Despite recent diplomatic momentum, U.S.-Iran negotiations remain likely to stall or collapse over irreconcilable demands, sustaining the risk of U.S. (and likely Israeli) military action in the coming weeks. In recent days, the United States has signalled that it is open to meeting with Iran to negotiate a deal that would avert military escalation in the region. Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, have also repeatedly declared that Iran is willing to negotiate a "fair" deal with Washington. Axios reported on Feb. 2 that Araghchi and U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff may meet in the Turkish city of Istanbul on Feb. 6. Against this backdrop, countries including Turkey, Egypt and Qatar have intensified their diplomatic efforts toward organizing a meeting between Iran and the United States, in a bid to prevent military escalation. Meanwhile, media reports suggest that U.S. President Donald Trump still has not made a final decision on whether to attack Iran, and that he remains open to a diplomatic solution. But despite the recent momentum toward talks, Iran is continuing to fortify bunkers and critical infrastructure in preparation for a potential conflict, while the United States is continuing to deploy military assets, including air defenses, to the region. U.S. officials are also reportedly unsure whether Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei would authorize his diplomats to cut a deal acceptable to Washington, while Tehran wants a U.S. military drawdown from the region to be an outcome of negotiations.

• In a Feb. 1 speech, Khamenei accused the U.S. of aiming to "devour" Iran's resources, warning that a U.S.-initiated war would become a regional conflict, while making no mention of negotiations. Trump responded by emphasizing a strong U.S. military posture, citing the deployment of "the biggest, most powerful ships in the world," but also left the door open for a deal, signaling readiness to test Tehran's warning if talks failed.
• On Feb. 1, Araghchi said that "friendly countries" are actively working to build confidence between Tehran and Washington, describing these efforts as "fruitful." In comments to CNN, Araghchi indicated that renewed talks with the United States are possible, provided the American negotiating team adheres to Trump's stated goal of reaching a fair and equitable deal that prohibits Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
• Qatar's prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, visited Tehran on Feb. 1 and met Ali Larijani, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, who later stated that the "formation of a framework for negotiations is progressing." Separately, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi urged his Iranian counterpart, Pezeshkian, to agree to meet with U.S. officials. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan also hosted Araghchi in Ankara to discuss potential venues and agenda items for a possible meeting with White House representatives in the coming days. 
• Eyal Zamir, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff, conducted a low-profile visit to Washington on Jan. 30-31 to discuss defensive and offensive options in the event of a conflict with Iran.

The United States is pursuing a coercive diplomatic approach aimed at forcing Iran to accept far-reaching demands, while Tehran is attempting a last-ditch effort to negotiate and buy time to prepare for escalation. Washington is pairing an expanded military buildup in the Middle East and explicit threats of force with a stated openness to negotiations, aiming to pressure Iran into a deal that would require relinquishing its nuclear program, curbing support for allied militias and accepting constraints on the range and development of its ballistic missile arsenal. Iran, facing domestic unrest and economic strain, is likely seeking a diplomatic off-ramp to avoid another costly attack, but may also be trying to buy time without changing its negotiating strategy. Tehran probably assesses that concessions on its nuclear program — such as moving highly enriched uranium abroad or halting future enrichment — could be enough to secure U.S. sanctions relief, without having to sacrifice its ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel. Israel, meanwhile, has continued to signal that Iran's ballistic missile program — rather than its nuclear program alone — constitutes the most acute and immediate threat to its national security, reinforcing the divergence between Israeli and Iranian goals that continues to complicate regional de-escalation efforts.

• The status of Iran's nuclear program and enriched uranium stockpiles remains unknown following the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, with damage assessments incomplete. 
• Iranian officials have repeatedly indicated that the country's ballistic missile program is not up for negotiation. Iran views these missiles, which can reach Israel, as its primary deterrent against external attacks and a core pillar of national sovereignty and regime survival. 

While talks are possible in the coming days, an agreement will remain elusive due to U.S. maximalist demands and Iranian red lines, which will keep the risk of U.S. military action elevated. The possible Feb. 6 meeting in Istanbul will serve as a kick-off for new negotiations on a U.S.-Iran deal. However, with both sides already asking for preconditions, talks will likely stall, particularly over the thorny issue of Tehran's ballistic missile capabilities. This means the negotiations may merely buy time for Iran to fortify its military and nuclear infrastructure, and for the United States to deploy more military assets to the region and plan another attack. If the talks fail or collapse, the continuation of these military preparations will significantly increase the likelihood of U.S. military action, which would likely involve Israel due to its current focus on the threat posed by Iran's missile program. Any such strikes would almost certainly trigger Iranian retaliation against U.S. forces and assets across the region, including against Israel and possibly Gulf countries and energy facilities.

• In recent weeks, Iranian military and political officials have been hinting that restraining the confrontation with the U.S. military may no longer preserve deterrence and could instead invite further pressure and strikes. In response to another U.S. attack, this means Iran would be more likely to attack Israel, U.S. regional assets and/or vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Iran could also activate its remaining proxies in the region.

If, despite all these constraints, the talks move past exploratory engagement, they could produce a limited agreement, which would depend on Iran accepting stringent nuclear constraints and the United States restraining Israel. If talks proceed, success would hinge on Iran accepting significant constraints to its nuclear program in exchange for calibrated U.S. sanctions relief and de-escalatory military and diplomatic steps. Such concessions would likely include relinquishing Iran's enriched uranium and future enrichment plans, submitting to intrusive monitoring and verification and freezing any pathway to nuclear weaponization. Success will also depend on whether the United States can restrain Israel from taking unilateral military action against Iran, and convince it that such a deal is, for the time being, beneficial. Any new U.S.-Iran deal would likely be narrowly focused on rolling back Iran's nuclear program and support for regional proxies. In return, Iran would likely secure partial, phased sanctions relief, along with reduced diplomatic isolation and a progressive drawdown of the U.S. forces amassed off its coast. This would reduce tensions between the two countries and reduce the risk of regional conflagration. 

• While unlikely, a U.S.-Iran deal could still materialize in the coming weeks. For one, a collapse of talks now carries greater strategic, economic and military consequences than in past rounds, as a regional spillover is more likely with both Iran and the United States preparing for a broader confrontation. Iran is now also entering discussions from a weaker position than in the past, as it faces ongoing domestic protests and a much larger U.S. military presence in the Gulf, which may make Tehran more willing to compromise. Furthermore, Iran's current halt on uranium enrichment grants it more political flexibility to negotiate on its nuclear program compared with past talks. 
• For the Trump administration, getting Iran to dismantle (or at least limit) its nuclear program and regional proxy strategy without resorting to military action would represent a political victory, given its promise to end wars — especially ahead of U.S. midterm elections in November.