After two days of fighting with Malian armed forces, recently formed Tuareg opposition movement the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) reportedly seized the border town of Tinzawatene on Feb. 8. The Malian armed forces and the MNLA have clashed occasionally since Jan. 16 in cities across Mali's northern desert.
Though claims by both sides are difficult to verify, neither has won a decisive victory in the overall conflict. Both are constrained by limited manpower and are similarly armed — inhibiting either from establishing control over the broad swath of territory that is Mali's northern desert. If the rebels can establish their hold on the town, it could allow them to make use of the nearby network of Saharan smuggling routes to sustain themselves, if they have not already done so.
Underequipped and Equally Matched
Both the Malian armed forces and the MNLA are equipped with small arms, crew-served weapons like heavy machine guns and mortars, and light vehicles. Malian armed forces are occasionally supported by old Soviet MiG-21s and a pair of Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters. Though valuable in responding to rebel assaults in key towns and cities, these assets face significant operational constraints and cannot be a decisive element of the conflict on a larger scale.
Nor has the influx of arms and fighters from Libya since the fall of Moammar Gadhafi allowed the MNLA — whose ranks are largely composed of these fighters — to establish an enduring advantage. Rumors have circulated for months that rebels may hold an unknown type and quantity of anti-tank guided missiles, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS, likely SA-7s from Libya) and even BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers. Possession of such weapons could give the rebels a countermeasure against the Malian military's air power.
The Malian government knows its limitations, which are both military and geographic. Mali's geography makes it difficult to maintain and supply forces — let alone to commit reinforcements. The country's government facilities, population centers, and economic hubs are concentrated in the south, a region known as the Sahel. By contrast, northern Mali is a vast expanse of Saharan desert characterized by extreme temperatures, rough terrain and long distances between towns and cities. This area has historically experienced minimum government presence or formal control. The increase in rebel activity in the north demands a government mobilization — but the rebellion will not be easily quelled. Driving supplies and troops northwards can take several days and these long, exposed lines of supply have proven vulnerable to attack and interdiction. Meanwhile, these same extreme conditions and poor supplies make relocation to the area an unappealing prospect for southern soldiers. There have been several reports of deployed personnel defecting to neighboring countries or officers returning with their families to Bamako because of poor conditions, including low pay and insufficient supplies.
From 2002 to 2005, the United States used C-130s to move Malian troops and supplies north to support counterterrorism operations as part of Washington's Pan-Sahel initiative. U.S. counterterrorism support has continued since 2005, but now consists mostly of training programs and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. In an attempt to secure more direct support in the north, the Malian Defense Ministry regularly releases statements associating the MNLA with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Meanwhile, the MNLA, hoping the West will refrain from offering more substantial support to Mali, actively denies any association with AQIM. The leaders of the MNLA appear to want to distance themselves from the threatening image of their predecessors, who were linked with AQIM jihadists and smugglers (whose operations often overlap). For this reason they project themselves solely as a national movement fighting for control of the northern territory.
At the moment, neither side appears able to gain a decisive advantage in the conflict. Though the rebels appear to have occupied Tinzawatene, it is unclear the extent to which that seizure was opposed and the degree to which the MNLA could hold out against a concerted assault to take it back.
Benefits and Risks of Smuggling Routes
If they can hold the town, the MNLA could use Tinzawatene's location to take advantage of the intricate network of Saharan smuggling routes. These extend from Algeria's Ahoggar Mountains (which served as AQIM's original base of operations for kidnapping tourists in 2003) to Mali's Tin Assalat Mountains in the east (the MNLA's own base of operations) and beyond. The smuggling routes avoid heavily trafficked and closely monitored water points and main roads that go through the cities of Tessalit and Aguelhoc. The leader of the last Tuareg opposition uprising in 2006, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, was a well-known smuggler and took advantage of these routes. Despite their association with illicit activity, these routes can serve a practical purpose: allowing the rebels to work around the impassable cliffs and sandy expanses that define the desert geography.
However, utilizing this network of smuggling routes would not come without risks. By choosing to associate with Algerian smugglers, the MNLA would muddy the claim that they are not linked with AQIM. Engaging with smugglers along these routes could also direct unwanted attention to the group from the West and from neighboring Algeria. Still, the ability to be unexposed and mobile in the northern desert using these routes is an enormous practical benefit, and the reason Tinzawatene's location is convenient — it sits along the middle of these routes. As clashes continue between the armed forces and the rebels in towns and cities across the north, the MNLA will likely continue to try to exploit their resources on the ground to gain the upper hand, while the Malian government will likely seek to secure control of the north through political means.
