Jihadist groups in Indonesia are currently very weak, as demonstrated in a thwarted March 29 attack in Makassar. Recent jihadist plots and statements, however, have indicated a growing interest in targeting ethnic Chinese Indonesians in an attempt to exploit one of the darker fault lines in Indonesian society with a long history of lethal violence. Unlike previous episodes of anti-Chinese violence, a repeat in the current era would risk a response from a much more assertive and confident China. Jihadists, or others, could meanwhile exploit conflicts arising from political, economic, religious or commercial frictions to destabilize Indonesia in the near future. 

Two attacks in Indonesia over the course of four days suggest that extremist violence is resuming there after a very quiet 2020. The first, on March 29, involved a man and a woman who detonated a homemade explosive device made from a pressure cooker outside the Sacred Heart of Jesus Cathedral in central Makassar during Palm Sunday services. Security measures at the church ultimately worked, limiting the fatalities to the two suicide bombers. Twenty others were injured, including the guard who stopped the couple. Several days later, a woman entered the national police headquarters in Jakarta brandishing what turned out to be a nonlethal airsoft gun. Responding security officers shot her dead in an effort to prevent what they thought could have been a mass casualty event. Authorities are still investigating connections between that incident and arrests related to the March 29 attack. A specific terrorism nexus is not clear; personal grievances may have been in play.

The March 29 attack marked the first significant jihadist activity in a major Indonesian urban area in over a year, as jihadist groups there have faced compounding setbacks linked to the decline of the Islamic State and COVID-19 related restrictions. Authorities have identified the suicide bombers behind the March 29 attack and are linking them to the arrests of around 20 people in January accused of belonging to the Islamic State-linked Jamaah Ansharut Daulah, (JAD) a faltering jihadist movement in Indonesia that has been mostly dormant for the past year. JAD was already in decline in 2019 thanks to counterterrorism efforts that were leading to regular arrests of the group's leaders and disruptions of local plots. The overall decline in the attractiveness of the Islamic State brand as it suffered losses in Iraq and Syria has also led to disenchantment within the group among its hundreds of Indonesian members who had pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was killed in 2019. The added restrictions on the gathering and movement of people during the COVID-19 pandemic have only amplified the group's struggles. Bans on mass gatherings denied attackers target-rich environments to conduct mass-casualty attacks and the movement of people, in general, was constrained by lockdown measures. Declines in jihadist attacks, however, do not mean that there is a decline in the overall jihadist threat. As Sidney Jones of the Institute For Policy Analysis of Conflict wrote in January, jihadism in Indonesia is down, but not out. Local networks that were around long before JAD consolidated support will continue to pose threats to Indonesian society long after JAD no longer poses a significant threat.

As attacks, in general, declined over 2020, a disturbing trend emerged that suggests jihadists are turning their attention to the ethnic Chinese Indonesian population. While there were no major successful attacks against ethnic Chinese targets in 2020, arrests of prominent jihadists have revealed an underlying interest in targeting ethnic Chinese communities and property due to their perceived wealth, the increasing influence of China in the region, and perceptions that China and Chinese Indonesians are anti-Muslim.

• The arrest of former jihadist financier Imarudin in 2020 revealed that he was convinced that China's growing military and economic power was a sign of the end of the world and that he was planning attacks on Chinese investments and personnel to spark a war between Indonesian Muslims and China. 
• In June 2020, police arrested two jihadists trying to make TATP they planned on using to attack churches frequented by ethnic Chinese Indonesians. The plotters were angry about China's treatment of Muslims in Xinjiang. 
• In April 2020, supporters of local Islamic State promoter Zulfiqar Rahman discussed targeting Chinese interests under the cover of social unrest.

