The Hong Kong protests carried out in spite of the new national security law showcase the volatile dynamic we expect to continue as authorities work to dishearten demonstrators and the broader pro-democracy camp. Following an official rejection of an application to hold rallies citing COVID-19 and past violent activity, pro-democracy demonstrators turned out by the thousands to mark the July 1 anniversary of the British handover of the city. While authorities arrested a relatively small number of protesters under the new law, how the detentions and trials proceed will indicate the legislation’s ability to truly dissuade protests in the future. There is also the possibility that further arrests will take place based on surveillance of protest activity.

  • Protesters gathered in several parts of the city including Causeway Bay, Tin Hau and Wan Chai. Most marched peacefully, though some destroyed shop windows, blocked roads with objects and lit at least one fire. 
  • The protests came just one day after the long-awaited promulgation and publicization of the details of China’s new national security law, which gives Hong Kong authorities sweeping powers to crack down on secession, subversion, terrorism and foreign collusion. 
  • Hong Kong police arrested around 370 individuals, including 10 under the new powers of the national security law, many for carrying pro-independence materials. 

Moderate pro-democracy forces will try to shape the protests in order to avoid seeing them run afoul of the draconian law, with an eye towards the long-term interests of preserving the opposition voice in Hong Kong. Going forward, the protests could take many forms, including peaceful gatherings by large groups of Hong Kongers on the streets with extreme care to avoid national security law red lines. It could also mean street violence by younger protesters defying authorities and inviting a crackdown. This could track with the pattern set during 2019 protests, during which moderates tried and often failed to rein in more radical fringes of the movement, largely led by students. The law might also eventually exert a chilling effect on overall turnout, but this will not be immediate. 

  • Despite calls by some of its leaders to go ahead with the banned July 1 demonstration, the mainstream protest group Civil Human Rights Front appears to have maintained the cautious stance it has held throughout the COVID-19 pandemic by distancing itself from the recent protests. 
  • A lawmaker from the pro-democracy Civic Party appeared at the protests with the purpose of imploring people to return home to avoid being targeted by the national security law. 
While the protests resulted in a relatively small number of arrests under China's new law, how the detentions and trials proceed will indicate the legislation's ability to truly suppress dissent.

More important than the targeting of protesters themselves will be how national security measures are applied to suppress political activity and speech by targeting current legislative council members and prospective candidates for their behavior. Hong Kong authorities will work to balance between using the full scope of its new powers and preventing a major political backlash ahead of September elections, while the central Chinese government will push for Hong Kong to rein in any disruptions and raise the cost of open dissent. Both will seek to incentivize the pro-democracy camp to refrain from disruption both on the streets and in government institutions. 

Amid this fraught interplay between the opposition and the establishment, foreign individuals and institutions carry a greater risk of being caught in the middle. All of the ambiguously-defined crimes specified in the national security law can be applied to foreign businesses as well, even if the offense is committed outside Hong Kong or China. Foreign individuals caught up in these matters could see themselves deported from Hong Kong, even if not formally prosecuted.

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