Colombian Vice President Angelino Garzon said Sept. 10 that peace with the National Liberation Army, the country's second-largest left-wing militant group, may conclude before the end of 2013. These talks are distinct from ongoing negotiations in Cuba between Bogota and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Colombia's main rebel movement.
Government negotiators reportedly already have held preliminary talks with National Liberation Army delegates in Venezuela and Brazil over an eight-month period, and the official talks are reportedly set to begin in Uruguay on Sept. 17. Details on the new round of talks, such as whether the National Liberation Army would be required to halt violence first and whether the government would negotiate regardless of armed attacks — as it has done with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — have not been revealed.
If the talks in fact begin, they would represent Bogota's fourth attempt in 20 years to broker a deal with the National Liberation Army. Most recently, former President Alvaro Uribe attempted to reach a peace agreement with the group from 2005 to 2007, but the efforts ultimately failed after eight rounds.
Bringing the National Liberation Army to the negotiating table represents a potential political victory for Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. If the government reaches negotiated settlements with both of the country's dominant guerrilla groups, a major source of political violence would be eliminated. This violence includes the National Liberation Army's frequent use of improvised explosive devices to damage oil pipelines and electricity transmission towers in northeastern Colombia, particularly in the border department of Arauca. The group has also carried out ambushes on security forces in that region. On Aug. 24, National Liberation Army militants in Arauca killed 14 soldiers during an ambush. The group also has been responsible for political kidnappings, most recently on Jan. 18 when it seized Canadian mining engineer Gernot Wober, whom it released Aug. 27.
Though more than a decade of counterinsurgency action against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and National Liberation Army has forced the militants to remote areas of the country, it has not entirely eliminated them as a security threat. Peace talks are Santos' best opportunity for ending the long-running militancy.
Talks with the National Liberation Army will face many of the same challenges encountered in talks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. The issue of political participation is the foremost concern for the militants. Neither will agree to conditional political participation, and each instead will demand full inclusion in the political process. The National Liberation Army also will not accept any plan that could see its leaders face the prospect of arrest and/or extradition to the United States. The National Liberation Army leadership, including its supreme commander, Nicolas Bautista, currently faces criminal charges in Colombia. These include charges stemming from a 1998 attack on an oil pipeline that saw 84 deaths and a 1999 incident in which 186 people were seized.
Another main obstacle to a peace deal with the National Liberation Army is its members' involvement in criminal activity. The rebels have been involved in everything from drug production and trafficking, extortion and kidnapping for several decades. For example, in Bolivar department, the group charges unlicensed miners a fee to operate their mines. In its stronghold of Arauca department, near the Venezuelan border, it reportedly smuggles cocaine to Venezuela. Such activities provide revenue the main leadership and local commanders would be reluctant to surrender.
Even if the group's leadership agrees to demobilize through a peace agreement, low-ranking guerrillas could continue illegal activities independent of their leaders. Like the right-wing paramilitaries before them, they could transform from a centrally led insurgency into numerous fragmented criminal groups controlling illicit markets on specific turf. This dynamic would add new groups to the Colombian criminal landscape and complicate Bogota's security policies.
