The Gaza Strip is eerily quiet following a shootout Aug. 14 between Hamas and the Gaza-based jihadist group Jund Ansar Allah at a mosque in Rafah that left 22 people dead. The clash was triggered after Imam and Jund Ansar Allah leader Abd-al-Latif Musa (aka Abu Noor al Maqdisi), announced during Friday prayers — and in the name of Jund Ansar Allah — the birth of an Islamic emirate in the Gaza Strip. Hamas wasted little time in sending its security forces to the Ibn Taymiyah mosque, where the Jund Ansar Allah militants were holed up. By the end of the shootout, Jund Ansar Allah's leader and top aide were killed, the group was crushed and Hamas was able to reassert its authority in the Gaza Strip. Jund Ansar Allah made its first appearance in Gaza following Hamas' landslide victory in January 2006. Once Hamas made the official jump into the political arena, Jund Ansar Allah had its opening. In the eyes of the more radical Islamist militants in Gaza, Hamas had essentially disqualified itself as a legitimate jihadist group by joining the political process. In addition to Jund Ansar Allah, Hamas has had to contain a number of other rival groups that have popped up in recent years, including Army of Islam, Jund Muhammad, Tawheed and Jihad and Ansar Bet al Maqdes. Jund Ansar Allah is a diverse group. In addition to its Palestinian contingent, its members include a large number of Egyptians, Yemenis and North Africans, according to a STRATFOR source connected to the group. Like other rival groups in the Palestinian Territories, Jund Ansar Allah is in favor of a broader jihadist agenda, one that extends beyond the Palestinian struggle with Israel and advocates the restoration of a transnational Islamic caliphate. Groups like Jund Ansar Allah pose a major liability for Hamas. While al Qaeda and other organizations have been soaking up the jihadist spotlight over the past decade, Hamas has been exceedingly cautious to avoid branding itself as a jihadist group. Hamas' notion of jihad is focused exclusively on Israel. The Israelis already have a low tolerance for Hamas, which refuses to recognize Israel's right to exist but will still negotiate behind the scenes on ceasefires and political settlements to retain authority in the Palestinian Territories. At the same time, the Israelis have zero tolerance for an al Qaeda-like group on its periphery that is free of political constraints and could use Gaza as a staging ground, much like Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan or Iraq, to orchestrate large-scale attacks. Likewise, Egypt will not tolerate a transnational jihadist spillover into its territory from Gaza when it's already dealing with an indigenous Islamist militant threat of its own. If such groups were able to operate in Gaza, the Israelis, backed by the Americans and others, would have the pretext to act with impunity in Gaza to crush the threat. Hamas' political authority would then be undermined and the group would face a serious risk of fracturing, leaving an already fragmented Fatah to pick up the pieces. In other words, the Islamist competition in Gaza boils down to power. Hamas is thus extremely selective in deciding which groups it absorbs into its wider militant umbrella. Groups with similar ideological orientation, like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, are Hamas allies and are useful for carrying out attacks against Israel when Hamas is under political constraints. But if any up-and-coming jihadist group tries to rival Hamas and hijack its militant campaign, Hamas is more likely to stamp it out. Such was the fate of Jund Ansar Allah.