For the FARC, an agreement over political participation will hinge on several issues crucial to the group's leadership. A principal one is the possibility of extradition of certain rebel leaders to the United States. On June 13, a Colombian negotiator hinted that the talks in Havana would not focus on individual FARC members, but rather on finding a political solution for the entire group. However, Colombian media reports in May claimed that the group had initiated indirect contact with the United States concerning the issue, and the group could seek to discuss certain pending U.S. extradition requests during the Havana talks. Rebel leaders are unlikely to agree to any peace deal that leaves the possibility of extradition unresolved.
The FARC is also seeking guarantees that its political involvement will be free from interference by Colombian militant organizations that oppose the rebel group. In the 1980s, the FARC's brief entry into Colombian politics after peace negotiations ended when pro-government paramilitary groups began intimidating and assassinating rebel political leaders. The demobilization of Colombian paramilitary and drug trafficking organizations over the past decade has mitigated the risks posed by such groups somewhat, but FARC negotiators will seek government assurances that rebel political leaders can participate openly and safely nonetheless.
Possible Complications
Such guarantees could bring FARC leaders into the political fold if they prefer secure political involvement to Colombian military pressure. However, even if an agreement is reached, some rebel combat units may not agree to a negotiated settlement and instead join regional criminal organizations — known locally as bandas criminales — to stay involved in the country's lucrative drug trade. Moreover, high-level rebel leaders would reap most of the benefits of political integration, possibly leaving some lower-ranking militants with little choice but to employ their skills in a criminal organization.
The success of the ongoing talks could also be hampered by other factors, such as Colombia's unresolved political disagreements with Venezuela. Caracas has threatened to withdraw its support from the ongoing negotiations in Havana, a move that could derail the talks before any meaningful progress is made. Venezuela is unlikely to follow through on its threat, but doing so could encourage Cuba to follow suit. This would jeopardize the negotiations between the rebels and the Colombian government and close the window on what currently appears to be a prime opportunity for a peace deal.
The talks could also be affected by Colombia's 2014 presidential election. The government has stated a goal of concluding negotiations by November 2013, making the current round of negotiations crucial to the re-election campaign of Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, who has staked his presidency, his re-election and his legacy on forging a peace deal with the FARC. Though the negotiations will likely extend beyond the government's deadline, Bogota will attempt to reach an agreement before the election. A poll in May indicated that 67 percent of Colombians backed the peace process, but lengthy negotiations without a peace deal could erode this support. Supporters of former President Alvaro Uribe's political faction, which opposes the negotiations, would seek to use such discontent for political advantage against Santos, who currently has an approval rating of roughly 45 percent.
It will likely take months for negotiators to craft a political integration deal acceptable to both sides. However, the FARC's gains over land reform in the previous round of negotiations, combined with the group's declining strength on the battlefield, will pressure its leaders to take the talks seriously. And resolving the tricky issues at stake in the current round of talks could provide the militant group with enough guarantees to remain at the negotiating table going forward.
