Georgia's general election will almost certainly generate social unrest, but the degree of political turbulence and the future of the country's foreign policy will depend on the transparency of the vote and the closeness of the results. Georgia will hold a general election on Oct. 26 to appoint the 150 members of its parliament and the next government. According to a Sept. 16 survey by American polling firm Edison Research, the ruling Georgia Dream (GD) party and its allies (such as the far-right People's Power party) will receive 34% of the vote, followed by Unity - To Save Georgia (USG), a new alliance including the country's largest opposition party, the United National Movement (UNM) of imprisoned former President Mikheil Saakashvili, with 19.2%. The Edison Research projections sharply contrasted with recent polling by pro-government pollster GORBI, which showed GD receiving 59.3% of the vote and USG receiving just 13.1%, and only two other opposition groups barely entering parliament. Polling ahead of the Oct. 26 election has shown a wide array of possible results, but polling averages have steadily projected GD to receive between 40-50% of the vote. GD — which has been in power since 2012 when it defeated Saakashvili's coalition — thus appears well-positioned to secure another term, depending on how much of the vote goes to parties failing to meet the 5% threshold to enter parliament. This is despite the ruling party's move to push through a controversial ''foreign agents'' bill in May, which has since bolstered support for the pro-Western opposition by undermining GD's previous narrative of having successfully steered Georgia toward EU membership after the country received candidate status last December.

• The Edison Research poll found as many as six other multiparty alliances could reach the 5% vote threshold to enter parliament. But a significant percentage of the opposition vote — potentially as much as 10-15% — could go to parties that fail to meet the 5% threshold, which would benefit GD when calculating seats in parliament. 
• The Edison Research poll also showed that only 36% of Georgians believe the country was headed in the right direction, while 71% said they believed GD had not done enough to deserve another term and that it was time to give someone else a chance; this is a notable uptick from the 61% who said GD did not deserve reelection in the last poll Edison published in July, suggesting voters' opinion of GD may have worsened in recent weeks. 

The election will take place against the backdrop of a divided opposition and a GD that seems increasingly willing to use state resources to secure reelection. The Oct. 26 general election will be Georgia's first that uses a fully proportional system and no majoritarian districts, which in theory could help the opposition by ending GD's ability to dominate in single-member districts. But in reality, GD will likely again receive well over 40% of the proportional vote, just as it did in Georgia's last two elections in 2016 and 2020. Georgia's opposition meanwhile, remains notoriously divided, with the largest opposition group, the USG alliance, unlikely to secure more than 25% of the vote, with four to five other voting blocs slated to each receive 5-12%. To compensate for its loss of some pro-EU urban voters since May, GD's election strategy has increasingly focused on boosting turnout among conservative and rural voters outside of Tbilisi. The Georgian opposition also believes the GD will use the state's resources and other legally dubious tactics, if not full-blown vote-rigging and -falsification, to boost its election results, as GD's recent rhetoric and actions suggest the party may be willing to go further than ever to prevent the opposition from assuming power. This would mark a fundamental change in Georgian elections, as Western governments and observer groups did not report significant issues in the country's 2016 and 2020 parliamentary ballots, apart from noting challenges and areas where legal and administrative practices needed updating. Additionally, Honorary GD Chairman Bidzina Ivanishvili and Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze's increasingly provocative anti-Western statements — including promises of legal persecution of their political opponents, as well as reports of their desire to deepen ties with Russia — suggest they are preparing the Georgian people for a possible prolonged confrontation with Western governments that would likely entail more sanctions against GD officials, especially amid likely questions over the election's legitimacy. 

• GD was once a nominally left-leaning party, capitalizing on Soviet-era nostalgia, populist economic policies, and reducing confrontation with Russia. But in 2023, GD dropped its affiliation with the Party of European Socialists and now expresses an affinity for Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's nationalist Fidesz party, which has been accused of harboring anti-democratic and proto-authoritarian tendencies. 
• On Sept. 17, the GD-controlled parliament passed a law that provides a legal basis for authorities to outlaw LGBTQ Pride events and public displays of the rainbow Pride flag, as well as censor LGBTQ films and books. The political opposition and activists say the law is primarily aimed at boosting support and turnout among conservative and rural voters for GD in the upcoming general election. 
• On Sept. 16, the United States announced it was sanctioning senior law Georgian enforcement officers accused of undermining democracy in the country. During a meeting with U.S. Ambassador Robin Dunnigan the following day, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze criticized the move as being designed to improve the opposition's chances ahead of the October election. But he said the sanctions would fail to accomplish this goal or change GD's policy agenda, and warned Tbilisi would downgrade bilateral relations if Washington pursued additional similar measures.

