In Mali, a Coup at the Core of the Sahel's Counterterrorism Fight

What Happened

The overthrow of Mali's president in a military coup casts further doubt over the county's ability to sustain counterterrorism efforts, and while the new junta is promising national elections, longstanding civil-military tensions suggest international pressure will be instrumental in shaping the timeline for government formation. President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita announced his resignation around midnight local time on Aug. 19 after being arrested by members of the military earlier in the day along with a number of other officials. Keita also announced that he was dissolving the country's national assembly and the cabinet. Members of the junta, which is calling itself the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), appeared on state media and announced that they would close international borders and implement a curfew. The group said that they were "not keen on taking power" but wanted to ensure stability so that they could organize general elections within a "reasonable time limit." The CNSP also said that it would respect all international agreements, including those related to security with France, that Mali had signed.

On Aug. 19, CNSP members, including its leader Colonel Assimi Goita, met with Imam Mahmoud Dicko, the Salafi cleric and inspirational leader behind three months of protests against Keita, to discuss the potential formation of a civilian-led transitional government.
Dicko's spokesperson has said that he plans to withdraw from politics, but he will likely continue to play an influential role behind the scenes as the formation and transitional process continues.
International partners have so far condemned the CNSP's coup. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has frozen financial flows and trade with Mali, cut Mali off from its internal-decision making bodies and closed its borders. The other leaders of the Group of Five (G5) Sahel Force, including Nigerien President Mahamadou Issoufou and Chadian President Idriss Deby, have also called for Keita's release. The 55-member African Union has suspended Mali's membership in the bloc as well.

Political Implications

The political transition process is likely to draw on previous, post-coup government formation efforts in Mali, which will probably precipitate disagreements among military and civilian political leaders regarding election timelines, the exact structure of a transitional government, and the military's role in the process. Although Dicko has emerged as the main leader behind the protest movements against the Keita-led government in recent months, he and other opposition leaders have differing priorities. Dicko is viewed as more politically moderate than members of the opposition Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5-RFP) party, and may accept the inclusion of former Keita administration officials in a transitional government. But his powerful influence and criticism of France's involvement in Mali may also lead to disagreements with the new junta, as the military depends on French support.

It remains unclear to what extent, if any, the CNSP coordinated with opposition figures before launching their operation to remove Keita. But the CNSP's overthrow nonetheless successfully tapped into the widespread opposition to Keita in Mali's capital of Bamako, with protesters lauding his removal.
Capitalizing on popular discontent over France's seven-year presence in the country, Dicko and the opposition have also become increasingly critical of Paris' role in Mali, including French mediation of the domestic political disagreements in which Dicko was involved.

Security Implications

Keita's downfall risks undermining French-led efforts to contain jihadist activity in the region by creating more space for international terrorism cooperation among the radical groups, including local al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates. The Malian military works with neighboring countries, the United Nations and France on several counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations in the region, including France's Operation Barkhane and the French-led G5 Sahel Force, as well as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). These efforts are heavily concentrated in central and western Mali against both al Qaeda's Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). While the most significant risk of increased terrorist activity is in Mali itself, reduced cooperation as a result of Keita's forced exit will also undermine counterterrorism efforts in both Burkina Faso and Niger.

The African Union and ECOWAS' decision to suspend some of their ties with Mali could complicate counterterrorism efforts in the near term, and if sustained, could significantly limit Mali's efforts to develop and offer any kind of independent capacity in mitigating the region's deteriorating security situation.
Less effective regional counterterrorism efforts could also enable easier transfers of fighters and funds to groups in northwestern Nigeria, which has seen a surge of militant activity this year in addition to the continuing violence from the Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP).