It is unclear how the Sept. 12 clashes started, but the altercation occurred after an advance team from the Capriles campaign arrived at the airport in Puerto Cabello, Carabobo state, about 122 kilometers (75 miles) west of Caracas. Dozens of Chavez and Capriles supporters threw rocks at one another, several vehicles were reportedly set on fire, and more than a dozen people sustained minor injuries.
The campaigns have traded accusations about whose supporters instigated the incident. United Socialist Party of Venezuela members have accused the Capriles campaign of starting the clash. Puerto Cabello Mayor Rafael Lacava said Capriles collaborated with Carabobo state Gov. Henrique Salas Feo to hire mercenaries to generate anxiety in the crowd, thus bringing about the clashes. Capriles' supporters have made similar accusations against the Chavez campaign. Tomas Guanipa, the head of Capriles' Justice First party, claims to have a document generated by the Chavez campaign directing party members to incite "hatred and violence." During an earlier incident on Sept. 2 in western Venezuela, opposition politician Vicente Bello from the New Era party, which is supporting Capriles in the election, claimed that Chavez supporters shot into a crowd of opposition supporters during a voting drill, injuring four.
These developments have created an atmosphere of tension and likely presage more violent incidents at political events throughout the country. Even before the recent clashes, Venezuela had been experiencing increased volatility. Throughout early 2012, the government's internal stability was threatened by Chavez's illness. While Chavez appears well enough to stand for election, questions about his health remain. During the campaign, Chavez and members of his administration have said they believe civil war will erupt if the opposition wins the election. While this is obviously intended to scare voters away from voting for the opposition, it could also be a warning to Chavez's fractious inner circle, which the Venezuelan president has taken several measures to keep under his control.
In 2007, Chavez announced the creation of Bolivarian militias that would report to Chavez and whose mission was to support the ideological goals of the administration. These and other pro-Chavez armed groups exist today and serve as an insurance policy of sorts for the Chavez administration. By forming an armed force that can instigate chaos in the event of a coup, Chavez made any attempt to depose him directly or destabilize his government more risky. The existence of these armed groups, the plethora of small arms trafficking in South America and the extreme political polarization in Venezuela all lend credence to Chavez's warnings of conflict, if not outright civil war, in the event of an opposition victory. But the militias also serve as a bulwark against any elements within the military or political elite who see a future for Venezuela that does not include an ailing Chavez.
The main purpose of the increasingly forceful rhetoric is to generate enthusiasm for the election. While polls are inconsistent and unreliable in Venezuela, there are some indications that Capriles may be gaining against the still quite popular Chavez. Possibly as a result of these perceived advances, the Chavez campaign is being extremely aggressive. Throughout Venezuela, loudspeakers on main streets have been playing Chavez speeches and issuing calls to support the government, adding to the sense of uncertainty and tension surrounding the upcoming elections.
The occasional violent confrontation is not unusual for political events in Venezuela, and clashes can be expected in Venezuela in the remaining three weeks before the elections. After 13 years in power, the stakes are high for Chavez and his inner circle. Chavez's election in 1999 unseated Venezuela's previous political elite. In the time since, Chavez and his associates have become the new political elite, and they can be expected to take assertive measures to retain that status.
