The U.K. flag is flown near the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., to honor the passing of Queen Elizabeth II, on Sept. 9, 2022.
(Drew Angerer/Getty Images)
The U.K. flag is flown near the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., to honor the passing of Queen Elizabeth II, on Sept. 9, 2022.

While the United Kingdom will likely avoid major U.S. tariffs, concessions to Trump could further complicate the ruling Labour Party's efforts to restore trade ties with the European Union and expand economic engagement with China. The U.K. government remains confident that it can avoid a trade war with the United States, with high-ranking officials, including Prime Minister Keir Starmer, recently saying that good relations between London and Washington will prevent an escalation of trade disputes. On Feb. 11, the U.K. government said that London would not retaliate immediately to the White House's Feb. 10 decision to implement tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from around the world, including the United Kingdom. And while U.S. President Donald Trump has already imposed or threatened tariffs against several U.S. key trading partners, he hinted at a possible exception for the United Kingdom, emphasizing his positive relationship with Starmer.

  • On Feb. 1, Trump imposed 25% tariffs on Canadian and Mexican imports but later suspended them for 30 days after Canada and Mexico pledged to tighten fentanyl and migration controls. This underscored the White House's willingness to both act on trade threats against key partners and engage in negotiation. Additionally, Trump imposed a 10% tariff on all U.S. imports of Chinese goods, to which China retaliated with 10-15% tariffs on imports of select U.S. goods. Trump also warned of substantial tariffs against the European Union.
  • According to the U.K. Office for National Statistics, the United Kingdom had a 71 billion pound ($90 billion) trade surplus with the United States in 2023, while the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis recorded a $14.5 billion U.S. surplus with the United Kingdom; the agencies attributed the discrepancy to using different accounting methods. This ambiguity benefits the United Kingdom, as Trump's tariff threats tend to target countries or trading blocs with which the United States has large trade deficits, like the European Union, which had a surplus exceeding $200 billion with the United States over the same period.

To avoid any significant tariff increase, the United Kingdom will likely need to make concessions to the Trump administration, such as increasing imports of U.S. products or taking a tougher stance on China, though a trade deal remains unlikely. Trump's tariff strategy so far suggests he is largely using tariffs as a targeted negotiating tool vis a vis specific countries to extract concessions on their trade and diplomatic relations with the United States. If this pattern holds, an outright economic confrontation with the United Kingdom is unlikely, given that the United States runs a trade surplus with the country, and has historically close ties with London, especially on security matters. Still, with economic growth central to Labour's agenda and the United Kingdom facing significant headwinds with little fiscal space for stimulus, Starmer's government will be keen to avoid significant trade restrictions from its largest individual trading partner (second only to the European Union, taken as a whole). Trump, however, might expect some concessions in return. While discussions for a U.K-U.S. free trade agreement could resume, a comprehensive deal remains unlikely due to unresolved regulatory disputes, particularly over conflicting food safety standards and healthcare services. Indeed, these disputes stalled U.S.-U.K. trade talks during Trump's first term, when former British Prime Minister Bors Johnson's more politically aligned Conservative government was in office. Instead, the United Kingdom will likely pursue sector-specific agreements in digital trade, defense and financial services to improve trade relations with the United States while also seeking to appease Trump by promising to increase purchases of U.S. products — such as liquefied natural gas (LNG) and defense equipment — and possibly by promising to take tougher stance vis a vis China.

  • Estimates from the United Kingdom's Centre for Inclusive Trade Policy suggest that a 20% blanket U.S. tariff on U.K. goods could reduce U.K. exports to the United States by 22 billion pounds ($28 billion), equivalent to 0.8% of the United Kingdom's GDP. This would be a relatively modest impact compared to other major European economies because services — which are key to the U.K. economy — are unlikely to face tariffs. Still, such tariffs would be a significant challenge for a government that views economic growth as essential to delivering on its campaign promises of improved living standards and public services. The Labour Party also views closer trade ties with key partners (including the European Union, the United States and China) as key to stimulating the United Kingdom's stagnating economy.
  • During an address to Congress, Trump's newly appointed U.S. trade representative, Jamieson Greer, mentioned the United Kingdom as a possible partner for future free trade deals in 2024 as part of U.S. efforts to ''seek market access in non-Chinese markets in incremental, sectoral and bilateral agreements.'' 
  • Given the political and regulatory hurdles that have previously stalled U.S.-U.K. talks on a comprehensive free trade deal, the United Kingdom and the United States may instead prioritize sector-specific agreements in key industries such as digital trade, defense and financial services. This could include agreements to facilitate cross-border data flows, enhance cybersecurity collaboration and promote regulatory alignment in emerging technologies such as AI and fintech. London and Washington could also seek to deepen their military-industrial ties via procurement deals and co-development projects in areas such as advanced weaponry, cybersecurity and space defense. Additionally, the two countries could pursue enhanced cooperation in banking regulations, insurance markets and investment frameworks to maintain London's competitiveness as a global financial hub.

