The FLN secured 221 of the parliament's 462 seats, while the National Rally for Democracy (RND), led by Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia and backed by Algeria's powerful state security agencies, won 70 seats and retained its position as the second-largest party in parliament. The conservative Islamist Green Alliance won 47 seats.
The FLN benefited from a divided and poorly organized opposition to increase its margin of victory in the election. Youth participation in the political process waned due to increasing dissatisfaction with the government. This left the older generation, which more broadly supports the president and the FLN, to claim a disproportionate share of the vote. The FLN's victory ensures a significant degree of influence for the army as parliament prepares to write the new constitution.
The Green Alliance, made up of the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), the Ennahda party and al-Islah, won fewer seats than expected. The Green Alliance's 47 seats leave it with 13 fewer than MSP held as a member of the previous parliamentary coalition backing Bouteflika. The Green Alliance's inability to add seats underscores the challenges it faces, including a lack of institutional organization and cooperation with other Islamist parties and infighting among Islamist candidates. Accusations of collaboration with the FLN also bring the scrutiny of other Islamists, who are wary of any cooperation with the establishment. Despite the international community's assessment of the elections as free and fair, Islamists have repeatedly claimed that the military — and by extension the FLN — engaged in election fraud. These claims have not generated large-scale protests or spurred international criticism of the electoral process.
This parliament is expected to complete a draft of the new constitution by the end of 2012. The FLN's large proportion of seats and the army's resulting influence mean the draft will likely do little to change the current power structures that govern Algeria. Opposition RND leader Ahmed Ouyahia has powerful backers within the state intelligence agencies, and his support was critical for Bouteflika's previous two presidential campaigns. Any effort by an FLN member to replace Ouyahia as prime minister could indicate increased internal cohesion in the FLN ahead of the 2014 presidential election. It might also indicate that the army is pushing back against the state intelligence agencies' rise to power.
The electorate may still reject any attempt by the army at power consolidation that excludes minority parties during the drafting of the constitution. Furthermore, if the army pushes for a prime minister who would co-opt his authority, Bouteflika could split the FLN and form a presidential alliance, as he has done in the past. Such a move would factionalize the FLN ahead of presidential elections and would strengthen the position of the intelligence apparatus.
The FLN's parliamentary gains show that the army can contain the potential Islamist threat for now. The military can therefore focus on the power struggle going on behind the scenes.
