Honduras' general election will determine whether the country's economic policies keep left or swing to the right, but regardless, legislative gridlock will likely constrain policymaking, and accusations of electoral irregularities will raise the risk of unrest and political instability. Honduras will hold a general election on Nov. 30, with voters selecting a new president, vice president, all 128 members of the unicameral National Congress and local mayoral positions. The presidential candidate with the most votes will win, regardless of whether they receive over 50% of the vote. Current President Xiomara Castro of the left-wing Liberty and Refoundation (Libre) party is not seeking reelection, instead backing her close ally Rixi Moncada on the Libre ticket. Salvador Nasralla, who formerly served as Castro's vice president from 2022 to 2024 before resigning to run for the presidency, is running under the centrist Liberal Party. Finally, former Tegucigalpa Mayor Nasry Asfura is running under the right-wing National Party. Polling for the election has been uneven, but generally indicates that Moncada and Nasralla have higher support than Asfura. A large percentage of voters remain undecided in the run-up to the vote, with a poll by Le Vote/Instituto de la Justicia conducted from Oct. 22 to 27 finding 34% were still undecided. Newly elected officials will take office on Jan. 27, 2026. 

• President Castro is not seeking reelection due to ostensible constitutional term limits; however, in April 2015, the Supreme Court of Justice of Honduras overturned articles prohibiting presidential reelection. This allowed former President Juan Orlando Hernandez of the National Party to controversially seek and win a second term in the 2017 elections. Despite the overturned articles, many Hondurans, particularly within the Libre party, continue to view reelection as unconstitutional, and the legality remains uncertain. 
• Castro won the presidency in the 2021 elections, defeating Asfura. Her election removed the National Party from power for the first time in 12 years, and was the first time a party other than the National Party or the Liberal Party (or their predecessors) has won the presidential election. 
• The other two presidential candidates, Mario Enrique Rivera Callejas of the center-right Christian Democratic Party of Honduras and Jorge Nelson Avila Gutierrez of the center-left Innovation and Unity Party, are also running, but they typically poll under 5% together.

Campaigning has been dominated by inequality, insecurity and corruption, and recent months have seen rising uncertainty over the legitimacy of the vote. Though Honduras has experienced moderately strong economic growth in recent years — reporting 3.6% annual gross domestic product growth in 2024, with expected 3.5% growth in 2025 according to the World Bank — the country has continued to face severe levels of economic inequality, with approximately half of the population living in poverty in 2025. Furthermore, though the country's unemployment rate was only 6.1% in 2024, Honduras has a highly informal job market, with private sector lobbying organization Consejo Hondureno de la Empresa Privada reporting in July 2025 that 82.5% of working Hondurans are informally employed. Polling indicates unemployment and the economy are significant concerns for Honduran voters. Meanwhile, Honduras continues to face one of the highest levels of violent crime in the Western Hemisphere due to the presence of Salvadoran gangs, Mexican cartels and local criminal organizations. Though the Honduran government has substantially reduced violence in recent years, with the official annual homicide rate falling from 34.4 per 100,000 people in 2023 to 25.3 per 100,000 people in 2024, violent crime and extortion remain a significant concern in most of the country. Similar to other Central American countries, Honduras faces high levels of government corruption and criminality, with all three major political parties repeatedly implicated in corruption scandals over the last decade, which is a significant source of frustration among voters. Of particular significance, in late 2024, a video became public that allegedly showed President Castro's brother-in-law meeting with drug traffickers in 2013 and discussing campaign funds. Finally, the election also faces uncertainty around the legitimacy of the vote due to previous electoral irregularities and Libre lawmakers' move in October to create the National Congress Permanent Commission, a temporary commission assuming legislative duties during the election period, which opposition parties criticized as an illegal maneuver by the ruling party intended to allow Libre to replace election authorities and interfere with the results. The commission began its duties on Nov. 1 and is scheduled to end on Jan. 20, 2026, a week before the new president and other elected officials take office.

