The new militia declared itself independent from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, an alliance of Tuareg groups that formed in late 2011 in northern Mali. Hassan Ag Medhi — a former colonel in the Malian army and a member of the previous iteration of the Front for the Liberation of the Azawad — announced the formation of the new group in Ouagadougou, the capital of neighboring Burkina Faso. The militia primarily consists of members of the Gao region's Chamanama ethnic group.
The fractious ethnic landscape in northern Mali has kept any alliances from staying together for any significant period of time. Along with erstwhile Islamist allies Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, the secular National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad began the rebellion by calling for secession or autonomy for northern Mali's Azawad region. However, as the rebellion proceeded, a rift formed between the secular groups and Islamist factions. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad has found itself on the defensive against the Islamists and has dropped its calls for independence in order to make itself eligible as a potential partner to the Malian government or to international actors.
The new Front for the Liberation of the Azawad is only the latest splintering of the rebel movement. Its break from the larger alliance is likely a result of the latter's displacement from Gao and Timbuktu and its general ineffectiveness in the face of aggression from Islamist militants. The Front for the Liberation of the Azawad's stated goals are more narrow: It primarily seeks to defend the ethnic and territorial interests of its sub-region against encroachment by other hostile militias. The group is not seeking the independence of the Gao sub-region, nor is it an Islamist group attempting to impose radicalism. Its leaders have served in previous Malian governments and in the Malian army, and they are likely angling to do so again.
Since the Front for the Liberation of the Azawad has no claimed separatist aspirations of its own, the authorities in Bamako may see the group as a useful partner in taking control of northern Mali from the ascendant Islamist factions. Since the group is already based in the area and likely has better intelligence on Islamist militia activity than the government, it could leverage this information to gain support from Bamako in the form of aid or weapons.
The formation of the group comes as the Malian government appeals for U.N. Security Council authorization of a peace enforcement mission to re-establish central government authority in northern Mali. The Economic Community of West African States has proposed a plan to deploy 3,300 peacekeepers to Mali, though international financial and logistical assistance would be needed to implement it.
Should U.N. Security Council authorization be granted — France has already stated its support for the mission, which could extend to logistical assistance — the regional mission would likely deploy in three stages. First, an initial headquarters element would arrive in Bamako to liaise with Malian authorities. A subsequent military logistics and positioning base would be established in the adjacent city of Koulikoro. Finally, Malian intervention forces would be deployed to rebel-held cities in the north such as Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal.
Establishing even a perfunctory presence in northern Mali would still be a monthslong development and would not mean the defeat of Islamist and al Qaeda fighters operating there. Northern Mali is a vast, remote desert, and while establishing military outposts in Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal may be a feasible objective for the proposed 3,300-strong support force, securing the rest of ungoverned northern Mali would be difficult. Establishing and protecting supply lines to the three outpost areas would also be extremely challenging — the lack of supplies for Malian forces fighting the rebels was one cause of the March military coup against the civilian government.
Securing the cooperation of localized militia groups like the Front for the Liberation of the Azawad could be helpful in collecting intelligence and interdicting militias beyond the military's urban bases. However, the group's reach does not extend far beyond the Gao sub-region into the rest of northern Mali. Reasserting control in other areas that critical for the government, such as Timbuktu or Kidal, may require alternative approaches.
