For the 77 years since the State of Israel's founding, the question of Palestine's future has fueled many, if not most, major conflicts in the Middle East. Those who argue it should be a single state have traditionally also advocated for the destruction of Israel along the way, spurring the great Israeli-Arab wars of the past, and the Hamas-led Oct. 7 assault in 2023. Proponents of a single Palestinian state have traditionally also advocated for Israel's destruction, spurring the great Israeli-Arab wars of the past, and the Hamas-led Oct. 7 assault in 2023. Conversely, those pushing for a two-state solution, while seemingly offering a path to compromise and peace, have failed to find a path to defuse the revanchism of far-right Palestinians and the expansionist aims of far-right Israelis. This has inadvertently given ground to these very same one-state advocates, who prefer to use war to achieve their aims. But neither Israeli nor Palestinian far-right factions have enough power behind them to fully implement their goals. Instead, current conflict dynamics suggest an uneasy ''one-and-a-half-state'' solution will instead emerge, which could reduce drivers of violence, though it might also deepen the West's isolation of Israel.
The Elusive Vision of a Palestinian State
Palestine's future is a particularly tricky subject, as even among Palestinians, the very idea of Palestine is not universally agreed upon. Deep disagreements have long hampered the Palestinian national project; even in its early days, as it developed during the Arab Revolt of 1936-39, these questions were being asked. Is it a pan-Arab state, a Muslim state, a secular state, a religious one? As the years went by and after repeated military defeats, many accepted that compromise with Israel would also be a prerequisite — but what kind of compromise, exactly?
Contrary to the claims of some far-right Israelis (like Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich), there is such a thing as a Palestinian nation, united by its common belief that an Arab-controlled state should exist somewhere within the former British mandate. Linguistically, religiously and culturally, existing ties differentiate Palestinians from Egyptians, Syrians, Lebanese, and Jordanians. But there are also real internal differences — produced by both the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself, as well as the geography and history of the eastern Mediterranean — that make a united vision of Palestine very difficult to achieve.
Much like other communities in the Levant, Palestinians are diverse. Politically, they encompass secularists, Islamists, pan-Arabists, liberals and conservatives. They practice various forms of Sunni Islam, while roughly 50,000 comprise a Christian minority. There are the people of the West Bank and the people of Gaza, who have not been able to travel freely between the two zones for decades, in addition to numerous familial, tribal, and local differences. And then there are some 2.1 million Israeli Palestinians, who enjoy full political rights in Israel, though some of whom still reject Israel despite living in it, while others serve in its government and military. For many Palestinians, politics is both national and hyperlocal, driven by their proximity to Israeli power and how that proximity impacts their day-to-day experience. And lastly, Palestinian politics itself is deeply fractured, the product of the Hamas-Fatah rivalry that led to civil war in 2006-7 and eventually saw the Gaza Strip fall under Hamas control and the West Bank under Fatah's. That Palestinians don't agree on their future is the reasonable outcome of such deep geographic, tribal and political divisions.
The One State, Two State Solutions
At the beginning of the Israeli-Arab conflict in the 1920s and 1930s, most Palestinian and Arab leaders wanted a single Arab state to replace the British mandate and then Israel after 1948, and favored war to achieve that aim. This view remains even today, with Hamas still claiming it wants a single, Islamist, Arab state to rule Palestine. Such a viewpoint inherently leads to a strategy of armed conflict and attrition, where the goal is to wear down a stronger Israel through cycles of violence and international isolation until it collapses.
But Palestinians' repeated military setbacks led many to discredit the idea of a single state. And so, the modern two-state solution outlined in the 1990s Oslo Accords, itself rooted in the 1948 U.N. partition proposal, emerged as the hope for pragmatists. This approach seeks Palestinian independence alongside Israel, with the aim of fulfilling Palestinian national and political aspirations. It is believed this could ultimately weaken or even eliminate the underlying drivers of conflict, thereby establishing stability and security in the Levant for the first time in decades. Most Arab powers and, according to polls, many Palestinians would take this option to escape the cycle of war.
But even if Palestinians can overcome entrenched divisions, a future for Palestine requires Israeli buy-in, and the two-state solution runs up against the block of Israeli ideological and strategic aims. Compared with Hamas, Israel's extreme right-wing is as maximalist in its demands. These far-right Israelis believe their country has the right to most, if not all, of the former mandate, and therefore have never believed in a Palestinian state. Meanwhile, Israel's defense establishment worries that a Palestinian state would repeat the history of the Gaza Strip, falling prey to a one-state, violent movement like Hamas, should it ever gain full sovereignty. As a result, the two-state solution has long been sabotaged by recurrent right-wing Israeli governments almost as soon as it began in 1993 under the Oslo Accords.
But if the one-state solution cannot be achieved (because Israel is too strong militarily), and the two-state solution cannot be achieved (because Israel's imperatives push its governments to block it, and because Palestinian divisions make a two-state solution less viable), then what is the future of the Palestinian movement — and the Palestinians themselves?
For now, the baseline is that even after the current war in Gaza eventually ends, the Palestinians will remain in limbo, torn between one-state revanchists like Hamas and ineffective pragmatists advocating for a two-state solution that Israel won't allow. That status suggests that future rounds of violence, whether in Gaza or the West Bank, are inevitable, triggered by an as-yet-unknown event that compels Palestinians back to widespread fighting.
