The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan is the only legally registered Islamist party in Central Asia. Like its Afghan Tajik counterpart, Jamiat-e-Islami, the party is organized based on the Muslim Brotherhood's model. The party was one of the groups that made up the United Tajik Opposition, an umbrella organization that fought against the forces of current Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon during the 1992-1997 Tajik civil war. Yet beyond a common enemy, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan shared little else with the other groups of the United Tajik Opposition, such as the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and the Gami and Pamiri clans.
With a reported membership of 40,000, the party is the second-largest political party in Tajikistan, but it is sharply limited in terms of policy-making. The Islamist party holds only two seats in parliament and does not hold any national-level Cabinet positions. Furthermore, Rakhmon has consolidated power; many opposition forces that were given political and security positions following the civil war — including the party itself — have since been purged from these positions.
Recent Developments
The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan looks to be rising in importance within the country's political and security realms. Several political movements have taken form recently in Tajikistan to contest Rakhmon in the upcoming presidential election. The most notable among these groups is the Youth Party, whose leader, Izzat Amon, reportedly has ties to the Islamist party. Amon led the youth wing of the party in countries such as Iran and Pakistan and is allegedly close to party head Muhiddin Kabiri. Religiosity in Tajikistan is growing, and the government has made moves that alienate Muslim groups, for instance, closing mosques and cracking down on religious elements. Given these circumstances, Stratfor in June identified the Youth Party — and by association the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, which boycotted the last presidential elections in 2006 — as a key movement to watch.
Tajikistan has experienced a high degree of instability as a result of the military operation in Gorno-Badakhshan following the July 24 killing of the region's top security official. One day prior to this operation, Sabzali Mamadrizoyev, the head of the Islamist party's branch in Gorno-Badakhshan, led a demonstration in Khorog, the regional capital, reportedly against the government's unwillingness to address the poor socio-economic situation in the region. Mamadrizoyev was detained after this demonstration, and three days later he was found dead after reportedly being beaten and shot with an assault rifle.
This is not the only important security development in which the party appears to have some sort of connection. On June 13, Holmumin Safarov, director of the country's department of forestry and Rakhmon's brother-in-law, was killed in Dushanbe. While it is unclear who killed him and why (Safarov was an influential figure, but not within Rakhmon's close power circle), two suspects were arrested Aug. 13 in connection with the case. One of the suspects is allegedly a brother-in-law of Muhammadali Fayzmuhammad, head of the Islamist party's audit commission.
These arrests came shortly after Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan offices in the town of Vahdat were vandalized and set on fire. Who carried out the incident is not known, though there is speculation that supporters of the Tajik government committed the act in an attempt to undermine the party's possibly strengthening position ahead of the presidential election in 2013. The party's emergence could also be a factor in the group's implication in the high-profile murder.
Looking Ahead
It remains unclear whether all of these incidents are related. And while its profile as an increasingly vocal critic of the government has been growing of late, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan still faces serious operational challenges. These include what appears to be a concerted effort by the government to crack down on the group and its religious supporters as well as internal divisions between moderates and more radical elements within the group itself.
The opaque nature of events within Tajikistan only complicates the assessment of the situation. Even now, it is not fully known what is going in Gorno-Badakhshan — the government severed communication lines to the region and media have not been able to report on developments there. While the government reported that it has reached a truce with former warlords in the region, and an uneasy calm appears to have taken hold in Gorno-Badakhshan, it is difficult to say whether fighting has actually stopped. Also, certain reports claim that protests against the military operations are continuing in the region.
While the situation in Tajikistan remains hard to measure, much of the militancy in Central Asia is not simply Islamist-related violence — it may be associated with countries' internal political dynamics as well. This appears to be the case in Tajikistan, where a power struggle that the civil war failed to fully settle could be resurfacing. If this is indeed the case, then the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan will be a key group to watch, considering the party's former role in an opposition that could be gaining strength in Tajikistan's uncertain and unstable environment.
