Summary

Ahead of Algerian parliamentary elections May 10, much has been reported in the media about the potential for an Islamist-led government akin to the government in Tunisia to take over. Algeria has decided to allow Islamist candidates to participate in the elections for the first time since they were banned in 1991. Although moderate Islamists are sure to win some seats in parliament, the Algerian regime has the tools to limit their overall influence.

The more important issue is the struggle quietly taking place ahead of the 2014 presidential election between the traditional holders of power, controlled by the military, and the intelligence services, in particular the Department of Research and Security (DRS).

Election Background

Unlike in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Morocco, Algeria's upcoming parliamentary elections are not part of a government response to civilian unrest or threats to the political establishment. Rather, these are regularly scheduled elections for Algeria's lower house, the National People's Assembly. The elections are unique in that Islamists not only will be allowed to participate but also will take part in writing a new constitution. Algeria's civil war (1991-2002) left its Islamists weak and fragmented, especially in comparison to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Ennahda in Tunisia. The inclusion of Islamists is intended to draw those willing to participate in the political process so the regime can deal with other challenges.

The more significant political challenge in Algeria is the quiet struggle between the military and the DRS. Popular support is waning for the National Liberation Front (FLN), the military-backed political party that has run Algeria unilaterally or as the majority party in a coalition since independence in 1962. Two-thirds of Algeria's population was born after independence and thus do not identify with nationalist and revolution-era rhetoric that the army and FLN have used for so long to win support. High youth unemployment, unequal distribution of energy revenues, a lack of affordable housing, and an ineffective subsidy program and associated rising food costs all contribute to the growing disillusionment with the current government.

Before Algeria gained independence in 1962, the National Liberation Front (FLN), in close coordination with the military, served as the opposition party to French colonial rule. After 1962, the FLN became the political arm of the military, and it since has been the vehicle for the army's involvement in Algerian politics. Governed by a distinctly Arab-nationalist agenda, the army and FLN have typically excluded most Algerian Berbers, who make up roughly a quarter of the Algerian population, from holding higher-level posts in their organizations.

However, Algerian Berbers have significant influence in the country's intelligence services, especially the DRS. Created during the war for independence, the DRS is younger than the military and does not share its Arab-nationalist bent. In addition, Algerian Berbers, such as Kasdi Merbah, the first appointed chairman of military security (the early version of the DRS), were influential in Algeria's intelligence services early in the republic's history.

Although the DRS does not have its own political party akin to the army's FLN, DRS leader Mohamed Mediene — an Algerian Berber — has connections to Interior Minister Dahou Ould Kablia, Energy Minister Youcef Yousfi, and National Rally for Democracy (RND) party head and Algerian Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia, all of whom are Algerian Berbers with long records of supporting the state security agencies, especially in their "eradicationist" views of dealing with the domestic Islamist threat. Mediene's links to Ouyahia, who has a history of competing with Algerian President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, make the RND the most likely avenue for DRS involvement in the country's politics — and for the containment of Bouteflika and the military.

Army versus Intelligence Services

The Algerian civil war coupled with a long period of AQIM attacks enabled the expansion and strengthening of the Algerian intelligence services, helping them to gain more power independent of the military. The army nominated Bouteflika for president, and he represented the FLN in the 1999 presidential election, which he won. Because Bouteflika was the first civilian to hold the office of president in Algeria in decades, the DRS expected that he would be more malleable than the military officers who preceded him. In Bouteflika's victory, the DRS saw a chance to further their political influence.

Ahead of the 2004 presidential election, the FLN attempted to replace Bouteflika with FLN Secretary-General and then-Prime Minister Ali Benflis. With the support of a dissident FLN faction, Bouteflika ran for and won a second presidential term on a joint RND-Movement for Society and Peace ticket. In exchange for delivering his party's support, Ouyahia was appointed by Bouteflika to replace Benflis as prime minister.

Now in his second term, Bouteflika — with the backing of the DRS, which shared his desire to limit the army's power in the political process — dismissed army Chief of Staff Gen. Mohammed Lamari in 2004. The move was widely popular among the Algerian public. With an aging military hierarchy and a lack of strong leadership after the centralization of authority pursued by Lamari, the army was unable to respond to the restructuring of the army chiefs.

Bouteflika and Mediene are widely rumored to have a de facto power-sharing agreement, with neither interfering in the other's affairs. In the lead-up to the 2009 presidential election, the DRS conceded to Bouteflika's request for a third presidential term and approved a constitutional amendment that lifted presidential term limits. After Bouteflika's victory in the vote, the DRS expected him to help groom a successor of its choosing to run in the 2014 presidential election. But the relationship became strained when Bouteflika started advancing his own succession plan.

Bouteflika began setting up his younger brother and personal physician, Said, to succeed him. Bouteflika allowed Said to forge key business relationships, offer government contracts to friends, represent the president in meetings, attend Cabinet meetings and reportedly begin forming a new political party. The DRS was quick to respond to these moves in order to remind Bouteflika that he needed the intelligence service's support.

After the army-controlled judiciary held up key Bouteflika appointees to investigate them, the DRS fired back at both Bouteflika and the army. Using its authority to conduct domestic investigations, the DRS launched a probe that resulted in the ouster from state-owned energy giant Sonatrach of several of Bouteflika and Said's allies, including the Sonatrach CEO and key vice presidents. The interior and energy ministers were also dismissed as a result of the DRS investigation.

After Bouteflika attempted to counter the move and the president and DRS exchanged threats, the affair ended with DRS-backed Berber officials being named to lead the interior and energy ministries and to serve as CEO of Sonatrach. (The Sonatrach CEO was replaced again in November 2011 by Abdelhamid Zerguine, a long-time though relatively unknown industry executive.)

Army's Advantages

Given the disarray within the FLN stemming from the succession issue, the more cohesive DRS hierarchy is poised to place its own candidate in office or at least further limit the actions of Bouteflika before the 2014 election.

But despite the growing influence of the intelligence agencies, the military still has its advantages. The army has a history of working with opposition parties and will attempt to integrate those that are willing into a coalition government with the FLN. The military also has better connections than the DRS with the more moderate Islamist parties. Bouteflika's 1999 amnesty with Islamist groups not only helped establish his own legitimacy separate from the army, but it also made small progress toward an Islamist-FLN conciliation. And although it is currently excluded from the traditional network of lucrative Sonatrach contracts, the army's size and capabilities have not been affected due to budgetary funding in government, the support of pro-Arab nationalists and official state-sponsored trade unions.

The Interior Ministry has historically been the body that counts votes. The current interior minister, Dahou Ould Kablia, is an old Berber intelligence officer with strong links to the DRS and Mediene. As a result, the army is attempting to take control by tasking the judiciary, a body very much under the influence of the army, with electoral oversight and the counting of ballots. This would likely guarantee the placement of parties friendlier to the army in the coalition government with the FLN.

Looking Ahead

Both the army and the DRS will spend the time between the parliamentary elections and the writing of the constitution to co-opt as many lawmakers as possible. While the army could attempt to forcibly oust the DRS from the political process, no one is eager for another civil war. Moreover, the DRS serves a vital role in combatting extremism within Algeria's borders. 

This contest between the military and intelligence services will continue until the 2014 presidential elections. The DRS is unlikely to ease up on its control of key ministries and government assets, and the FLN and army will become increasingly divided as the presidential election approaches and continue to be too distracted by internal disputes to effectively challenge the DRS. The Islamists will not bring down Algeria's future or current government. With their moves kept safely in check and their political gains limited in the short-term, the biggest threat to Algeria's political stability is the quiet, ongoing competition between the military and intelligence services.