The United Kingdom will maintain a middle-ground between concessions to the United States and rapprochement with the European Union, but accommodating Washington's demands might further complicate Labour's ''reset'' with Brussels, increasing tensions with key European partners. London will seek to preserve its ties with Washington while avoiding major concessions that could complicate efforts to reduce trade barriers with the European Union, which are central to the Labour government's economic growth strategy. Potential sector-specific deals with the United States in digital trade, defense and financial services would not necessarily contradict Labour's efforts to incrementally improve U.K.-EU trade relations in areas such as trade, energy and security. However, the more the United Kingdom aligns with EU standards and regulations — for instance on AI governance, data-sharing rules, carbon prices or financial services rules to retain equivalence arrangements with the bloc — the less flexibility it will have to meet U.S. demands. Starmer's government may, in turn, be forced to assume an even more cautious approach to its rapprochement with the European Union, which is already complicated by Labour's reluctance to make concessions that could be seen as undermining Brexit or that could run counter to other policy priorities, such as bringing down net migration levels or reducing red tape. Such hesitation would risk further slowing and complicating progress on deepening U.K.-EU trade and security cooperation.

  • Starmer has pledged to ''reset ties'' with the European Union after 14 years of Conservative rule. However, he has also outlined ''red lines'' regarding how far Labour is willing to go in its rapprochement with Brussels, particularly ruling out rejoining the EU single market or customs union. Labour aims for greater regulatory alignment and deeper cooperation with the bloc through incremental advances and sector-specific agreements. The two sides are set to begin formal negotiations on a defense and security pact in the coming months.
  • The Trump administration is unlikely to oppose closer U.K.-EU defense cooperation, as it would strengthen Europe's ability to defend itself and support Washington's goal for a gradual military disengagement for the region. However, should U.K.-EU trade talks stall, tensions could spill over into defense and security negotiations, as several EU states — especially France — have tied progress in trade discussions to defense cooperation.
  • Ahead of the first post-Brexit meeting between a British prime minister and EU leaders on Feb. 3, Starmer stressed that the United Kingdom does not view its ties with the United States and the European Union as mutually exclusive. He added that both relationships were ''crucial'' to the country, and that London will not have to ''choose'' one over the other. While the United States remains the United Kingdom's largest single trading partner, accounting for 179 billion pounds ($222 billion) in annual trade, the EU market is nearly twice as significant at 348 billion pounds ($438 billion) in annual trade, according to government figures.

Closer alignment with the United States poses a much more significant challenge to Labour's push to improve trade and investment ties with China, as pressures by the Trump administration for stricter economic security measures could strain relations with Beijing. The United Kingdom is seeking to thaw relations with China through high-level diplomatic and economic re-engagement, a strategy underscored by Foreign Secretary David Lammy's and Chancellor Rachel Reeves' visits to Beijing in October 2024 and January 2025, respectively. With the U.K. economy stagnating, Starmer's government has been actively pursuing new trade and investment opportunities wherever possible, including with China. But pressure from the Trump administration could complicate these efforts by pushing the United Kingdom toward adopting stricter economic security policies that could strain trade and investment ties with Beijing. The White House may, for example, demand that the United Kingdom tighten screening of both inward and outward investment in exchange for exemptions from U.S. tariffs. The Trump administration could also demand stricter export controls on AI, semiconductors and other critical technologies, as well as restrictions on the use of certain Chinese technology, such as those used in vehicles. Trump made similar asks during his first term, when he pressured the U.K. government into removing Chinese vendors from the United Kingdom's 5G and fiber networks, imposing significant costs on telecom operators. Making such moves now could irk Beijing, stalling London's efforts to expand trade and investment cooperation and potentially triggering Chinese retaliation, adding to the headwinds already facing the U.K. economy.

  • On Jan. 11, Reeves and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng signed a series of bilateral agreements in Beijing, including new licenses for U.K. financial services firms to operate in China. They also inked deals to expand bilateral cooperation in financial services, trade, climate and sustainable finance, as well as address sensitive issues such as trade imbalances and economic security. The U.K. government estimates the signed agreements will deliver 600 million pounds ($729 million) over five years and potentially up to 1 billion pounds ($1.2 billion) in total economic value to the British economy. 
  • Compared with its Conservative predecessors, the Labour government faces less internal pressure to adopt a hawkish stance on human rights and security concerns vis-a-vis China, allowing for a more pragmatic approach. Labour's strategy still aims to maintain a balance between economic engagement with China and broader strategic alignment with allies on economic security and de-risking — all the while without appearing overly accommodating to Beijing, a politically sensitive issue in the United Kingdom. Additionally, the United Kingdom's service-oriented economy, unlike the manufacturing-heavy economies of other major European countries, makes it less vulnerable to the impact of China's growing manufacturing exports, and thus generally less affected by protectionist tendencies. 
RANE
SUBSCRIBERS ONLY

Expert analysis when it matters most.

Get access to RANE's decision-grade geopolitical intelligence.