The first Nigerian media report on the seizure of a massive Iranian arms shipment at a Lagos port was published Oct. 27. In the weeks since, STRATFOR has sought to answer questions about the incident. Among these are why it was publicized in the first place, how increased searches of Iranian cargo by Nigerian customs officials could affect Tehran's West African smuggling operations, and which outside powers may or may not be using Abuja as a pawn in a larger game against the Iranians. Below is a timeline and analysis of the incident:

July 10

• The MV Everest cargo ship, owned by French shipping company CMA CGM, arrived at Lagos' Tin Can port. The ship had been loaded in Iran's Bandar Abbas port, then made a pit stop at the Jawaharlal Nehru port near Mumbai before arriving in Lagos. It unloaded 83 containers there, which were then stored in the Frano bonded warehouse. These containers were labeled as building materials, and the building materials that were used to conceal the weapons crates inside were clearly marked with Perso-Arabic script, according to the original photos taken the day the first container was inspected.

July 11-15

• The MV Everest departed from Lagos (reports vary on the date of departure).

Oct. 20

• Thirteen of the 83 containers were moved from the warehouse to the A. P. Moller Terminal at Lagos' Apapa port. When the people accused of involvement in the smuggling operation — two Iranian nationals and two Nigerians whose identities were disclosed later — tried to move these 13 containers from the warehouse back to the port for re-export, they reportedly attracted the attention of Nigerian authorities. Some reports alleged that the process of obtaining the proper documents for re-export raised red flags; others stated that an additional business partner felt he was not getting his fair share of the proceeds and tipped off the authorities. What is known is that authorities were actively monitoring the containers by this point.

Oct. 26

• Security officials at the port opened the first container to inspect the cargo. Hidden among legitimate building supplies were 24 crates full of weapons, including small arms cartridges, mortar ammunition and 107 mm rockets. A handful of journalists for a Lagos-based newspaper were present and recorded the scene. A senior security official from Lagos state warned the journalists not to publish the report, due to national security concerns. STRATFOR sources said no government officials informed the Nigerian media of the seizure; the tip came from a port employee. Furthermore, only one media outlet carried the initial report, not a wide cross-section of the Nigerian press. These facts indicate that the Nigerian government made no organized effort to publicize the seizure.

Oct. 27

• The first media report describing the weapons seizure was published. The name "Iran" was buried deep in the body of the article and was not the primary focus of the piece. Nigerian National Security Adviser Andrew Azazi responded to the report by urging that no one jump to conclusions. No one in the Nigerian government had actively tried to push the Iranian angle at this point, at least not publicly.

Oct. 28

• The first Israeli media report alleging the weapons were meant for Hamas in Gaza hit the press. A high-level security meeting including all the top officials of the Nigerian government, the National Security Agency (NSA), the military, Nigerian intelligence and police convened in Abuja. The meeting lasted five hours and resulted in the NSA's taking over the investigation. Security was increased at Nigeria's airports, seaports and borders. Reports surfaced that the customs agent allegedly involved in the incident was arrested. Within one day of the first media report, Abuja took measures to show that it was not taking the matter lightly. The Israelis, meanwhile, who have an interest in publicizing any potential indicators that Iran may be in violation of U.N. sanctions, showed that they either have an excellent open-source monitoring system of Nigerian media or that they knew beforehand what the MV Everest was carrying. Indeed, STRATFOR sources have reported that the entire operation was based on a tip from Israeli intelligence.

Oct. 29

• The Iranian ambassador to Nigeria was summoned to the Foreign Ministry. The biggest mystery at this point was where the containers were headed.

Oct. 30

• The French shipping company confirmed that the containers did in fact originate in Iran. CMA CGM also stated that one week earlier, the Iranian shipper called to ask if the French company could load the containers back up and ship them off again, this time to Gambia. This was the first time any party publicly mentioned Gambia.

