahead of time. Israeli options were limited — firing on the flotilla would likely have resulted in more casualties. But there are also ways to disable a ship by fouling its propellers that could also have been attempted. The Israelis engaged the flotilla some 120 kilometers (about 75 miles) from the Israeli coast, and the fast attack craft of the Israeli navy would have had the benefit of maneuverability, so there may have been other options. But the night of May 30 was also the last night before the flotilla would have reached Gaza, so if boarding was going to be done, this night was the last chance for it under the cover of darkness. The Israelis may also have hoped to seize wanted individuals or prevent evidence of weapons or other contraband from being destroyed or dumped overboard. But while the Israelis successfully used military force to achieve an objective — the ships of the flotilla are being escorted to the Israeli port of Ashdod — the casualties and international perception of the attack may have far more profound and negative implications for Israel.