Egypt has wrapped up the second and final day of the referendum on a constitution that the military regime sees as a means of not only normalizing the post-coup political process but also creating a system that solidifies the interests of the armed forces. The regime of Col. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has also sought to create a national charter that is palatable to large swathes of the populace, especially given the challenges the armed forces have faced since the dawn of the multi-party politics era nearly three years ago. Since Mubarak's fall, the military has struggled to find a civilian partner to replace the former dictator's National Democratic Party as a governing elite.
That al-Sisi has been promoting himself as the next president speaks volumes about the armed forces' difficulties in replacing the defunct National Democratic Party, founded by former President Anwar Sadat and then presided over by Mubarak for three decades. The rise to power of the Brotherhood in 2012 briefly created the possibility that a military-Islamist understanding of sorts would usher in a new era, but the Islamist movement's considerable opposition from the beginning gained strength when the Brotherhood alienated non-Islamist forces. The Brotherhood's inability to engage in the politics of compromise created a situation in which the military was forced to remove the Morsi government.
Although the military, through force, has been able to contain the civil resistance mounted by the Brotherhood and its allies (mainly smaller Islamist parties), as well as the insurgency mounted by jihadists, it is still struggling to normalize the situation in the country and secure indemnity for the coup. A key reason for its ability to manage the backlash to the coup has been its broad support from an array of political forces, including the second-largest Islamist movement, the Salafist al-Nour Party, which backed the coup and has remained a supporter of the transition.
Salafists: The Military's Islamist Ally?
While it had only one seat on the body that drafted the new charter, al-Nour has been mobilizing its supporters to approve the referendum, a move that will go a long way in countering the Brotherhood's call for a boycott of the vote. Al-Nour's stance is informed by its desire to fill the void left by the decline of the Brotherhood. As a result, it has played a key role as the only Islamist entity to participate in the drafting of the new document and was able to gain certain concessions on the role of religion in politics.
Al-Nour has made a dramatic transition from being an ultraconservative movement that rejected democracy and shunned politics to one displaying a great deal of pragmatism. In the wake of the Brotherhood's collapse, al-Nour is the single-most organized party, evidenced by the fact that it garnered a quarter of the votes in the 2011-12 parliamentary elections. In the next round of legislative elections — expected in the latter half of the year, after the presidential vote in April — al-Nour is unlikely to repeat its performance, but it could still emerge as the largest bloc in parliament. There is still the problem that the new constitution strictly prohibits religious parties, but since al-Nour is the only Islamist group that supports the new constitution, it has likely struck a deal with the military.
Al-Nour's goals serve the military's purposes because the military needs to ensure that the Brotherhood, which has been uncompromising in its stance on the coup, does not regain its strength. Furthermore, the armed forces need to show that the post-coup roadmap has broad national support that transcends ideology. This much the military has achieved, but its real challenge is to ensure that the new order can create a civilian leadership that cannot challenge the military and, more important, can administer the political economy of the country.
The military cannot escape the dilemma it was caught in when it was forced to remove Mubarak and the National Democratic Party: There is no single political force with which the army can partner. Al-Nour's support is helpful, but the military wants to avoid repeating what happened with the Brotherhood. The military will rely on al-Nour to keep the Islamist camp split, but there are limits to how much political ground the army is willing to cede to al-Nour, especially since it lacks a reliable secular party to counter-balance it.
The Problem of the Presidency
There is currently no coherent secular political force that the army can rely on, though there is a range of small parties and personalities that could be cobbled into a coalition. However, many secular and centrist forces are uncomfortable with a military-dominated political system, further weakening the non-Islamist camp. For this reason, the army is caught between the choice to either field al-Sisi as the presidential candidate or put up a former commander, such as former chief of the army staff Lt. Gen. Sami Annan. The problem with the latter option is that most of the old commanders are tainted due to their association with Mubarak. More important, since the coup, a public relations campaign promoting al-Sisi as the stabilizer of the country has made an impact on many Egyptians eager to see the power vacuum in Cairo filled by a strong leader.
However, many supporters of the regime (such as UAE Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al-Maktoum) and some within it are uncomfortable with the notion of al-Sisi seeking the presidency. They are concerned that al-Sisi's bid could further destabilize the polity, which the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council has been trying to repair through the injection of financial assistance. Although the United States announced on Jan. 15 that it would resume aid to Cairo, the U.S. administration needs al-Sisi to maintain at least the appearance of civilian supremacy over the military. This is why U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel has made more than 25 calls to Egypt's leaders in the six months since the coup, the most recent of which occurred Jan. 13.
What is unclear is whether al-Sisi would remain as army chief while running for president, as was the case with former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. Stratfor has written about how there are similarities between the civil-military struggles of present-day Egypt and Pakistan in the 1990s. The referendum and al-Sisi's presidential bid has parallels with former Pakistani military ruler Gen. Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's referendum in 1984 that set the stage for military-controlled civilian rule with Zia as president. In fact, al-Nour's collaboration with the al-Sisi regime is similar to the relationship that the Zia regime enjoyed with Pakistan's Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami. It would be less controversial for him to hand over leadership of the military to a successor, but then it could lead to a power struggle between al-Sisi and the new army chief.
Of course, al-Sisi, even as a civilian president, would shepherd the interests of the military. However, the armed forces would still be the primary force behind the regime, and as president, al-Sisi would depend on them. Mubarak's fall demonstrated how quickly the military will part ways when the president can no longer govern. Al-Sisi risks a similar fate should he encounter problems of governance, especially as a civilian president, where he would have a hard time balancing between the need to placate democratic demands from the public with the interests of the military. For these reasons, and the fact that it would be controversial to occupy both posts, al-Sisi may decide to remain as military chief, where he can be kingmaker.
The Military and the New Charter
No matter who becomes president, the military enhanced its control over policymaking through amendments in the new constitution. The charter — drafted by a 50-member, military-appointed and mostly non-Islamist body — will replace the constitution that was crafted by the Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly during the Morsi presidency.
For example, according to Article 141, the president has to have fulfilled military service — a new requirement. In addition, Article 234 stipulates that the defense minister, who is the commander-in-chief, must be from the ranks of the army and must be approved by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (for at least the next two presidential terms).
The top national security body, the National Defense Council, which was already composed of mostly military commanders, is the one entity that can discuss the military's budget; the charter does not specify who can approve the budget. Furthermore, the previous law on trying civilians in military courts for crimes against the armed forces has been enhanced by Article 204, which defines such crimes as those that take place within military areas. In a move to further strip the legislature of power, Article 145 states that all treaties that the government enters into will be put to a national referendum, as opposed to needing two-thirds support from both houses, as required by the 2012 document.
In fact, the new charter has created a unicameral legislature by eliminating the upper house. Furthermore, the president has the power to appoint key Cabinet members — the ministers of defense, interior, foreign affairs and justice. Article 137 has done away with the requirement that if the dissolution of parliament by the president does not gain majority support in the national referendum, the president must resign. Through these amendments the military is ensuring that a president, who, by design, will be friendly to military interests, will be powerful and well insulated and that the important policies of the state remain outside the purview of civilian political forces that are likely to gain control of parliament.
The secularists and al-Nour have blessed the new constitution because they are still trying to ensure that a new system emerges in which the Brotherhood is not the major player. Once in the new corridors of power, these same forces will likely be quarreling with each other. More important, they will probably object to the imbalance of power between civil and military institutions, especially since the decline of the Egyptian economy is something that no military or civilian government can adequately address in the immediate term.
