Hamas possesses Iranian-made Fajr-5 rockets, which have a range of roughly 75 kilometers. Recently, Hamas has claimed that rockets launched at Jerusalem on Nov. 16 were locally made rockets that various Hamas representatives were calling M-75s, Grad 75s or Grad 76s.
If Hamas has indeed developed the capability to independently develop long-range rockets, then the dynamic of this conflict shifts dramatically. It would be one thing for Israel Defense Forces to eliminate a finite number of rockets that have been successfully smuggled into Gaza. The rockets themselves are massive — roughly 6 meters (approximately 20 feet) long and some 900 kilograms (roughly 2,000 pounds) in weight — and are thus highly vulnerable to detection once deployed. It would be quite another for the Israeli military to attempt to eliminate the rockets along with manufacturing facilities that, while they would need to be industrial-size and thus more vulnerable to detection than simple storage sites, would likely be located deep inside urban population centers in Gaza. Israeli intelligence about the number of long-range rockets Hamas possesses would become even more questionable, and Israel would have to contend with a long-term threat of Hamas locally assembling rockets capable of reaching Israel's core cities.
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It is important to keep in mind the difference in capabilities required to produce a longer-range rocket versus a short-range Qassam rocket. Industrial-size facilities and professional weapons manufacturers are needed to produce longer-range rockets along the lines of the Fajr-5 for maximum range and accuracy. For example, longer-range rockets require a nozzle made of materials (such as steel with a high carbon content or graphite) that can withstand heat exhaust and stabilize the rocket's flight path. This would require production in controlled conditions by professional weapons manufacturers for maximum precision in constructing the body of the rocket. Inconsistencies in weight and uneven surfaces of the solid propellant can make a dramatic difference in the burn rate and the stability of the rocket once in flight. In short, the manufacturing of long-range rockets requires industrial standards that cannot be met in an underground warehouse with a highly vulnerable supply chain, as would be the case in Gaza. In contrast, shorter-range rockets can function without a nozzle, and they can be assembled relatively quickly with some basic steel welding in suboptimal conditions using materials more easily obtainable within Gaza.
Stratfor has learned that while there are deeply buried manufacturing sites in Gaza for Qassam-type short-range rockets, the Fajr-5s are not locally produced. The Fajr-5 rockets that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have been launching toward Tel Aviv and Jerusalem were likely smuggled from Sudan through the Sinai Peninsula. Iranian manufacturers have been suspected of setting up manufacturing facilities in Sudan, hence the presumed Israeli airstrike on the Yarmouk munitions factory in Sudan on Oct. 23. Given their large size, the Fajr-5s are typically smuggled one at a time and in separate parts. Following the example of Hezbollah's preparations in the Second Lebanon War in 2006, Hamas relies on an extensive underground tunnel system to assemble the rockets. According to a Stratfor source, Iran trained several Palestinian technicians on how to assemble the Fajr-5s, and there are likely a few of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force operatives in Gaza for this purpose. The Palestinians likely gave the assembled rockets the M-75 name to support the claim that they were locally manufactured. In the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah did something similar when it started calling the Fajr-5s that it had acquired to target Haifa the "Khaibar-1."
Though Hamas is unlikely to have the capability to manufacture the Fajr-5s locally, Israel still faces a major intelligence dilemma in determining how many rockets Hamas has at its disposal to threaten Israeli cities — and whether that constitutes enough of a threat to warrant the ground incursion for which it has been preparing. Since the Fajr-5s are highly detectable, Hamas (again, similar to Hezbollah's tactics in 2006) tends to launch one rocket and then immediately conceal the 11-meter-long launcher (and crew) in an underground tunnel.
Hamas now has two options. Even less frequent Fajr-5 attacks can call into question Israeli claims that it has destroyed 90 percent of Hamas' arsenal, though the Palestinian organization would still risk inviting a ground incursion. If Hamas wants to avoid an Israeli invasion, it could choose to go quiet and cease launching rockets, allowing Israel to believe that it has decimated Hamas' arsenal and rely on defenses such as the upgraded Iron Dome battery recently deployed to Tel Aviv to protect against remaining Fajr-5 threats. Hamas could wait for Israel to demobilize (thereby reducing the potential for Israel to respond with a ground invasion) before firing another long-range rocket to achieve a symbolic victory by demonstrating that Israel's military superiority can be effectively challenged. The rate of Fajr-5 attacks in the coming hours will be revealing about which path Hamas pursues.