But some trends suggest this may not be the case in the long run, as Israel is no longer content to merely manage the Palestinians in military occupation. Israelis are actively building settlements so deep into the West Bank that annexation will be in many ways de facto (and perhaps, one day, de jure through formal status changes). That is because these settlements already operate under Israeli civil law, and settlers expect the same security as if they were in Israel proper. Even as the current government punts on formal annexation again, the reality on the ground is that Israeli control in parts of the West Bank is now so entrenched that Palestinian cities are increasingly being cut off from one another. This ''Swiss cheese'' approach of control is already severely weakening the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority (PA), the one institution that has been able to keep the West Bank from joining Gaza in outright war since Hamas' Oct. 7 attack on Israel. Eventually, without a revised Israeli strategy for controlling the West Bank, the PA's authority could erode to the point that it no longer functions, potentially leading to cities falling under the control of Hamas or another group that is just as radical.
The One-and-a-Half-State Solution?
But if not a second state, then what? With Israel facing growing global pressure to jettison the status quo and provide at least limited autonomy to Palestinians, there is something that might be called the one-and-a-half-state solution. In this vision, Israel would establish reservation-style territories for Palestinian residents in the West Bank and Gaza while controlling strategic transport corridors and settlements. Under such a system, the Palestinian Authority would be dissolved, replaced by a combination of Israeli police and military forces alongside Palestinian civil and political officials. Here, Palestinians would have autonomy within specified zones, such as urban areas and relatively unwanted lands. They could set their taxes, attract investment and pass laws, but would have very limited security autonomy and would not control their borders, airspace or waters. They would remain reliant on Israel for security and unable to block Israeli military operations, including a potential invasion if Hamas or another extremist group gains ground in an autonomous zone. In short, this vision would look almost imperial in nature: an Israeli core would govern the unincorporated Palestinian periphery, seeing them as residents rather than as citizens, content to allow them limited economic and social autonomy but not political or strategic sovereignty.
Another version of the one-and-a-half-state solution would involve Israel annexing and naturalizing segments of the Palestinian population, such as its Christians, or West Bank towns like Bethlehem (which, for geographic and religious reasons, is already more tied to Israel's economy), in an effort to offset international pressure for a Palestinian state and further diminish the West Bank's Palestinian population. This strategy would not go so far as to upset the delicate Jewish-to-Arab balance inside Israel itself, nor would it invite in communities that are too far right to function as Israeli citizens. And while such a move would inevitably invite criticism from some corners, naturalizing Palestinians as full Israeli citizens with all the same rights would at least somewhat undermine critics who argue Israel is practicing anti-Arab apartheid, while also segmenting out more radical communities into autonomous zones that could be more harshly policed. It is hard to see a far-right or right-wing Israeli government going along with such a naturalization plan, as they favor more extreme alternatives. But a center-right or even centrist government, eager to offset international criticism but not eager to embrace a full Palestinian state, may one day consider such a measure.
The one-and-a-half-state solution would keep some of the causes of conflict intact, but the path chosen will influence how strong they are. For Palestinians, the lack of sovereignty and national self-determination are ongoing issues fueling conflict. However, if they gain limited autonomy over daily matters, these causes, including radicalization, could become less severe. Under a technocratic, reservation-style solution that promotes some economic growth in the Palestinian territories, these conflict drivers could decrease even more. While it is hard to imagine today, if Palestinian cities become sufficiently safe and functioning enough to attract investment and tourism, it could help lift Palestinians out of poverty and reduce their reliance on external aid, moving the population toward a more middle-class lifestyle.
Still, the lack of full sovereignty means radicals like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad would continue to find followers, albeit fewer ones. If Israel proceeds to annex and naturalize some limited numbers of Palestinians, the population base from which militants could draw would be smaller (and therefore provide fewer recruits). This is because these citizens would become part of Israel's political body, increasing their incentives to align with its economic and security interests rather than Palestine's.
International Implications of a Half-State Future
But while this one-and-a-half-state solution would not entirely resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it would change the geography, weaken the drivers, diminish its scale and raise the threshold for violent escalation. A partial state solution would also temper, though not diminish, the risk of a wider regional conflict. Iran, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and others would continue to advocate for war with Israel, but would have weaker allies on the ground in Palestine itself, and fewer triggers for escalation as the drivers of violence abate. Meanwhile, more pro-Israel Arab powers like Saudi Arabia might be appeased by a partial state solution to normalize ties with Israel, or at least deepen relations. States that are already comparatively friendly with Israel, like Egypt, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, would also face less domestic pressure to isolate the country due to the marginal economic and security improvements brought about by the half-state solution.
However, this does not mean Israel would be out of the woods of isolation. Instead, it might well be that Israel's real challenge could come from its great power patron, the United States, and Europe, where seismic change in political sentiment is underway. Western nations are no longer as focused on Israeli security, as they face bigger issues in Europe and Asia. And as Israel becomes less relevant to their geopolitical interests, and as the Palestinian ''reservation system'' continues to produce its own minor outrages of dignity and disruption, the United States and European countries will be freer to isolate or restrict relations with Israel to pressure it into offering more political concessions to the Palestinians. A half-state would not close the political values gap between the more liberal West and the increasingly religious-nationalist identity of Israel, nor offer the West a strong strategic advantage in its core regional interests of controlling extremism and securing energy and trade. Instead, this half measure could embolden critics who argue that if Israel can offer a half-state, why not a full one? Ironically, Israel's drift toward a half measure might just strengthen the very diplomatic trends in the West it aims to head off.
