Three explosions rocked the Sinai Peninsula resort town of Dahab on Monday, killing at least 30 people and injuring 160. Egyptian authorities say bombs had been planted in a restaurant, a hotel and a supermarket in a crowded tourist district. The attack appears to be the work of al Qaeda's Egypt node, which has carried out two significant attacks in the Sinai region previously: the bombings at Taba in October 2004 and the Sharm el-Sheikh bombings in July 2005. The Sinai — a drugs- and weapons-smuggling route where illicit trade is key to the residents' economic survival — has provided al Qaeda with a vast desert terrain in which to build up a jihadist infrastructure. Cooperation among segments of the approximately 100,000 Bedouins living in the thousands of square miles between Sharm el-Sheikh and Arish is key to al Qaeda's ability to maintain its outposts in Egypt, the native country of Ayman al-Zawahiri. The strikes at Dahab came only a day after another recording, believed to be by Osama bin Laden, was released. Given the timing, Sinai strikes conceivably could fit into a larger al Qaeda bid to reignite popular support in the region — but the call is not likely to resonate far beyond Egypt's borders. Ideological literature discussing the dynamics of jihadism in Egypt often laments the fact that al Qaeda's Egyptian cells lack the propaganda mechanisms employed by their colleagues elsewhere, and have not been very successful in building popular support for their cause. Though the Egyptian node has staged several spectacular attacks with high casualty rates — beginning with the 1997 Luxor attacks — al Qaeda's efforts to recruit followers for its ideological war largely have came to naught in Egypt. Instead, the moderate Islamist movement — so defined by its willingness to engage in democratic political processes — has been swaying increasing numbers, as seen by the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB's) significant gains in recent polls. Even the MB's more radical counterpart in Egypt, Gama'ah al-Islamiyah — most of whose members have renounced violence, and who Cairo has been freeing from jail since the late 1990s — has been bitterly critical of the direction in which al Qaeda has steered the jihadist movement. It is important to remember that the aims of the core al Qaeda leadership generally do not coincide perfectly with those of local al Qaeda affiliates carrying out attacks in their zones of influence. The Egypt-based node of al Qaeda generally strikes at lightly protected tourist targets — as opposed to "hardened" targets like foreign embassies or commercial targets such as ports and ships — in hopes of destabilizing President Hosni Mubarak's regime. Hitting at such a key sector of the economy is certainly valuable from a tactical perspective, but it does little to serve al Qaeda's wider strategic goals or to expand the organization's influence. And it is at the strategic level that the core leadership — what we refer to as "al Qaeda prime" — concerns itself, seeking to open new fronts in regions that carry great symbolic value in the Muslim world. One such location, of course, would be the Palestinian territories. Al Qaeda affiliates long have been monitoring the security conditions there, and there are concerns that conditions following the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza provide an opportunity for the jihadists to move into the region and strike directly at the Jewish state. Given the financial crisis facing the Hamas-led government and with thousands of Palestinians not drawing paychecks, al Qaeda theoretically should find no shortage of disaffected people needing to vent their anger against Israel. But there is an obstacle in al Qaeda's path: Hamas. Hamas has no interest in seeing its resistance campaign hijacked by jihadists. The core strategy of Hamas has been to split Israel from the United States and European Union as much as possible, enabling it to move forward with its political agenda. Obviously, the group has run into serious financial complications, but no variables have shifted in the equation that would alter the way Hamas leaders will deal with al Qaeda operatives attempting to make a foray in the territories. Aligning with al Qaeda and internationalizing Hamas' conflict with Israel would significantly hamper Hamas' plans to evolve into a political movement, with a militant arm to fall back on once Washington gets involved. What's more, Hamas is all too aware of this. So it should come as no surprise that Hamas immediately rejected bin Laden's message of support April 23, when he used the West's cessation of financial aid to the Palestinian National Authority as cause to denounce the "Zionist-Crusaders war on Islam." Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri responded by saying that his group was "interested in good relations with the West." It was not the first time Hamas has tried to distance itself from messages of good will by al Qaeda leaders — but Zuhri did point out that the growing frustration in the territories very well could be an inroad for al Qaeda in the region if Hamas is not given sufficient means to govern Gaza and the West Bank effectively. With Hamas nowhere near ready to relinquish its control, and with other Islamist forces becoming more entrenched in the Middle East, it seems that al Qaeda must bide its time and seek other routes around the ideological impasse that limits its growth and influence.