Saudi Arabia's pursuit of uranium enrichment will likely remain a sticking point in U.S.-Saudi-Israel talks, which could push the kingdom to deepen its ties with China, as evidenced by Riyadh's recent talks with Beijing over a potential nuclear plant. According to an Aug. 25 report published by The Wall Street Journal, Saudi officials are considering a Chinese bid to build a civilian nuclear power plant in the kingdom, partially in the hopes of pressuring the White House to grant concessions on Riyadh's nuclear energy goals. The report comes after several Western news outlets reported earlier in August that the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel are negotiating a mega-deal that would see Saudi Arabia recognize Israel in exchange for increased U.S. security guarantees and a civilian nuclear energy deal. U.S. President Joe Biden is also considering a face-to-face meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on the sidelines of the Sept. 9-10 Group of 20 (G-20) summit in New Delhi, India.

• U.S. officials have stressed that a broad U.S.-Saudi-Israel agreement will be complicated to finalize and that they are only now starting to negotiate specific details of the deal, which they hope to hammer out over the next 9-12 months.
• Meanwhile, the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) on Aug. 24 invited Saudi Arabia and five other countries to join their bloc starting on Jan. 1, 2024. China has led the BRICS expansion project.

For the United States, a mega-deal with Israel and Saudi Arabia would enable it to better concentrate on its strategic rival China, which Riyadh is seeking to exploit by demanding significant security and nuclear concessions as part of the agreement. The United States is hoping to use the mega-deal to limit Saudi Arabia from furthering its relationship with China, which has blossomed in recent years amid Beijing and Riyadh's growing strategic alignment (with the former in need of Saudi oil to fuel its economic development, and the latter in need of new foreign partners to reduce its reliance on the United States). As part of the U.S.-Israel-Saudi mega-deal, Washington is reportedly considering stipulations that would bar Riyadh from pricing its oil in yuan, restrict the kingdom's use of Chinese communications technology (like Huawei's 5G equipment), and disallow a Chinese military presence on Saudi soil. Several of these conditions run counter to Saudi Arabia's strategic interests in pursuing closer ties with China and Russia in a multipolar world, particularly as the United States and Europe continue to raise concerns about Saudi human rights violations and seek to reduce their consumption of fossil fuels — the bedrock of the Saudi economy. As a result, Riyadh will likely only agree to put guardrails on its relationship with China in exchange for significant security and nuclear concessions that would effectively make it impossible for the United States to criticize Saudi Arabia's human rights record or sanction the country for any reason due to defense commitments. In the face of Iran's continued nuclear development, Saudi Arabia would also likely insist that the United States either: 1) allow the kingdom to control enrichment so that it could develop nuclear weapons, 2) sign a defense agreement that would bring the United States to Saudi Arabia's aid in the event of a conflict, or 3) potentially bring Saudi Arabia under the U.S. nuclear umbrella where the United States would promise to defend Saudi Arabia using its own nuclear weapons in the event of an Iranian nuclear attack on Saudi Arabia.

• In addition to potentially joining BRICS, Saudi Arabia joined the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a dialogue partner in March. 
• China mediated an Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization in March, showing its growing influence in the region.
• Although the Biden administration has walked back promises to review its relationship with Saudi Arabia due to human rights abuses, the United States will likely continue to be more mindful of human rights, press freedoms and democratic rights over the long term. This means differences between the United States and Saudi Arabia will remain.
• Saudi Arabia and China have expressed some skepticism toward the fast-paced energy transition away from fossil fuels. For example, Saudi Arabia and China aim to achieve net-zero emissions in 2060, which is 10 years later than most Western countries, including the United States. Moreover, the United States has become far less reliant on Saudi oil, whereas Saudi Arabia's exports to Asia now represent 76% of its total oil exports, with China importing between 1.5 to 2 million barrels per day each month.

