Ukraine is taking steps to engage the United States amid continued provocations from Russia. Its persistent political, economic and security challenges, however, will prevent immediate and meaningful U.S. assistance, thus keeping Kyiv lodged between Russian and Western interests. In a recently aired interview with Axios, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appealed to recently inaugurated U.S. President Joe Biden to “enter a new phase” of bilateral relations by emphasizing the centrality of the United States to improving Ukraine’s future prospects and revealing that he was “a little bit” angry with former President Donald Trump.

• On Feb. 2, Ukraine sanctioned media assets in the country linked to a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, which resulted in the shutdown of three pro-Russian television stations. The Ukrainian government described the banned channels as malign Russian propaganda tools — taking pains to portray the move as combatting disinformation, and not restricting media freedoms.
• On Feb. 1, Zelensky’s party voted to expel a lawmaker who was one of several Ukrainian individuals and entities sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department in January for attempting to meddle in the U.S. November election. On Jan. 28, Ukraine announced that it had also opened a criminal investigation into interference in the U.S. presidential election.
• On Feb. 1, Reuters reported that Ukraine is in talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to create a special financial court to tackle problems restricting economic growth, as part of broader discussions on conditions to receive further IMF monetary support. The announcement was seen as a positive sign of Ukraine’s reform intentions.

Zelensky’s administration is trying to move past Trump-era controversies by appealing to Biden’s pre-existing sympathies for Ukraine’s precarious position under sustained Russian influence. The Trump administration continued to provide Ukraine with political, economic and security support that began under former President Barack Obama. Trump himself, however, never showed a serious policy interest in the country or any appetite to confront Russian actions there. Ukraine also became embroiled in U.S. political controversies that led to Trump’s first impeachment, along with his unproven corruption allegations against Biden and his family. In contrast to Trump’s indifference, Biden is deeply familiar with Ukraine after serving as the point-person for the country during the Obama administration, and has argued for more robust support to back Kyiv against Moscow.

• In his first interview with an American news outlet since the U.S. November election, Zelensky told The New York Times in December that Biden “knows Ukraine better than the previous president” and argued that Biden could “really help strengthen relations, help settle the war in [eastern Ukraine] and end the occupation of our country.”
• On Feb. 3, Russian authorities announced they had drafted legislation to increase investment in Crimea, the peninsula once controlled by Ukraine before Russia’s annexation in 2014. The proposed legislation includes granting anonymity to certain investors in the territory to shield them from possible Western sanctions.
• On Feb. 1, Russian-backed breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine announced that they had begun to administer Russia’s COVID-19 vaccine, marking the latest demonstration of Russia’s support for the contested territories. Russia has already been providing its vaccine to what it claims are its citizens in Crimea, in contravention of Ukrainian accusations that the Kremlin is using its vaccine as a geopolitical cudgel.

Despite his personal and governmental outreach to Washington, President Zelensky will face obstacles similar to those that dogged his predecessors, limiting his ability to break Ukraine’s strategic stalemate. The country continues to face three principal hurdles in its quest to decisively reorient itself toward the West, namely Russian-backed separatist regions in the eastern half of the country (not to mention Russia’s direct presence in Crimea); a powerful contingent of pro-Russian political forces (including in Zelensky’s own party); and endemic corruption. On the final point, which is the challenge over which Zelenskiy arguably has the most control, Western observers agree that last year Zelensky wavered and allowed backsliding to occur.

• The government in Kyiv will need to demonstrate more serious commitments to reform and, despite receiving more attention from Washington, should not expect the Biden administration to provide it with instant or unconditional assistance. Cognizant of how Ukraine was ensnared in domestic U.S. political controversies in the past two years, Zelensky will also have to carefully calibrate his level of engagement with Biden administration officials.
• Ukraine’s government will need to translate its steps in the past week into more aggressive, sustained actions to limit the influence of political forces aligned with Russia and, especially, tackle corruption. Absent more concrete actions, Zelensky should not expect the United States to commit to providing new meaningful political and economic support, let alone security assistance to push back against Russian actions in the country, despite Biden’s sympathies for the Ukrainian position.
• Zelensky will also have to walk a tightrope when engaging with Biden to avoid providing potential fodder to conservative U.S. political voices, who may allege that his support for the Ukrainian government is linked to unsubstantiated corruption accusations involving the previous work Biden’s son did with a Ukrainian energy company. These allegations may distract and detract from potentially stepped-up support from Washington to Kyiv.

Kyiv can count on more engagement from the Biden administration compared with its predecessor, but is unlikely to receive the requisite attention it desires amid a long list of foreign policy challenges Biden will likely prioritize ahead of it. When it comes to addressing Russian threats, Washington has expressed that its initial focus will be on other issues, including Moscow’s alleged involvement in the SolarWinds cyberattack and its domestic political repression, and not Ukraine. More broadly, Ukraine will have to compete for U.S. attention amid its focus on many other pressing issues, including climate change, the rise of China and the Iran nuclear deal — the last of which will require notable support from the Kremlin.