Colombia is once again at the negotiating table in an effort to end the most enduring conflict in the Western Hemisphere. Sixty-five years ago Tuesday, one of the most violent periods in Colombian history began, setting the stage for the ongoing conflict between the government and the rebels. The peace process will be drawn out and will face many challenges, but it represents Colombia's best shot at ending what has often seemed an intractable civil war.

On April 9, 1948, populist movement leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan was assassinated and a period of violence known as "La Violencia" resulted. The bloodletting lasted ten years, caused the deaths of some 200,000 Colombians and set off decades of civil war. A power-sharing agreement between the liberal and conservative elites was signed in 1958, but rather than securing peace, a new civil conflict emerged. This new war was not between liberals and conservatives, but between Marxist guerrillas and the national government. This war continues today and has resulted in hundreds of thousands of casualties and millions of internally displaced refugees.

The peace negotiations that began in November 2012 between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, more commonly known as FARC, appear to have stalled. Negotiators have yet to agree on the first of five bargaining points — land reform — and attacks on security personnel and energy infrastructure continue largely unabated. Four items remain on the agenda: political participation, ending the conflict, drug trafficking and victims' rights. None of the remaining points has quick or easy solutions. When the talks were unveiled in October 2012, the Colombian government said it hoped to conclude the negotiations by November 2013. However, if they do not make this deadline, they have until the May 2014 presidential election as a buffer to work out their differences. While it seems that little progress has been made, there is much going on behind the scenes; slowness should not be confused with failure.

Ironically, the FARC and the political opposition, led by former President Alvaro Uribe, have incentives to drag out and polarize the negotiations, to a point. The FARC are aware that they can likely exact more concessions from the government the longer they delay. But this stalling technique will be tempered by the fact that if the opposition wins, the FARC leadership would lose perhaps their last chance to reach a negotiated settlement. The opposition, which has long been against negotiations with the FARC, knows that stalling negotiations would help it to build electoral support. This too has its limits, since the opposition cannot afford to appear obstructionist if a peace deal is imminent.

To buy time and strengthen its negotiating team, the FARC recently requested that six new negotiators — including FARC secretariat member Jorge "Pablo Catatumbo" Torres Victoria — join the team in Havana. Torres Victoria is a hardline leader who commands the group's western front. To allow time for these additions, they postponed negotiations until April 18. Bringing Torres Victoria on demonstrates that the FARC is not in any hurry to settle, but also may be serious about reaching a settlement.

To ensure safe passage to the negotiations, the government ordered the military to suspend operations in a specific zone of the Meta department April 7-9 and ordered the prosecutor general to lift any arrest warrants for the negotiators. Hearing of the temporary measures, Uribe tweeted the precise coordinates where the Red Cross would retrieve the negotiators for transport to Havana. Uribe was presumably intending to generate anger with the government and gain support from within the military. This tactic may have backfired. Instead of delegitimizing the negotiations, the tweet prompted Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon to accuse Uribe of undermining national security. After publicly affirming that the military stands behind Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, Colombian armed forces chief Gen. Alejandro Navas said he would launch an investigation into who released the coordinates. This incident shows that Uribe and the opposition must take care to balance their being critical of the peace process with actions that directly undermine negotiations.

In speeches throughout the day, it also became evident that the government would seriously consider entering into negotiations with the country's second largest rebel group, the National Liberation Army, or ELN. Since July, the ELN has signaled that it is interested in entering into negotiations, but the government and rebels have been unable to agree to acceptable terms. The ELN wants to enter talks without preconditions, but the government is requiring an end to kidnapping. It also wants to establish a timeline to reach peace before it will consider talks. Santos' suggestion that the government is entertaining the possibility of negotiating with the ELN sooner rather than later demonstrates that the government is extending its commitment to pursuing peace with the rebels while cracking down on the equally if not more serious threat emanating from Colombia's criminal groups. Showing progress on the security front would allow the government to hold investor interest and hopefully generate popular support. 

In Colombia, politics and violence are deeply connected. All those involved in the current negotiations — the government, the FARC and the opposition — need to execute a very careful balancing act. The government needs to be tough with the FARC while also securing a peace deal if it wishes to extend its tenure and secure its place in history. The FARC needs to stall, but stalling too much means risking their last chance for a negotiated settlement. The opposition must continue trying to undermine the peace negotiations without appearing to be obstructive. These talks are Colombia's best chance to reach a settlement since the beginning of the conflict. But as the events of Monday and Tuesday show, it will be a slow, complex process as all the actors balance personal gain with national interest.