The focus on Chinese targets demonstrated in the instances listed above suggests that there is general interest within local Indonesian jihadist networks in targeting ethnic Chinese populations and interests of the People's Republic of China in Indonesia. The pervasiveness of the theme in statements from jihadist figures and disrupted plots by authorities means that more plots against ethnic Chinese targets are likely in the future, increasing the likelihood that one of them eventually will succeed. Animosity toward the ethnic Chinese population in Indonesia is well established and has led to violence in the recent past, which is all the more reason to be concerned over a jihadist focus on Chinese targets. Ethnic Chinese communities have long had a presence at trading stations throughout the Indonesian archipelago, and occasionally over the centuries, they have faced targeted violence.

Adding to the concern is that around half of the 7 million ethnic Chinese Indonesians are Christian, creating an overlap with the jihadist focus on Christian targets. Two prominent examples in the modern era demonstrate the tendency for ethnic Chinese Indonesians to be treated as scapegoats and the failure to distinguish between the ethnic Chinese population (most of which has Indonesian citizenship) and the policies of the People's Republic of China. The recurrent nature of anti-Chinese sentiment over the course of Indonesia's history suggests that another chapter of violence is very much possible. 

• In the mid-1960s, a frenzy of violence disproportionately targeted ethnic Chinese as part of a broader purge of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). At the time, the PKI was the largest nonruling communist party on the planet, and enjoyed support from mainland China as part of an overall effort to support a global communist revolution. There was also a strong Islamist motivation for these killings. While the population used communism as a tenuous justification for violence, political and economic opportunism also played a role due to perceptions that ethnic Chinese Indonesians were relatively wealthy. Reliable figures are unavailable, but estimates put the number of deaths in the thousands and property damage and theft in the millions of dollars. 
• Similar anti-Chinese sentiment flared up in 1998 when a nationwide political, economic and unemployment crisis sparked riots across Indonesia during the first half of May. Once again, ethnic Chinese Indonesians bore the brunt of the violence, making up most of the more than 1,000 deaths and nearly 200 documented cases of sexual attacks, and accounting for a great deal of the property damage.

Anti-Chinese sentiment continues today, albeit typically in more subtle expressions. In 2016, conservative Muslim groups launched the "212 Movement" to bring down Jakarta gubernatorial candidate Basuki "Ahok" Tjahaja Purnama, an ethnic Chinese politician and a Christian, based on accusations that he had insulted Islam during his campaign. The opposition movement against him culminated in a 200,000-person rally in central Jakarta on Dec. 2, 2016, that contributed to Purnama's eventual election loss and conviction for insulting Islam. The 212 Movement has dissipated since then, with the turnout at following events on the anniversary of the 2016 rally paling in comparison. Authorities meanwhile banned the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), one of the lead groups behind the movement, in December 2020. The success of the original 2016 rally was at least partially attributable to anti-Chinese sentiment and opposition to an ethnic Chinese Indonesian gaining an important office. Other examples since then demonstrate the persistence of anti-Chinese sentiment:

• December 2018 - A demonstration outside the Chinese embassy in Jakarta protested the mistreatment of Muslim Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
• September 2019 - Police disrupted a plot to attack ethnic Chinese-owned businesses in Jakarta during a rally organized by the 212 Movement/FPI.
• December 2020 - Around 800 Indonesian workers damaged property at a Chinese-backed nickel smelting project over plans to bring in Chinese national workers and over anticipated layoffs. 

The history of anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia and its potential to cause widespread violence makes it a societal fault line that radical Islamists could exploit by appealing to larger swaths of disaffected Indonesians. Attacking ethnic Chinese or Chinese national populations, or Chinese-backed projects, would be beneficial for these jihadist movements. They have struggled to gain widespread popularity in the country, but attacking Chinese interests would resonate with more mainstream Indonesian nationalist sentiments to keep the country free of foreign control and to defend Islam. It would also put the Indonesian government in the awkward position of having to defend ethnic Chinese or Chinese national interests, a policy that would risk alienating even more moderate segments of the Indonesian population. 

