The March coup in Bamako gave Malian Islamist militants and Tuareg rebels an opening to gain control over northern Mali, which in turn gave al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb more space to operate. Soon after taking hold of the region, however, the Islamist groups turned on the Tuareg secessionist groups and began consolidated control over the main northern cities of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu for themselves.
With the Malian government unable and unwilling to take on the militants until this point, the Economic Community of West African States had proposed sending a 3,000-member intervention force to Mali even before the recent meetings. The troops would likely deploy with a three-step strategy: first, establish stability in Bamako; second, reorganize the leadership of the Malian armed forces and ensure that former junta leader Capt. Amadou Sanogo does not try to undermine the military or the government; and third, deploy to northern Mali to recover control of the urban centers and protect the return of Malian government authorities there.
The Economic Community of West African States, of which Senegal and especially Nigeria are leading members, and other supporters in the international community, including France and the United States, have not wanted to intervene while the junta remained in charge. For legal and political reasons, they did not want to empower the military officers and provide them security assistance to deal with the Islamist threat for fear it could inspire similar coups in other regional countries.
Now with a new Malian government in place, an intervention force is politically possible. Mali's new national unity government is made up of members of the former civilian government overthrown in March as well as the junta that deposed them, civil society groups and opposition parties. Civilians are also leading the government, an important factor for other countries that had been resistant to extending military and security cooperation to Mali.
The intervention force, should it be formed, would be drawn from the regional bloc; it has not been determined exactly which countries would contribute. The United States and France, either themselves or via a U.N. resolution, could provide material assistance in the form of intelligence sharing, financial support and possibly transportation assistance.
There are other security concerns in West Africa that the Nigerian and Senegalese leaders may be discussing, including political violence in Ivory Coast or al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's possible infiltration of militant or rebel groups in Nigeria or Senegal, respectively. The meeting could also give Senegal and Nigeria the opportunity to review the flow of small arms in the region, like the unresolved issue of 14 containers of Iranian small arms intercepted at the Nigeria port of Lagos in 2010 and the identity of their intended recipient.
However, militant activity in Mali is clearly the most immediate concern for the region. No announcement on a military intervention force should be expected at the conclusion of Jonathan's visit Aug. 23, but recent reports indicate that al Qaeda elements in Mali are decamping for Algeria or otherwise reducing their visibility in Mali. If accurate, this would suggest that some jihadists are anticipating action against them, which the recent meetings by the Nigerian, Senegalese and French may be intended to facilitate.