• Polling from Sept. 29 to Oct. 8 by Le Vote/Instituto de la Justicia found that 30% of voters thought employment should be the new government's top priority. The same poll found 18% of voters thought the government's top priority should be corruption, 17% education, 17% healthcare and 10% crime. 
• El Salvador-based gangs MS-13 and Barrio 18 have increased their presence in Honduras in recent years amid the implementation of a massive anti-gang state of emergency in neighboring El Salvador, which reportedly pushed many gang members into the country to escape arrest. The drop in homicides in 2024 is likely largely due to the Castro government's imposition of the country's own state of emergency in November 2022; however, human rights organizations and critics have alleged that the crackdown has allowed security forces to operate with impunity.
• Honduran elections are often marred by allegations of election fraud. For example, when Hernandez controversially won reelection in 2017, the Organization of American States said there were numerous irregularities. Primary elections in March 2025 saw severe logistical failures, and there have been repeated reports of errors in the voter registry system ahead of the Nov. 30 vote. 
• In addition to allegations that her Libre party is attempting to manipulate the election results, President Castro alleged on Oct. 29 that rivals are plotting a "criminal conspiracy" to steal the election. Meanwhile, on Nov. 9, Moncada cast doubt on the legitimacy of the election results transmission system, saying she would not accept the results issued by the National Electoral Council following the vote. 

A Nasralla presidency would focus on job creation and a more pro-business agenda, while a Moncada government would adhere to current, more leftist policies, but regardless of who wins, legislative gridlock will constrain executive authority. Based on current polling, Nasralla is slightly more likely to win given his wider appeal across the political spectrum (which will likely make him popular among undecided voters) and popular frustration with Libre's corruption scandals. His government's main focus would be job creation and efforts to stimulate private sector investment. A Nasralla government would also further expand counter-crime efforts, as he has promised to implement a crackdown similar to El Salvador's. Nasralla has expressed a desire to improve relations with the United States, and his government would likely consider reducing ties with China. By contrast, a Moncada administration would adhere to the current government's agenda, with a focus on expanding social programs and addressing wealth inequality, including by implementing leftist policies, which she describes as "democratizing the economy," likely including expanded taxes on the private sector to increase government revenue. Moncada would be unlikely to go out of her way to antagonize the U.S. Trump administration given Honduras' reliance on exports to the United States, but she would also be unlikely to withdraw her support for the government of Venezuela or to exchange relations with China for those with Taiwan. Both issues have a moderate potential of resulting in coercive U.S. actions against Honduras, including in the form of expanded tariffs, sanctions on government officials and/or military operations against criminal groups designated as terrorist organizations. Regardless, the ability of either president to govern will be constrained by likely gridlock in the National Congress, as it is unlikely that any of the three parties will achieve a legislative majority on their own. While this is unlikely to disrupt security operations, it will constrain the economic policies of the incoming government if divisions are particularly severe. 

• Asfura is unlikely to win the presidency, given the persisting high opposition to the National Party due to corruption allegations and controversy related to former President Hernandez, who, after leaving office in 2022, was extradited to the United States on drug trafficking charges and was later found guilty and sentenced to 45 years in prison. In the low-likelihood scenario that Asfura does win, his government would focus on attracting private investment, and though his government would likely attempt to roll back social spending, in practice, he would likely face challenges due to both protests and pushback from rivals in the legislature. He would also shift from the current government by reengaging with Taiwan and breaking ties with China, improving relations with the United States. 
• Corruption challenges are deep-seated in Honduras, and it is highly unlikely that any government efforts will significantly reduce corruption within the next few years, meaning compliance challenges for operations in Honduras will persist over the long term. 

Regardless of who wins the presidency, unrest and political instability will likely persist over the postelection period, with the low-likelihood, high-risk possibility of an extralegal attempt to prevent the new government from taking power. Political figures will continue to allege that their rivals are attempting to steal the election in the weeks ahead of the vote, and at least some will likely do so afterward. These allegations will likely trigger mass protests in Tegucigalpa and potentially other major cities in the days following the announcement of the results, as well as potentially around the Jan. 27 inauguration. Unrest would create safety threats to bystanders and logistical challenges for businesses, as previously seen during the 2017 election period. Given the scale of preelection tensions, there is also the low-likelihood, high-impact potential for the Libre party, a rival political party or the military to try to prevent the winner from taking power or even stage a coup. This would significantly raise political instability and unrest risks in 2026, creating safety threats for companies' local staff and uncertainty around future operating conditions.

• Honduras has experienced multiple coups, with the most recent occurring in 2009 against former President Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales, President Castro's husband. Zelaya was a member of the Liberal Party and after taking office in 2006 shifted further left. On June 28, 2009, the Honduran Armed Forces launched a coup against him, successfully removing him from office and exiling him to Costa Rica. Zelaya later returned to Honduras, and he has been active in the Castro government.