Because security policy has dominated Colombian politics in recent years, diverse political parties have put their differences on social and economic issues aside to form coalitions that have effectively functioned as national unity governments. Former President Alvaro Uribe established the first such coalition in 2006, an approach his defense minister and successor, Juan Manuel Santos, continued after winning the presidency in 2010.
Santos' coalition brought together all three of Colombia's main political parties — the Social Party of National Unity, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party — as well as the smaller Green Party and Radical Change Party. Together, the current governing coalition controls 78 percent of the seats in the Senate and 85 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Representatives.
Political cohesion on this scale is unprecedented in recent Colombian history. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, conflict between the Liberal and the Conservative parties, at that point the only two, was frequent and bloody. The Thousand Days' War, which lasted from 1899 to 1902, and a period of civil war known as "La Violencia," which lasted from 1948 to 1958, were both partisan conflicts, and together resulted in around 300,000 deaths. Hostilities ended in 1958 when both parties forged a power-sharing agreement known as the National Front. This was not a coalition, but rather a pact between political elites to alternate control. It ended in 1974, when electoral reforms allowed a multiparty system to emerge, making the arrangement irrelevant.
In the event of a negotiated settlement with FARC, differences in economic, social and foreign policy will replace security at the forefront of political discourse. Security threats will not disappear entirely, but without the FARC threat, the conflict will lose its ideological nature, security will become mainly a law enforcement problem and offshoot armed groups will focus more on profit-oriented criminal activities and less on politically driven acts of militancy. Coalition-building will not disappear entirely, but broad coalitions will become less politically necessary or feasible in the absence of an overriding issue around which to unify.
Opportunity for the Left
The trauma and memory of the conflict will diminish the chances that FARC may transform into a mainstream political party, but the Colombian left would still enthusiastically welcome a peace settlement. The left has seen its political fortunes wither in recent decades due to the public perception that it is unwilling to criticize FARC or is even actively allied with the group due to similar ideological roots and political grievances. A number of leftist politicians and parties have been accused of collaborating or sympathizing with FARC; in 2010, controversial lawmaker Piedad Cordoba was stripped of her Senate seat, banned from politics for 18 years and charged with treason for her presumed ties with the rebel group. Cordoba would later go on to lead the Patriotic March party, which is widely viewed as the political arm of FARC.
While Colombia has experienced solid economic growth over the past decade — it grew on average 4.3 percent annually since 2000 — inequality, poverty and unemployment persist worse than in the rest of the region. Inequality has fallen steadily since 2002, but Colombia is still the 10th most unequal country in the world. The percentage of the population living on less than $2 per day has been reduced by half since 2002, but 16 percent still live in poverty. Additionally, Colombia's unemployment rate of roughly 10 percent in 2012 is much higher than the regional average of 6.5 percent.
Besides these economic conditions, other factors could provide political opportunities for the still-dormant left. Demographically, a significant shift in population occurred as a result of the civil war. The forced internal displacement of millions of Colombians from the countryside to towns and cities has created an enlarged marginalized urban class that, in the absence of an armed conflict, may identify more closely with the left.
The fractious nature of Colombia's political scene could also be an asset to a resurgent leftist movement. Of the three major left-leaning political parties in Colombia — the Liberal Party, the Green Party and the Alternative Democratic Pole — the first two are already members of the ruling coalition. The largest party in Colombia and coalition leader, the Social Party of National Unity, was created by Uribe and Santos, who were both previously members of the Liberal Party. Their new party, however, lacks ideological coherence since it was mainly formed to serve as a vehicle for Uribe to continue his security policies.
The Social Party of National Unity has been characterized as center-right but could become more leftist in orientation if it perceives a challenger emerging in the wake of a FARC peace accord, or it could lose relevance and fracture. Indeed, since the 2010 elections and his subsequent falling out with Santos, Uribe left the party he co-founded and the right-wing National Integration Party also left the governing coalition. The Social Party of National Unity then incorporated the Green Party and the Liberal Party into its coalition, signaling its ideological flexibility and a shift to the left.
FARC's Political Future
FARC's senior leadership is a politically motivated group, and the devastating military campaign launched against FARC may have convinced its leaders that armed conflict is no longer the most expedient way to achieve the group's political aims. On Nov. 19, FARC declared a unilateral cease-fire, presumably to curry favor with the populace, and on Nov. 28 the government met with and implicitly recognized the Patriotic March party. Negotiators in Havana recently discussed the topic of incorporating FARC into the political system and wider society, and both sides have indicated that they are open to the idea of the rebel movement becoming a legitimate political movement.
FARC ceasing violence and entering politics has a historical precedent. In the 1982-1986 peace negotiations, the government and the rebels signed the Uribe Accords, which resulted in a bilateral cease-fire and the formation of the FARC-led Patriotic Union political party. FARC's lead negotiator in the current talks, Luciano Marin Arango, was elected to Congress in the 1980s. This political armistice eventually disintegrated, however, when leftist rebel groups such as M-19 violated the cease-fire and when paramilitary forces began intimidating and assassinating FARC's political leaders. However, given the demobilization of many offshoot rebel and paramilitary groups, there are fewer actors today to derail the peace negotiations or violate them if the talks are successful. Colombia's second-largest rebel group, the National Liberation Army, still poses a threat, but it too has signaled that it is interested in negotiations and may eventually begin a similar process with the government.
Even in the event of a peace agreement and a change in Colombia's domestic political landscape, a stronger leftist movement will still face constraints. While a leftist candidate could win the presidency, since any such movement would need to align with at least one if not two of the major centrist parties, it is unlikely that there will be a substantial shift in the country's current economic policies, which includes low tax rates, infrastructure investment and maintaining a favorable climate to attract foreign investors.
The major differences between the Social Party of National Unity, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party largely center on how to deal with inequality and the country's still high poverty levels, which is where a leftward shift may begin to manifest itself. If the political marginalization of the left is ended through a peace agreement with FARC, leftist parties may be able to compete against the country's more centrist and conservative parties.
In the near term, Colombia may look increasingly like neighboring Peru, where populist policies have strong support but are counterbalanced by the country's institutional and political commitment to economic liberalism and foreign investment in commodities production. Once political incentives in Colombia shift from defeating a militant organization to solving some of the country's persistent socio-economic challenges, Colombian politics will likely become more ideologically diverse. Still, given the need for coalition alliances by any foreseeable leftist movement, prospective policy changes are likely to be modest and will not drastically undermine the country's economic growth trajectory.