A jihadist effort to replicate the enthusiasm of the 212 Movement protests would likely rely more on violence rather than mass rallies. While a single attack on an ethnic Chinese Indonesian target could be contained, a sustained campaign of attacks could inspire broader segments of the population outside of the jihadist networks to join in for their own reasons. As demonstrated in the examples above, antipathy towards the ethnic Chinese Indonesian population stems from a variety of issues, ranging from more mainstream to more esoteric extremist conspiracies, including:

• Concern over the Chinese government's treatment of its Muslim population, especially in Xinjiang, where reports of widespread humanitarian abuses have emerged.
• Concern over China's economic interests in Indonesia ranging from China-backed projects (like the nickel smelter) to Chinese-led infrastructure projects linked to its Belt and Road Initiative.
• Opportunistic criminal activity that uses political justifications to attack Chinese communities due to the perception that they have more money and attacks on them are less likely to be investigated. 
• Jihadist-favored end-of-days prophecies arguing that China's rise is an indication of the impending end of the world, and that an all-out war is the only way to save it.

Future violence targeting the ethnic Chinese Indonesian population has the potential to be far more impactful than previous episodes in the 20th century due to China's rise in the 21st century. Beijing was in no position to counter the rise in anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia in the mid-1960s due to its own internal turmoil at the time. In 1998, China was still very much an emerging economy with minimal power projection even in Southeast Asia. By  2021, and in the years to come, however, China has become much more engaged regionally and willing to pressure local governments to protect its interests. For example, China has become much more involved in local security matters in countries like Pakistan and Myanmar in order to protect its personnel and interests there. 

Based on contemporary examples elsewhere, another inflammation of anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia in the current era is much more likely to attract attention from China and, depending on the egregiousness of the transgressions, have a more regional impact. The intensity of the response would depend on the severity and scope of the violence, as well as the relationship between the targets and the People's Republic of China. Indonesians have blurred the line between Chinese ethnicity and Chinese citizenship over the years, punishing ethnic Chinese Indonesians for unrelated policies from Beijing. Failure to distinguish between ethnic identity and national policy has the potential to exacerbate and spread the impact of any violence targeting either ethnic Chinese or Chinese national interests.

There are many indicators of an increased threat of violence and social unrest linked to attacks on ethnic Chinese populations. The current government under the leadership of President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo has taken a very measured, pragmatic approach to its relationship with China, firmly resisting Chinese incursions into Indonesian territory while remaining realistic about China's importance as a trading partner and investor in the country. 

• The most important sign to watch for is a shift in political tone (more likely to come from Indonesian opposition parties) toward a more anti-Chinese stance. As demonstrated in the past, increased animosity toward the People's Republic of China can still lead to violence against the unaffiliated ethnic Chinese Indonesian population. Issues range from human rights issues in Xinjiang, territorial conflicts in the South China Sea, Belt and Road Initiative projects and other commercial operations. 
• Another sign to watch for is more instances of labor unrest like the December 2020 incident at the nickel smelting facility. Accusations of unfair treatment of workers or replacing local workers with Chinese nationals can cause isolated unrest that can quickly spread if workers elsewhere express similar grievances. 
• Increased militant focus on predominantly ethnic Chinese churches has the potential to simultaneously alienate two marginalized populations in Indonesia. 
• As demonstrated by numerous plots outlined above, violent individuals have discussed using episodes of social unrest as opportunities to target Chinese-owned businesses, the most prominent and softest of their potential targets.

Indonesian authorities are well aware of the threat and, as demonstrated by the numerous arrests associated with plots against the ethnic-Chinese Indonesian community, are seeking to avoid the destabilizing effects of renewed episodes of ethnic violence. Jihadists, in general, are on the defensive across Indonesia, simply trying to avoid arrest, gather resources, recruit more militants and carry out rudimentary attacks when they can. For jihadists hoping to leverage what little power they have at the moment, however, aggravating ethnic divides in Indonesia that have the potential to disrupt larger strategic relations is their most promising strategy.