A group calling itself the Forces for the Liberation of the North released a statement in the Malian newspaper L'Essor on Aug. 16 announcing that it is a splinter group from the Ganda Iso militia and that it intends to liberate Mali's north. The group said it has 700 men in the town of Mopti, along the Niger River, ready to take on the Islamist militants who have occupied much of the African country.
Like the Ganda Koi militia, Ganda Iso comes from Mali's Hausa-Fulani community; Bamako has used both groups in the past to counter Tuareg separatist activity in the deserts of northern Mali. Ganda Iso has since evolved from a militia into a political entity, but the elements of the group that formed the Forces for the Liberation of the North are preparing more actively to defend themselves. Stratfor has noted that non-Tuareg communities in Mali could field militias to combat Islamist militants. The Aug. 16 report and other signals from militias and communities suggest this possibility is materializing.
While many obstacles to an effective intervention in the north remain, increasing grassroots opposition to Islamist militant groups could eventually weaken the militants' hold on the region's three key cities — Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal — giving Bamako the chance to restore its authority in the long term.
Bamako's Challenge
The main adversaries from the March 22 coup in Bamako — discontented junior elements of the military on one side and the old political elite on the other — are still struggling against one another. This is hampering the transition back to civilian rule and delaying the chances for an effective unity government in the near term. An internationally recognized government must take power in Bamako before the Economic Community of West African States can seek approval and coordinate the logistics for an offensive against northern militants. The West African coordinating body is also seeking a U.N. mandate, which would provide political cover against accusations of foreign occupation and likely funding.
Once political squabbling in the capital ends and the Economic Community of West African States can deliver on its vow to deploy a 3,300-troop force to Mali's north, plenty of logistical difficulties lie ahead. A military attempt to overwhelm the two dominant militant Islamist groups, Ansar Eddine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad, would have to overcome the same geographic obstacles that hindered Bamako's first attempt to dislodge the militants. This time, however, several signs of vulnerability among the militants have emerged that Bamako and external actors could exploit.
Militant Vulnerabilities
The Movement for Unity and Jihad enjoyed some popularity after the militant takeover in northern Mali since it provided social services to locals. But the militants have taken other steps that have angered the civilian population. Throughout the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, the militants worked assiduously to enforce Sharia. This strongly clashed with local mores, which favor a moderate interpretation of Islam.
In Gao, hundreds of locals reportedly protested attempts to cut off the hand of a suspect accused of theft, delaying the sentence's execution for a day. An Islamist assault on a radio commentator who urged residents to return to the streets prompted locals to demonstrate. And the destruction of shrines in Timbuktu has antagonized many locals who depend on tourism for their livelihood. These frustrations have the potential to fester, cementing local opposition to the Islamists and providing an opening for Bamako.
Making the militants' position more precarious, most members of the Movement for Unity and Jihad and of Ansar Eddine are semi-nomadic Tuaregs or foreigners with few ties to the pre-existing communities.
Skirmishes between local militias and Islamists have been reported throughout the conflict. These militias have included elements of the Ganda Iso, later morphing into the Forces for the Liberation of the North; the National Liberation Front of the Azawad militia of Arab traders based in Timbuktu; and the Ganda Koi, a militia that fought alongside the Ganda Iso against Tuaregs in the 1990s. The Ganda Koi pledged its allegiance to the Malian armed forces Aug. 14, suggesting that anti-Islamist momentum is building.
While these militias lack the cohesion to serve as a central authority or security apparatus in the north, their ability to mobilize and defend their cities — with or without Bamako's blessing — could significantly complicate Ansar Eddine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad's long-term plans. Indeed, the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad, the main secular secessionist element of the original rebellion, still maintains bases in the area that could serve as beachheads for forces seeking to oust the Islamists.
Mediation Efforts
Realizing that their hold will gradually become more precarious, leaders of Ansar Eddine reached out to members of the Economic Community of West African States and to Burkina Faso on Aug. 7 to seek mediation. How these talks will proceed is not clear. The Islamist groups at the very least will be asked to sever their ties with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in exchange for assistance from the Economic Community of West African States. To avoid setting a precedent, the Economic Community of West African States will want to avoid legitimizing a sub-national rebel group by speaking directly with it. Still, the Economic Community of West African States and Bamako understand their constraints, so there will be some give-and-take between them and the Islamists.
Unconfirmed reports speculate that Ansar Eddine has come to the negotiating table because many of its troops have returned to Libya, where they think new opportunities have appeared. If the leaders of Ansar Eddine ultimately find their situation too dire, their main goal in negotiations might shift to securing asylum or amnesty for their key leaders.
As time passes, militant vulnerabilities are becoming more apparent to all parties involved in the conflict. They do not have the capacity to govern territory over the long term and have few levers through which to establish their legitimacy among the populace. Their limitations will likely significantly weaken their grasp over Mali's three key cities in the long term, and this will potentially open the way for an eventual northern offensive.
