Summary

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has pledged to stay on as the presidential candidate for the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) despite his failing health. Amid rumors that Chavez is now gravely ill, there are serious doubts as to whether he can live long enough to see the results of the Oct. 7 election, let alone survive another six-year presidential term.

Stratfor believes the two likeliest scenarios are that Chavez dies or steps down prior to the election or that he dies shortly after the election, which is not a guaranteed victory for the president. Whoever wins the election will face daunting economic and security challenges. The winner will have to manage the country's fractious security forces, any group of which may compete violently for power if a political vacuum is created. The military is divided and weak and likely will not attempt a coup so long as the authority of the civilian government is undisputed. With many of Venezuela's military leaders sanctioned for drug trafficking by the U.S. government, any government that comes to power must protect key members of the "Chavista" elite. 

If Chavez Bows Out of Contention 

If Chavez dies or is otherwise incapacitated before the elections, the country's vice president, currently Elias Jaua, would assume the presidency in accordance with the Venezuelan constitution. A relatively unpopular and uncharismatic leader, Jaua's main asset is his unwavering loyalty to Chavez. Notably, Jaua also heads the recently created Council of State, which consists of representatives from the National Assembly and the Supreme Court and includes Jose Vicente Rangel, a former vice president and influential moderate, nationalist and Chavista. The council's stated purpose is to advise the president, but its creation may be an attempt to establish a presidential transition plan — or at least the appearance that a transition is under consideration.

It is unclear who would be the PSUV candidate in this scenario. Of all the possibilities, Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolas Maduro appears to be the most likely candidate. A longtime Chavez loyalist, Maduro has held multiple government posts over the past decade, and, like Chavez, he has a close relationship with the Cuban government. He is also probably the most able of Chavez's inner circle to sustain public support. However, other factions within Chavez's circle, which includes Defense Minister Henry Rangel Silva and National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello, apparently do not fully support Maduro. Significantly, these factions are more intimately linked with the Venezuelan military than is Maduro.

But neither Rangel Silva, who is deemed a drug kingpin by the United States, nor Cabello has the kind of public support needed to lead the country. Instead, they would most likely support — and try to influence — whoever Chavez designates as his successor or stand-in for the presidential election. If Chavez is completely out of contention, any alliance between his successor and the remnants of his regime would be tenuous. With no strong leader holding the Chavistas together, divergent interests would emerge and put pressure on any incoming government.

The key decision the group would have to make is whether to hold the election at all. And if it does decide to hold the election, the group would have to determine which Chavista successor has a chance of defeating Miranda state Gov. Henrique Capriles Radonski, the popular center-left opposition candidate.

However, canceled elections would provoke a strong international reaction, which, given that the Venezuelan economy heavily depends on trade with the United States, could lead to potentially devastating trade sanctions against the interim government. But Venezuela is not a pressing concern for the United States, which relies heavily on Venezuelan oil and therefore may abstain from sanctions.

Moreover, democratic states in Latin American, particularly Brazil, have unpleasant memories of past dictatorships and have consistently vowed to retaliate against governments that abandon democratic principles. Between hostile Latin American neighbors and European trading partners, roughly half of Venezuela's imports, which are increasingly important as Venezuela's domestic productivity has declined, would be at risk. This threat strongly deters the abandoning of democracy.

If elections were allowed to move forward, Capriles would have a real chance of defeating a fractious and divided PSUV candidate. The manner in which Chavez departs the race would affect the outcome of the election. Assuming he is still alive while his successor runs for office, Chavez' open support for a successor likely would translate to increased public support, despite the weakness of the available candidates. But whoever wins the election would have to balance competing economic, political and security factions under the constant threat of public unrest and the possibility of increased criminal and militant activity.

If Chavez Runs for Re-election

If Chavez lives long enough to run as the PSUV candidate, his popularity could bring him a victory. However, assuming the severity of his illness persists, Chavez could die soon after the election. According to Article 233 of the 2009 revision of the Venezuelan constitution, if the president dies while president-elect or before the first four years of his term are completed, the president of the National Assembly — currently Cabello — would become president and be required to call for snap elections within 30 days.

This scenario presumes that Capriles has lost the election to Chavez. With the coalition of opposition parties tenuously held together, a presidential defeat would likely cause the opposition to fracture. For its part, a weakened opposition would submit a candidate against a potentially unpopular or weak PSUV candidate. The outcome of the election would depend on a variety of factors, such as Chavez's naming of and support for a credible successor and the degree to which economic challenges — such as goods shortages, utility service failures and inflation — affect Venezuelans. In this scenario, the resultant government would not only be politically weaker than the one in the first scenario, but it also would face the same underlying challenges.