The northern Malian separatist movement gained momentum after the fall of Moammar Gadhafi's Libyan regime in October 2011, when thousands of armed Tuareg tribesmen who had previously served in Gadhafi's military returned home. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) launched its first offensive Jan. 16, assaulting the northern towns of Menaka, Tessalit, Aguelhok, Anderamboukane and Lere in the ensuing 10 days. They have engaged in several skirmishes, raids and supply route ambushes since taking the Mali-Algeria border town of Tinzawatene on Feb. 8.
The Malian government's inability to defend against the Tuareg rebellion was the main reason cited by Capt. Amadou Haya Sanogo, leader of Mali's military junta, for taking power. However, the confusion caused by the military takeover worked to the Tuaregs' advantage. An emergent pro-Sharia group calling itself Ansar Dine captured the town of Kidal, and the MNLA took Gao and Timbuktu, all largely without resistance. In addition to its retreat from the north, reports of low morale, infighting and desertion indicate that the Malian military has lost cohesion.
The Malian military retreat and continued political uncertainty in Bamako will give the rebels, who now have captured what they consider their traditional homeland, time to secure their territory. If they can delay a Malian counter-offensive for a few months, they likely will retain control over the territory throughout the country's rainy season, which lasts from June to September and usually degrades transportation infrastructure and communication in the south, making the long distance between Bamako and the north even more hazardous.
The rebels indicated a willingness to negotiate with the Malian government and ECOWAS in an apparent attempt to diffuse external pressure and stall incentives for military intervention. The MNLA says it does not intend to further expand its territory and is trying to allay concerns over alleged associations with jihadists, especially al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. It is in the interests of the MNLA to portray itself as a non-threat to Bamako, for while ECOWAS has expressed a willingness to negotiate with the Tuareg rebels, they have also indicated that they may resort to force to maintain Malian territorial integrity. With public opinion in southern Mali solidly against the establishment of an independent Azawad, it will be difficult for parties to reach a comprehensive agreement on the status of the north.
Moreover, the two groups responsible for capturing the northern territory may not be entirely aligned in their goals. The MNLA demands independence, while Ansar Dine wants the application of Sharia. The groups' relationship, and the extent to which they have set aside their different ideologies, is not yet clear, and the Malian government — whatever form it takes — will likely try to exploit that opacity to depict any Tuareg rebel movement as threateningly jihadist and militant.
