Scattered protests emerged across Algeria after President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika announced his intent to run for a fourth term Feb. 22. Indeed, thousands have rallied to oppose his candidacy in the April 17 election. Bouteflika has led Algeria since 1999 but suffers from serious health problems, which have led some to speculate that he is unfit to lead Algeria for another five-year term. Six candidates are currently campaigning, but Bouteflika is expected to win, since many Algerians see him as the only candidate able to preserve stability and manage competing power factions within the regime.
Algeria's neighbors in North Africa and energy customers in Europe are closely monitoring the election process; stability in Algeria is critical to the balance of power in the region and to the continued exports of oil and natural gas. Although the ongoing protests have not gained enough traction to seriously hurt Bouteflika's chances of re-election, growing public frustration over widespread corruption, high unemployment and inequality for ethnic minorities will present serious challenges for Bouteflika and his party as they seek to maintain their grip on power and stabilize the country.
After Arab Spring protests deposed leaders in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, Bouteflika resorted to public spending campaigns to help fend off protests against rising price levels, high youth unemployment, a shortage of housing and a lack of minority rights. For its part, the Algerian population was also wary of political unrest after a civil war (1991-2002) claimed the lives of 200,000 people.
But as the elections draw near, several pro-democracy parties and the three largest Islamists parties — including the Movement for the Society of Peace, the Algerian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood — have formed an opposition front because they believe the outcome of the election was decided before campaigning began. Despite a protest ban passed during a nation-wide state of emergency in 2001, opposition protests began at the end of February, calling for Bouteflika to step aside and for people to boycott the election.
Political and Ethnic Protests
Students, rights activists, journalists, lawyers and intellectuals have formed a civil society group called the Barakat movement (Arabic for "That's Enough") similar to the groups that protested in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011. The Barakat movement is protesting in many cities, including Algiers and Batna, but most of its protests so far have drawn only a few hundred people. According to one of its cofounders, the Barakat movement was formed right after the arrest of anti-Bouteflika demonstrators March 1. The movement is working to establish true democracy peacefully after decades of rule by a system it believes has shown contempt for its people. Though anti-establishment, Barakat has not yet shown any indications of receiving foreign funding or support as other protest movements in the region have. The movement has organized eight protests since the beginning of March and has branches in 20 of Algeria's 48 provinces.
The mainly Berber region of Kabylie in northern Algeria has also seen many of the anti-Bouteflika protests, especially in the major cities of Tizi Ouzou and Bejaia, as the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie has protested for greater minority rights and against poor living and working conditions and alleged government corruption. Berber protests in this region are not new, and many remember the "Black Spring" in 2001, when 126 people died after Bouteflika ordered security forces to crush Berbers protesting against discrimination.
Current protests are not as widespread, nor have they rallied thousands of people as the Black Spring did. But feelings of marginalization remain. At the beginning of March, protests in Kabylie and elsewhere in Algeria were quelled by security forces, which at times outnumbered the protesters. Only recently has the government started to permit protests, following an outcry from international human rights groups.
The protests highlight a deeper problem in the current regime's hold on power in Algeria. Bouteflika rules over a vast desert territory and a fractious political landscape. Like many rulers in neighboring regimes, he developed a strong internal security apparatus to maintain order. The country's large energy revenues, which make up 90 percent of state revenues, have helped Bouteflika finance a strong military and intelligence service. But the need for stability has trumped the desire for reform.
Options for the Regime
Now, as the political elites continue to back Bouteflika despite the ongoing protests, there is concern that the regime may not be able to govern coherently, potentially losing its monopoly on power and threatening Algeria's stability. However, faced with a large and pervasive security apparatus and seemingly resigned to a Bouteflika victory, many in the opposition are simply calling for a boycott of elections instead of backing another candidate. Bouteflika's political capital has traditionally relied on the legitimacy granted by strong participation in elections and a wide margin of victory. A lower-than-expected voter turnout could weaken Bouteflika and his administration's mandate more than isolated protests could, impeding his ability to push through difficult, though necessary, political and economic reform.
As the election date draws near, Bouteflika appears to have maintained the support that won him 90.24 percent of the vote in the 2009 election. Bouteflika has incorporated all of his would-be challengers (former prime ministers Abdelmalek Sellal, Ahmed Ouyahia, Abdel Aziz Belkhadem) into his campaign team and has gained the support of the two largest parties in Algeria, the National Liberation Front and the Democratic National Rally. He has also gained the support of the country's main labor union, the General Union of Algerian Workers. With this level of support, no candidate appears to have the political backing necessary to seriously challenge Bouteflika.
With the strong likelihood of another Bouteflika administration, there is the possibility of a larger uprising after the election if the Barakat movement, the Berber groups, the supporters of Ali Benflis (Bouteflika's main challenger) and other pro-democracy groups coalesce into a unified front. In this case, the regime would be less inclined to use restraint, since Bouteflika would have been democratically re-elected and could put down perceived security threats violently. Even if a unified opposition does not challenge his authority, Bouteflika's ailing health could prevent him from taking the presidential oath and leading ministerial meetings. If that happens, the speaker of the upper house of parliament would become interim president and would hold another election within 45 days.
The results of the election will be announced April 30, and if Bouteflika is able to begin a fourth term he will likely pass a constitutional amendment to name a vice president, who could take over if he dies in office. Ahmed Ouyahia, a staunch Bouteflika ally, would most likely handle the affairs of state and protect the interests of the powerful elites, but questions remain as to who might permanently take over.
Since Algeria has nearly $194 billion in foreign reserves from energy exports, the regime has the means to buy support through spending on social programs and housing. Recent tensions between Europe and Russia could cause Algeria's energy trade, which already supplies one-fifth of Europe's natural gas imports, to become more strategic in the coming months. However, rising domestic energy consumption must also be satisfied. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's recent visit to Algiers underscores Washington's interest in maintaining cooperation with Algeria in the fight against al Qaeda militancy in neighboring Mali, Niger and Libya.
With foreign interests at stake, Bouteflika must decide whether to form the consensus government necessary to push through reform to combat corruption and strengthen the judiciary or to maintain the regime's grip on power and preserve the vested interests of the elites. As strikes and rallies remain small and have yet to converge into a widespread movement capable of forcing political reform, Bouteflika may continue to buy time and take little action in order to maintain the status quo, but by doing so he could face greater destabilization in the coming months.
