While the Egyptian military refrains for now from cracking down again on Muslim Brotherhood protesters, representatives from the United States, the European Union, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar are in Cairo looking to broker a compromise between jailed Brotherhood leaders and the military — one that will calm the streets and reapply a democratic veneer to Egypt's political process. This scramble for a solution makes all interested parties appear to be human rights advocates while they pursue their respective and, in some cases, competing strategic interests. But their mediation efforts have added to the Egyptian military's dilemma on how to navigate the political crisis while keeping critical aid channels open.

When the Egyptian military deposed Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi from the presidency on July 3, it did so with the implicit understanding that countries already nervous about the spread of Islamist governments in the region would quietly welcome the move and provide the necessary financial aid to sustain a new regime. The United States and the Europeans maintained an ambiguous stance, publicly avoiding characterizing the shift as a "coup" while staying in close and quiet contact with Egypt's generals. With their own deep aversion to the Muslim Brotherhood already in plain view, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates publicly stepped up financial aid to the new military-backed regime, adding to a steady and quiet stream of payments that had made their way to the military and opponents of the Brotherhood in the months leading up to the intervention.

These countries will consider their investments worthwhile so long as they can be assured of two things: that the military remains in control and that the Muslim Brotherhood's forced return to the opposition after a brief spell in politics doesn't end up destabilizing Egypt even more. Political frustrations are boiling over, and even the most risk-tolerant portfolio investors are shying away from the economically devastated country. The military appears to be in control, but the tension in the streets does not yet allow for any confidence.

Some element of diplomatic damage control is also required at this stage. In private, these countries can be satisfied with the military publicly retaking the reins from the Muslim Brotherhood, but widespread footage of violent crackdowns creates a public relations quandary for all. A similar dynamic prevailed in 2011 when Saudi Arabia militarily intervened in Bahrain to quell Shiite protests. The U.S. State Department at the time issued repeated condemnations of the Bahraini government on human rights grounds. Meanwhile, it was an open secret that Washington and Riyadh were equally invested in preventing a political crisis in Bahrain that could jeopardize the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and play to Iran's favor.

Egypt has created an uncomfortable situation for players across the region. The roughly $8 billion worth of aid that Qatar provided to the Morsi government before the military intervention now competes with the roughly $12 billion of aid pledged by Qatar's Gulf rivals. Egypt received 52 percent of all Qatari foreign aid between 2011 and 2012, and Doha's new leadership wants to ensure that investment will pay off, with or without the Muslim Brotherhood in power. Should Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood decide to resist Qatari attempts at mediation in order to pursue its own interests and complicate the military's attempts to consolidate power, Doha is hoping it can still leverage Egypt's natural gas needs to its benefit. To that end, Doha recently dispatched a second tanker of liquefied natural gas in exchange for Cairo's foreign export partners rerouting natural gas production toward domestic consumption. The hope is that it will remind Egypt's new leadership of the ramifications of working with or against Qatari interests.

Turkey, notably absent from the group of diplomats trying to mediate in Cairo, is no better off. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's vision of molding a moderate Islamist government in Cairo was suffering well before the military moved against the Muslim Brotherhood. When Turkey early last week hosted an Arab delegation to try to chart a political path for Egypt, Turkish officials predictably came under attack by most of the attendees for Ankara's continued support of the Muslim Brotherhood, leaving Turkey looking even more defensive and weak than before it called the meeting. Turkey's loyalties cannot be as flexible as Qatar's. Turkey's ruling party cannot compromise in its imperative to limit the military's role in politics and to bring more Islamists into the political mainstream. It took decades to neutralize the military's power in Turkey, and it would be naive to think the same could be replicated in a matter of months in Egypt.

The Egyptian military is not yet in the clear, however. The military retains enough influence over internal security forces to prevent total lawlessness and has the diplomatic support of countries with the means to provide meaningful financial support to the regime. Still, it cannot prevent a serious challenge to its credibility as it tries to reinforce its control. The military has been on this slippery slope since it decided to remove former President Hosni Mubarak from power in 2011. Military generals quickly went from being heroes of the revolution to the enemies of the revolution, as protesters demanded a transition to an elected civilian government. When elections produced a Muslim Brotherhood government, the military was accused of conspiring with an authoritarian Islamist leadership. Now, with the Muslim Brotherhood relegated again to the sidelines and the military visibly in charge, the country's military chief, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, is already being branded a megalomaniac. 

Whatever shape the government takes in Cairo, political dissent in Egypt will continue to fester. The military understands it has a short window of time to make a show of force while Morsi remains the target of ire, and while it still has enough popular backing to do so. But that period is already slipping away, and without sufficient economic options of its own, the military cannot simply turn away the foreign mediators looking to protect their own image and interests in Egypt. The military's limited freedom to act will result in more haphazard policies. In this climate, neither crackdowns nor political concessions will likely create a lasting impression on the street.