What Happened
Despite scattered reports of violations, a cease-fire in Tripoli brokered by Turkey and Russia between the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Libyan National Army (LNA) that took effect Jan. 12 appears to be holding. GNA leader Fayez al-Sarraj and Khalid al-Mishri, head of Libya's State Council, a governmental body that supports the GNA, traveled to Moscow and quickly signed the deal. Meanwhile, LNA Field Marshal Khalifa Hifter and Aguila Saleh, head of Libya's House of Representatives, a rival government to the GNA, were considering signing off on the deal on Jan. 14. If the truce becomes official and is respected by all sides in the conflict, it would mark the first significant pause in hostilities that began when the LNA began its offensive to capture Tripoli in April 2019.
Why It Matters
Hifter's apparent willingness to back away from his push on the Libyan capital marks a significant development, considering the amount of damage the fighting has inflicted on the city. What's more, the ability of Russia and Turkey to quickly arrange a truce after months of European efforts to halt the fighting have fallen flat demonstrates just how much European influence in Libya has eroded as Russian and Turkish influence has risen. Meanwhile, European efforts at intervention have progressed, with a long-planned German conference aimed at bringing the Libyan factions together finally set to convene on Jan. 19. In addition, Italy's defense ministry is reportedly preparing a decree that would boost the Italian military presence in Libya.
The factional nature of the Libyan conflict — local militias each with their own, often incompatible, goals and interests provide the bulk of the fighting forces on both sides — means the cease-fire will be inherently fragile. Even though the previous cease-fire between the LNA and GNA extended for nearly two years, the prospects that the current truce will last beyond a matter of a few weeks remain uncertain. That's because, during the previous breaks in the Libyan civil war, the coalition of militias and regular armed forces that constitute Hifter's LNA had a common objective, whether battling jihadists or seizing control of oil fields, that gave them unity of purpose.
If the prize that Tripoli represents to the LNA's militias is taken off the table, Hifter's support among his army's constituent units could wane, and those fighters could begin to turn on Hifter or on one another as more localized squabbles erupt. The forces that oppose Hifter, on the other hand, see his willingness to agree to a cease-fire as merely an effort to buy time in order to prepare another, even stronger attack on Tripoli. Finally, it remains unclear where Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, both of which support Hifter's anti-Islamist position, will fit into any comprehensive negotiations that could emerge. The Emiratis may give lip service to the peace talks as they have done in the past, but they almost certainly do not want Hifter to agree to any settlement that caps his power and legitimizes Islamist factions in a future unity government.
Strategic Context
A further movement away from armed conflict in Libya does not necessarily reduce the risk of a disruption in the country's oil production. If the status quo holds as negotiations progress, with eastern and western Libya both continuing to operate under rival governments, the seeds could be planted for the country to remain divided and eventually move toward a federalist model. In the process of negotiation, with both sides trying to gain an advantage in talks, the country’s oil fields, which Hifter's forces now largely control, will become a major point of contention in the coming months, although it will not initially be affected. Control of oil will be used as negotiation leverage, with Hifter and his eastern allies calling for audits and transparency over the Central Bank of Libya, which handles all payments for the country's oil exports. Hifter could possibly use the threat of an oil cutoff to extract those concessions. That's why the end of military violence in the country won't necessarily improve the chances of Libyan oil flows remaining uninterrupted.