Nov. 1

• Tehran issued a statement in which the government refused to comment on the issue, aside from stating that no Iranian national had been arrested in connection with the seizure. The same day, a Nigerian media report citing top security sources shed light on the involvement of a Nigerian Muslim activist named Sheikh Ali Abbas Othman Hassan (aka Sheikh Abbas Jega). Jega is said to have spent much of the past two decades living in Tehran, working for a Hausa language service at Radio Tehran. Though he lives in the Iranian capital, Jega reportedly visits Nigeria frequently and has extensive contacts in both countries. Jega was fingered as not only the man who helped the two Iranians implicated in the shipment obtain Nigerian visas, but also as the listed owner of the shipment itself. (The Iranian nationals' names are listed as Sayed Akbar Tahmaesebi and Azimi Agajany.) The report also described the involvement of another Nigerian national named Malam Aliyu Oroje Wamakko, who was working as a clearing agent at the port. Wamakko was cited as the lone suspect detained thus far. The report was unconfirmed, however. After this, there was a noticeable lull in media attention until Nov. 10, when Nigeria's State Security Service (SSS) held a press conference. The report about Jega, Wamakko, Tahmaesebi and Agajany did not gain much traction. No one was hyping the incident, but there must have been intense discussions between the Nigerian and Iranian governments during the lull because Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki arranged a visit for Nov. 11.

Nov. 10

• An SSS spokesman called untrue Israel's claims that the arms were destined for Gaza and confirmed publicly that the SSS arrested two Nigerians involved in the plot — the consignee and the clearing agent. The SSS spokesman also claimed the organization was monitoring the shipment before it even arrived in Nigeria.

Nov. 11

• Mottaki arrived in Nigeria. (Nigerian Foreign Minister Odein Ajumogobia later said Mottaki personally admitted to him in their meeting that the weapons originated in Iran.)

Nov. 12

• The first media report alleging that the two Iranian nationals involved in the operation were members of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was published. Mottaki and Ajumogobia held a meeting that yielded several results. Ajumogobia said for the first time that Nigeria would consider reporting the matter to the U.N. Security Council (UNSC). (It would emerge later that Nigeria informed the UNSC on Nov. 12, but it was nothing more than a notification that the government was investigating the issue, not a call for greater international involvement.) The Nigerians stated they obtained Tehran's permission to interview Agajany and that the SSS was already conducting the interview. The other Iranian national, Tahmaesebi, had diplomatic immunity, making him off limits to interrogation. He subsequently left the country with Mottaki's delegation. Ajumogobia also said the Nigerians were investigating the Gambian angle and that they had detained Jega in connection with the probe. The most important aspect of the story is the Nigerian threat to report Iran to the UNSC for a violation of the sanctions levied on Tehran in the summer of 2010. Were Abuja to push for an international investigation into the affair, it likely would give the United States and other countries pretext for additional sanctions. That the Nigerian government only informed the UNSC of its investigation — and that it would inform the world of its findings at a later date — gave Abuja a card to play in the future.

Nov. 14

• Ajumogobia left for New York to attend the UNSC meeting on Sudan. He was widely expected to use the occasion to publicly call out Iran on the use of Nigerian territory for an illicit weapons smuggling program but instead only quietly discussed the matter. This served as a major indicator that Abuja, at least at that point, did not intend to press the issue too hard. This did not mean, however, that the Nigerians were all that happy about the matter.

Nov. 15

• Mottaki called the entire incident a "misunderstanding." He conceded that an Iranian citizen — Agajany, whom the Nigerians detained — was involved but said the citizen was working for a private company, refraining from describing it as an Iranian firm. Mottaki lauded Iran's relationship with Nigeria, even saying that his counterpart had accepted an invitation to visit Iran in late November for the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) ministerial session. The Nigerians, however, seemed to have a different viewpoint and displayed two signs of tension with Tehran: denying that Ajumogobia had yet committed to the OIC session and canceling a friendly soccer match scheduled for that week in Tehran. They claimed they did not have enough players.

Nov. 16

• The Nigerians said an investigation into Iran's activities was still under way.

Nov. 18

• Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan convened another top-level security meeting — the second reported since the seizure — to discuss the matter. The meeting lasted four hours. No public statements were made, but media reported, citing an anonymous media source at the meeting, that Nigeria did not intend to go after Iran on the issue. Also, a STRATFOR source reported that another Iranian cargo shipment was seized at the Lagos port, this time in relation to a heroin smuggling operation.

Nov. 19

• Nigeria's National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) announced the seizure of a 130-kilogram (nearly 290-pound) shipment of heroin traced back to Iran. The seizure was made Nov. 18. At this point, Abuja had shown no signs that it intended to press the weapons seizure too intently, but it also declined to adopt the Iranian line that the incident was a "misunderstanding." While any container with an Iranian connection arriving in Lagos after the seizure would be sure to automatically get a full search, it is also likely that the decision to publicize the enormous heroin seizure had political authorization from the top.

