Already, the opposition has secured the signatures necessary (from 1 percent of all registered voters) to complete the first preliminary stage in the recall referendum process. If it manages to collect signatures from 20 percent of the electorate — the second preliminary stage — Venezuela's National Electoral Council will be required to organize a recall vote. Despite its attempts to delay the referendum, Maduro's government cannot cancel the vote outright for fear of galvanizing public opposition. Instead, it will keep trying to put off the vote for as long as possible, preferably past Jan. 10, 2017, the cutoff date for holding a new presidential election. (If Maduro were recalled after that date, Vice President Aristobulo Isturiz would succeed him).
The Sept. 1 marches are unlikely to precipitate a referendum this year, something the opposition leadership probably understands. Nonetheless, the protests will give MUD an opportunity to demonstrate how much force it can bring to bear against the current government. Since the opposition coalition does not control any major government institutions (besides the National Assembly, arguably the weakest of the three branches of Venezuela's government), it hopes that public participation will give weight to its demonstrations. This approach will at once give the institutions that support Maduro — particularly the military — an indication of the public's discontent and play into MUD's political campaign ahead of the 2019 presidential vote. A major turnout at the protests would likely make it far more difficult for the government to keep stalling the recall vote. At the same time, actively opposing the state through demonstrations will help MUD position itself as the logical alternative to Maduro and earn the coalition some publicity.
MUD will stage its demonstrations at seven points, mostly in the eastern part of the capital where the bulk of its support base is located and where pro-government colectivos are less likely to interfere. In response to the protests, the government will probably deploy military and police forces into the streets to try to keep protesters from reaching the designated sites and to contain those who do. Subway and bus line closures are also likely.
As with past demonstrations, confrontations between the two sides are likely, MUD's calls for peaceful protests notwithstanding. Given the tense political atmosphere in Venezuela, violence at the demonstrations could easily give rise to more protests from the opposition. Demonstrations limited to the opposition's support base are unlikely to threaten the government, but the possibility of violence during the Sept. 1 protests could raise the stakes. If security forces inflict heavy casualties in their efforts to quell the protests, for instance, military commanders may reconsider their support for Maduro — and whether the country can afford to postpone the recall referendum any longer.
