As George Friedman noted in this week's Geopolitical Weekly, the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians is inherently insoluble. Hamas and Israel have fought constantly since Hamas' founding during the First Intifada in 1987, but the conflict has occasionally ebbed and flowed in intensity. The violence continued even after Hamas assumed control of the Gaza Strip following the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, and now we are witnessing the third iteration of high-intensity warfare in eight years.
Throughout the current round of fighting, several people have warned that Israel should be careful to avoid totally destroying Hamas so that it is not replaced by an even more radical group. In much the same way, the perceived weakness of Fatah during the First Intifada led to the formation of Hamas as a vehicle for Palestinian resistance. Reinforcing this point, Lt.-Gen. Michael Flynn, the outgoing chief of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, told the Aspen Security Forum on July 26 that if Hamas were destroyed, "the region would end up with something much worse."
Threats To Hamas' Power
Traditionally, Israel has feared anarchy in Gaza. In its past military campaigns, Israel Defense Forces have attempted to damage Hamas' ability to strike Israel but have stopped short of trying to totally destroy the organization.
However, we have recently received reports from a Hamas contact in the region who believes there is now an international conspiracy to destroy Hamas. While this report may very well be hyperbole, it nonetheless illustrates the group's fears of losing control due to external action. As was also noted in the Geopolitical Weekly, even if Israel were somehow able to destroy Hamas, the reality of the Palestinian situation dictates that another resistance group would arise to take its place.
Considering the Islamic State's recent success in Iraq and Syria and the longstanding pro-jihadist sentiment that exists in Gaza, it is quite possible that a jihadist group could replace Hamas, validating the fears of those who warn of a more radical alternative to Hamas.
Certainly, Hamas has long feared a jihadist threat to its leadership position in the Palestinian struggle. The concern became especially pitched after Hamas joined the political process and stood for elections, a move that alienated many radical Palestinians. There are others within Hamas who are politically aligned with the group but are theologically closer to Salafi-jihadism.
These fears have prompted Hamas to repeatedly use force to suppress its rivals in Gaza. For example, when the jihadist group Jund Ansar Allah declared an emirate in Gaza in 2009, Hamas took swift action and attacked the group's mosque in Rafah, an operation that resulted in the deaths of 22 Jund Ansar Allah members, including its leader.
Implications of New Leadership
For the residents of Gaza, the ascendance of a jihadist group in their territory would result in the implementation of a strain of Islam that is even more austere than the one promulgated by the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Hamas and something far different than the ideology of the secular Fatah. A jihadist leadership could prove to be a big shock for the people living in Gaza, as it was for the residents of Timbuktu, Mali, following its jihadist occupation in 2012. Despite widely disseminated propaganda that likens living under the jihadist version of Sharia to heaven on earth, the Islamic State's occupation of Mosul, Iraq, has forced tens of thousands of people to flee the city since June. For the minority Christian community in Gaza, jihadist rule would have severe consequences, and it would not be the only one affected. Even among Gaza's ethnic Muslims, there are many who are secular or practice a more moderate form of Islam. This means that a large portion of the Gaza population would be affected, and for many of them, jihadist rule would be far worse than living under Hamas.
Hamas would also not surrender its position easily. Any transition to a jihadist leadership in Gaza would be possible only after a protracted and bloody fight. But from an Israeli perspective, jihadist rule in Gaza might not be worse than Hamas rule because its ability to attack Israel might be more limited.
Hamas' Tactics
First of all, tactically, many of the methods that define the jihadist use of violence have long been employed by Hamas. For example, Hamas was employing suicide bombers, pedestrian bombers and vehicle bombs long before most of the world had ever heard of al Qaeda. Hamas began suicide bombings in 1993, shortly before the end of the First Intifada, and continued its suicide bombings even after the Oslo Accords were signed that year. Indeed, Hamas' suicide-bombing operations were to become the hallmark of the Second Intifada, with dozens of Hamas suicide bombings in 2001 and 2002.
Hamas has also long engaged in kidnapping operations. This is illustrated by the 2006 kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who was held hostage by Hamas for five years before being exchanged for more than 1,000 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli custody. True to form, the current round of violence was sparked by the abduction and murder of three Israeli teenagers, who were kidnapped and murdered in June. Israel has blamed Hamas for the teens' deaths, although some doubts remain about the validity of those claims, and the perpetrators of the attack have not yet been officially identified.