Nov. 21

• The chief of the NDLEA thanked U.S. intelligence for the tip-off that led to the seizure of the heroin shipment. The NDLEA statement bolstered theories that foreign intelligence helped to notify Nigeria about the weapons shipment as well. If the United States helped Abuja track down drug shipments, it is not a stretch to think that similar cooperation exists in the realm of illicit arms.

The Remaining Questions

Who pushed for the arms seizure to get publicized in the first place, and how did the story spread?

This does not appear to have been a conspiracy by the United States or another foreign government to discredit Iran by providing another piece of evidence that it is violating U.N. sanctions. Rather, it seems that it was simply a case of the Nigerian press getting wind of suspicious activity at the Lagos port and publishing the report despite explicit threats from security officials to refrain from doing so. The Israelis were the first to turn the incident into something bigger, with the claim — poorly supported by geographic logic — that the weapons were intended for Hamas in Gaza. Once those accusations were made, the Israelis stopped pushing them, for the issue had become an international affair and Abuja was forced to respond. Washington has, for the most part, had nothing to say about the incident, but that does not necessarily mean Washington does not care. It could be holding back on the issue to use it as leverage later.

Why did the Nigerians not kill the story, then, if they did not want it made public?

One reason is that, in the first few days at least, the Nigerians were legitimately concerned about the possibility that such a huge shipment of high-powered weapons was being sent to militant groups within Nigeria. The West Africa/Gambia re-export possibility was not publicly mentioned until four days after the first container was opened, and the Iranian shipper's move to transfer the containers from the warehouse back to the A. P. Moller Terminal occurred just weeks after the Oct. 1 Abuja blasts believed to have been carried out by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. Nigeria was also concerned with its credibility and its relationship with the United States (Nigeria is the United States' fourth-largest provider of crude oil). Nigeria was one of the non-permanent UNSC members that voted in favor of sanctions on Iran last summer. Even if Nigeria never intended to push for a full international investigation into the issue, the government would feel compelled to at least go through the motions.

How does this bode for Nigeria's bilateral relations with Iran?

Once it became clear the weapons were not intended for any groups inside of Nigeria, but that Nigeria was being used as a transshipment point in a smuggling route to another country in West Africa, Abuja knew the seizure did not represent any direct threat to its national security. Therefore, in terms of bilateral relations with Iran, Nigeria is unlikely to do anything especially rash. If it does, however, it likely will be due to pressure in the future from outside parties such as the United States or Israel. In other words, Nigeria likely will not use this incident as a card in the larger game against Iran unless Washington prods it to do so. A statement made early on by Ajumogobia gave the clearest indication that Abuja wanted to maintain the ability to avoid putting itself into a corner: "The Security Council resolution, to which Nigeria was party, was dealing with nuclear materials. There's no indication that's implicated here."

What will the potential effect be on Iranian smuggling routes in West Africa?

Information on the precise nature of Iranian smuggling in West Africa is extremely difficult to come by, as it is the nature of such business to be conducted under the table, making any data susceptible to influence by rumor and speculation. It is highly unlikely, however, that these two recent seizures — the arms on Oct. 26 and the heroin on Nov. 18 — were the first times that Iranians had ever used Lagos for such operations. The quantities were too large for a first run; there are clearly well-established personal relationships in place between Iranian smugglers and Nigerians employed in customs, government agencies, security agencies and other arenas. Lagos suddenly has become an unfriendly port for Iranian smugglers. Any container that comes through there, during the next few months at least, surely will be searched. Business may return to normal after the spotlight on Iran fades, but for now, Iranian smugglers likely will focus on other ports in the region. The only downside for the Iranians is that Lagos is by far the largest port, capable of handling the biggest volumes in the region. The next intended destination of the weapons after Lagos is believed to have been Gambia, a country that has no need for such hardware. Where the weapons were going from Banjul is unknown and also relatively insignificant in terms of how it will affect Iran. The heroin reportedly was heading for European markets, an industry which will continue on unabated regardless of whether Lagos can continue to be used as a transshipment point.

What should we watch for next?

Nigeria has said it is investigating the issue and that it will inform the UNSC of its findings at a later date. There is plenty of evidence to implicate Iran in violations of U.N. sanctions that prohibit illicit weapons shipments if Abuja chooses to pursue this line. If Nigeria brings this story back to life later on, STRATFOR will be watching closely to see what possible trade-offs have been made with foreign governments, primarily the United States, that would give it an incentive to do so.