
The incompatible, and apparently unmovable, positions of North Korea and the United States over denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula will likely prove the undoing of warmer relations between the two Koreas.
The warming relations on the Korean Peninsula appear to have reached a new high point, but appearances can be deceiving. On March 5, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un met with a 10-member South Korean presidential delegation — the first such meeting during his seven-year tenure. The delegation's main goal is to open dialogue between the United States and North Korea. But with the United States sticking to demands for denuclearization and North Korea intent on the opposite, such a dialogue (if it happens) will quickly run into a wall of non-negotiable issues.
The United States sees talks as a means to an end, with denuclearization the only end it will accept. And in a March 3 speech, U.S. President Donald Trump underscored this position yet again. While it remains open to so-called "talks about talks" with North Korea, the United States has escalated its campaign of maximum pressure by imposing new unilateral sanctions and calling for the United Nations to blacklist a new set of vessels accused of trading with North Korea. Advancing beyond the preparatory stage of negotiations without setting preconditions, Washington fears, could create space for North Korea to advance its weapons program. Instead, the U.S. strategy is to squeeze North Korea until it is desperate enough to grant concessions — a point not yet reached.
North Korea, for its part, has been equally adamant that denuclearization is not an option. Despite its outreach, Pyongyang has been clear that it objects to the sustained pressure and will not accept preconditions for dialogue. In fact, North Korea already canceled a planned sit-down with U.S. Vice President Mike Pence on Feb. 10 because the United States announced it was planning new sanctions. As North Korea zeroes in on completing its nuclear deterrent, it is following a tried-and-true strategy to use a diplomatic offensive to ease containment. This technique served Pyongyang well when tensions reached a crescendo in 1994, 1998 and 2000. In each of these cases, North Korea was able to ease tensions enough to buy time, only to later continue its nuclear weapons program. However, the United States has been clear it is aware of this approach.
With joint military drills between the United States and South Korea set to resume in April after the Winter Paralympics conclude in Pyeongchang, the crisis seems set to return to full swing. But there is still room for an improvement in inter-Korean relations, even if U.S. red lines loom. Kim's meeting with South Korean officials could play well in the country by presenting him as a rational leader who can be negotiated with. Economic concerns are the most important issue for many South Koreans, and North Korea presents an unwelcome complication to such bread-and-butter issues. However, the decision to accept or reject North Korean outreach will ultimately be made in the United States.