In response to suicide bombings and kidnappings carried out by Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups, Israel has spent millions of dollars constructing walls that separate Gaza and the West Bank from Israel. In response, Palestinian militants have dug tunnels to bypass the Israeli border walls. The tunnels are used for smuggling goods and weapons into Gaza from the Sinai Peninsula. They have also been used to infiltrate Israel during attacks, most recently during the current round of fighting in Gaza, and were used in the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit.
Iranian Support for Hamas
In addition to tunnels, Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups have also come to increasingly rely on rockets to counter Israel's defensive walls and to strike the Israeli military and population centers.
At first these rockets were fairly primitive, homemade devices such as the Qassam, which only has a range of 10 kilometers (6 miles). But eventually, Hamas was able to procure manufactured artillery rockets capable of striking targets at longer distances. In 2007, Palestinian militants began to employ Grad rockets smuggled into Gaza via the Sinai Peninsula by Iran, effectively doubling their reach to 20 kilometers.
Iranian support for Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups was again evident in 2012, when Iranian-manufactured Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets were launched into Israel. With ranges of 45 kilometers and 75 kilometers, respectively, these rockets greatly extended the Palestinians' range and target potential. The Fajr-5 can reach Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, placing a large portion of Israel's population at risk of rocket attack.
In the latest round of hostilities, Palestinian militants have employed the Khaibar-1 rocket, which has a range of 160 kilometers, demonstrating that the Iranians have once again fortified the Palestinian rocket arsenal and increased their reach to threaten nearly all of Israel.
During the current offensive, militants have used advanced anti-tank guided missiles provided by Iran to engage Israeli armored forces. They have also demonstrated effective small unit tactics and sniper capabilities, which are difficult to develop independently and are likely the result of Iranian or Hezbollah training.
Recent developments show the importance of Iran's sponsorship of Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Though there has been some evidence that smaller weapons systems such as small arms, man-portable air defense systems and Grad rockets have been smuggled into Gaza from Libya, there is little doubt that without Iranian assistance, Palestinian groups would lack access to advanced training and longer-range artillery rockets that pose an acute threat to Israel.
Through decades of bypassing arms embargoes and supporting militant groups across the globe, Iranian intelligence and military forces have gained a great deal of smuggling experience and have created a very sophisticated transnational network for smuggling arms and weapons components. This has given the sophisticated Israeli intelligence service trouble as it has tried — and failed — to prevent Iran from providing more dangerous weapons to the Palestinian militant groups in Gaza. In recent days, senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have vowed to redouble their efforts to provide arms to Gaza.
Iranian Support for Jihadists in Gaza
So let's return to the replacement of Hamas with a jihadist group in Gaza. If that were to happen, it would very likely reduce, if not end, Iran's sponsorship.
Hamas is a Sunni organization, but it stems from the Muslim Brotherhood tradition, which is not outright hostile to the Shia. Though Hamas' support for Sunni insurgents in Syria has caused quite a bit of tension in its relationship with Iran, Hamas has been rather quiet about its views of Shiism. The Islamic State, on the other hand, is extremely hostile to the Shia. Its recent video releases from Iraq have documented the destruction of Shiite mosques and shrines and the mass executions of captured Shiite prisoners. Jihadists also pose a very real threat to Iran's Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah.
It is hard to imagine that a jihadist entity in Gaza would receive the same amount of support and training that Iran is currently providing to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Without such state sponsorship, the Palestinians would have far less reach and capability.
But Iran is not the only Hamas sponsor that would likely be impacted. Over the past few years, propaganda wars between Hamas and Israel have raged alongside the physical ones. Hamas has become increasingly adept at this propaganda and has been successful in harnessing a great deal of international support and sympathy from other Arab states, moderate Muslims and even secular individuals and non-governmental organizations in the West. It is quite unlikely that a jihadist organization in Gaza could elicit the same type of broad-based international support and sympathy, and Israel would likely face far less criticism for its actions against a jihadist entity in Gaza.
Jihadist ascendency in Gaza would also benefit the Israelis by ensuring that the Palestinians remain divided. Fatah in the West Bank has had serious problems finding common ground with the Hamas leadership, but as developments in Syria illustrate, it is unlikely that a jihadist group in Gaza would ever partner with Fatah.
While there may be some larger strategic implications of jihadist rule in Gaza when Egypt and Jordan are factored in, at the tactical level, a jihadist entity with little international support and state sponsorship may actually be viewed by Israel as the lesser evil in comparison to Hamas.
