Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon came to power in 1994, during Tajikistan's 1992-1997 civil war between the Popular Front and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). The war began with uprisings in Tajikistan's Garm and Gorno-Badakhshan regions because, following the power vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the areas' ethnic groups were under-represented in the government of former Tajik President Rakhmon Nabiyev.
Emomali Rakhmon led the Popular Front, made up of the Tajik government, the Kulyabi and Khojenti clans and factions from Uzbekistan and Russia. Sayed Abdullo Nuri led the UTO, which comprises the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Democratic Party of Tajikistan and the Gami and Pamiri clans.
The Popular Front won the war but agreed to share power and give the UTO 30 percent representation in government structures. That representation was never fully implemented, causing discontent in the opposition and problems for Rakhmon, including an assassination attempt in 1997 and two coup attempts in 1998.
Since then, Rakhmon has consolidated his power in most of the country, except in the Rasht Valley — an area that is difficult for Tajik security forces to reach and is known to be under the influence of rebels from the former opposition. Rakhmon's government refers to the rebels as Islamist militants, but the level of Islamist militancy in the region is unclear. Many of the rebels were members of the UTO. Also associated with the UTO was the IRP — an Islamist party that is currently the major opposition party in Tajikistan and reportedly the country's second-largest party even though it only holds two seats in parliament.
Tajik politics have remained fairly stable since Rakhmon has been able to prevent the rise of any serious political challengers by using various tactics, such as creating registration problems for new opposition parties. However, the security situation has not remained as calm in recent years. A flare-up in violence in 2010, including a prison break and the killings of 25 military personnel, led to security sweeps, confrontations with the rebels in the Rasht Valley, arrests of former fighters and a crackdown on religious activity.
New Developments
Notable political developments are already taking place ahead of Tajikistan's 2013 presidential election. New political movements are beginning to form and could eventually become political parties. Three of these movements are the National Movement of Tajikistan, the Popular Front Without Weapons and the Youth Movement. The National Movement of Tajikistan consists of Tajiks living and working in Tajikistan, the United States, Europe, Iran and Russia. The Popular Front Without Weapons is seeking to resurrect the former Popular Front party, which was abolished in 1997, to participate in the election.
These movements will not likely pose serious challenges to Rakhmon at present. They are in their nascent stages and some may have even been created by Rakhmon, as was the case with other parties emerging ahead of the 2006 presidential election. But the Youth Party is different, and potentially significant, due to its ties to both youth and religious segments of the country. Religious sentiment has been increasing among Tajik youths and could cause problems for the existing regime.
The Youth Party and the Future of Tajik Politics
The Youth Party is in the process of applying for registration in order to increase youth involvement in Tajik politics. The movement's leader, Izzat Amon, reportedly has ties to the IRP, which boycotted the 2006 election, criticizing the electoral apparatus as unreliable. But a more active IRP, working through the Youth Party, could be significant in the upcoming election.
Amon is reportedly close to IRP head Muhiddin Kabiri, and from 2004 to 2008 Amon led the youth wing of IRP outside Tajikistan, in countries such as Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Amon also has organized IRP activities and registered a group called The Union of Tajik Youth in Russia.
The Tajik government has already shown its concern with the Tajik youths' religious tendencies, implementing sweeping crackdowns on their activities and their ability to connect with foreign religious groups. The importance of the Youth Party and its ties to the IRP are potentially troubling for the regime, especially in the run-up to the 2013 presidential election. The problems posed by increasing religious and political opposition will be further complicated by the insecurity that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan could create.