The United States remains highly unlikely to let Saudi Arabia enrich uranium, reducing the prospects of a deal on the matter. One of the United States' core interests in the Middle East is limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But giving Saudi Arabia the functional ability to enrich uranium makes it more likely that the kingdom will develop nuclear weapons in the future without U.S. permission, exacerbating what would likely be a regional nuclear arms race between Iran, Saudi Arabia and potentially Egypt or Turkey. In 2018, the Saudi crown prince said that his country would ''without a doubt'' develop nuclear weapons if Iran did. However, to do so, Saudi Arabia would need to be able to enrich its own uranium as global enrichment powers like the United States would not transfer enriched uranium to Saudi Arabia for weapons development purposes. Saudi Arabia also does not have the capability to build nuclear power plants itself. And under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the United States can only export nuclear technology to countries that have signed a so-called 123 Agreement with nine nonproliferation criteria that must be met, including a prohibition on enriching or reprocessing without U.S. consent. But while Saudi Arabia could sign such an agreement, the U.S. Congress could overturn it if the deal is seen as not providing enough limits on Saudi nuclear activity. 

• Several recent 123 Agreements — including with Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam — have included a so-called ''gold provision'' in which the country involved agrees to forgo enriching or reprocessing uranium. In 2018, when then-President Trump was rumored to be exploring a potential weak 123 Agreement with Saudi Arabia, bipartisan legislation was quickly introduced to increase potential oversight of any such deal. This would likely occur again if the White House pursues a new 123 Agreement with Riyadh that doesn't include a ''gold provision'' or is otherwise widely seen as weak.

Without a nuclear deal involving enrichment, Saudi Arabia will likely demand concrete U.S. security guarantees, but several obstacles may keep them from materializing. If Saudi Arabia were to give up control of enrichment, it would still need a deterrent to protect itself from the nuclear threat posed by Iran, which has shown no interest in giving up its enrichment rights in nuclear talks with the West. But the only way for Saudi Arabia to establish the same level of deterrence would be through signing a defense treaty that brings the kingdom under the U.S. nuclear shield. However, Saudi Arabia and the United States have different values, government systems and levels of personal freedom, unlike virtually every other country with which the United States shares a defense treaty. A defense deal would also require the United States to place a significant amount of trust in the soon-to-be 38-year-old Crown Prince Mohammed, who has already in Washington's eyes proven to be a troublesome partner and reckless in some of his foreign policy endeavors (including the 2017-21 blockade and embargo of neighboring Qatar, home to the United States' Al Udeid Air Base, forward headquarters for the United States Central Command, or CENTCOM). Additionally, two-thirds of the U.S. Senate would need to approve a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia, which would be a tall order given that Congress has been more critical of the kingdom in recent years than the White House.

If it can't reach an agreement with the United States, Saudi Arabia may entertain a nuclear pact with China, but inking such a deal may still prove too risky for both Riyadh and Beijing. If the United States and Saudi Arabia do not reach an agreement on nuclear or defense agreements, the mega-deal with Israel may fall apart. To fulfill its desire for a nuclear deterrent, this could see Saudi Arabia turn toward China, which would not enforce as many proliferation restrictions as part of a nuclear deal compared with the United States. But such a deal has remained elusive, despite Riyadh and Beijing having had multiple opportunities to reach a nuclear agreement in recent years amid slowing talks with the United States and its allies. This is in part because China does not want to exacerbate a nuclear arms race in the Middle East (the source of most of China's crude oil imports), which means that even if Beijing allows Riyadh to be involved in the enrichment process, it may seek an informal promise from Saudi Arabia to not enrich uranium for military purposes. Moreover, a nuclear agreement with China would undermine Saudi Arabia's vital defense ties with the United States. While China is a growing economic partner, Saudi Arabia's overall defense relationship with China remains relatively limited and is nowhere near the level where it could adequately replace the kingdom's robust defense partnership with the United States. Given this, Riyadh may decide that it's better off not angering Washington than signing a deal with China.

• Saudi Arabia could also try to sign an agreement with another enrichment power, but most other exporters of nuclear technology, like South Korea, would also require limitations on Saudi Arabia's enrichment capabilities. While Russian nuclear power company Rosatom may be willing to forego strict enrichment limits, Western sanctions would make cooperation with Russia difficult for Saudi Arabia.