Against this backdrop, there are three main scenarios for how the Georgian election and subsequent unrest could develop: 

Scenario #1 (Likely): GD and its allies win enough seats to form a government, and go on to survive a period of protests and increased Western sanctions. 

In this scenario, Georgian Dream and its allies win the 76 seats needed to form a majority government. While external observers note opposition claims of vote tampering or that some elements of the election were not in line with international best practices, they do not find grounds to claim the election was significantly less free or fair than previous elections. Still, opposition parties call for mass protests in Tbilisi and other urban centers across the country, claiming fraud and intimidation of voters. Riot police use violence against demonstrators and stop attempts by the protesters to establish encampments, most importantly in central Tbilisi, Protests continue for several weeks but do not pose an acute threat to the government. GD blames the West for the protests but avoids persecuting the political opposition, believing that doing so is unnecessary and that relations with Europe and the United States can eventually be stabilized. The United States and the European Union enact further sanctions against Georgian officials, but these actions do not pose significant threats to the Georgian economy or preclude an eventual restoration of ties, as GD continues to feign interest in deepening Euro-Atlantic integration. To reduce its exposure to U.S. and EU sanctions, Georgia also continues to pursue greater economic and political and economic ties with China and Russia. But the government still expends considerable effort in preserving ties with the West in the hopes of normalizing GD's increasingly authoritarian grip over the country. 

Scenario #2 (Less likely): GD and its allies win the election, but widespread accusations of fraud trigger more paralyzing protests and painful retaliation from the United States and Europe, forcing GD to lean on China and Russia to stay in power. 

In this scenario, GD wins the election, but the result is marred by widespread and credible accusations of vote-rigging on the party's behalf. These allegations are strong enough to prompt Western governments and organizations to formally conclude the election was not transparent. Large-scale demonstrations erupt across the country as Georgians nationwide protest GD's contested victory, prompting a security crackdown that results in excessive violence and arrests. The GD government's harsh crackdown on protests, combined with its alleged voter fraud, prompt Western governments to not just sanction individual Georgian officials, but impose costs on the Georgian government and broader economy. This sees the European Union reduce cooperation initiatives with Georgia, including visa-free travel for Georgians in EU countries. The United States, meanwhile, further cuts aid to Georgia. Despite this pressure, GD clings to power, claiming these Western actions are intended to foment regime change. Believing this is their last chance to restore their country's democracy and prospects for Euro-Atlantic integration, Georgian opposition protesters likely become increasingly radical and risk-averse in their efforts to paralyze life in the capital until the government concedes to their demands to either enter power-sharing negotiations or cede power altogether. Assuming the GD government survives, increasingly desperate GD authorities eventually seek closer commercial and political ties with China, as well as Russia (albeit to a lesser extent to avoid angering the public), to stay in power. 

Scenario #3 (Least likely): Opposition parties win enough seats to block GD from forming a government, prompting pro- and anti-GD demonstrations as the United States and Europe signal support for pro-Western political forces. 

In this scenario, opposition parties deny GD and its allies the 76 seats needed to form a government. GD likely attempts to use bribes and blackmail to secure seats from the opposition to restore its majority, but these efforts prove unsuccessful amid the immense public pressure on the opposition to unseat GD. Opposition supporters likely take to the streets in masses to celebrate the results, while GD supporters likely do the same to protest the outcome, setting the stage for potential street clashes between the two groups. Of the various opposition parties on the ballot, about five reach the threshold to enter parliament, with the UNM likely securing the most seats among the opposition. These parties then enter complex negotiations to form a government. Since almost every other Georgian opposition party holds very strong misgivings toward the UNM, the talks are tense and probably last weeks — unprecedented in Georgian parliamentary history — but the parties ultimately succeed in forming a broad, pro-European coalition government. The European Union attempts to reward this new, pro-Western Georgian government through assurances about the country's EU membership prospects. But Russian threats prevent Tbilisi from aligning too closely with the West, as Russia seeks to remind the Georgian government of the potential consequences of its pro-Western orientation. To deter the new government from actions sought by the West (such as joining Western sanctions against Russia), Russia could reduce trade ties with Georgia, which would undermine the country's economy. Russia may also seek to flare tensions in Georgia's Russia-occupied breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, such as by conducting provocative shelling or physically moving the barriers marking the borders between Georgia and the two regions.