Autocratic governments have been a feature of Central Asia since the fall of the Soviet Union. The region consists of the former Soviet states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, all of these are governed by highly centralized power cores ruled over by formidable executive figures, typically long-serving presidents with high official public approval ratings. Kazakhstan's Nursultan Nazarbayev and Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov have led their countries for the entire post-Soviet era, while Tajikistan's Emomali Rakhmon has been in power since 1994. Few of the region's governments tolerate any hint of opposition, whether in the form of public demonstrations or opposition political parties.
What Drives Protests in Kazakhstan
Events in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan over the weekend highlight the power of these centralized governments. In Kazakhstan, demonstrations against government plans to privatize agriculture turned out to be much smaller than expected, in part because of government efforts to avert them. Previous protests this year brought out thousands of people in cities including Almaty, Astana and Atyrau, but the May 21 demonstrations were much smaller in size, mostly in the dozens to low hundreds.
The crowds were likely smaller because of Nazarbayev's announcement two weeks earlier that Kazakhstan would put a moratorium on land reforms. The two-year freeze was designed to assuage public fears that Kazakhstan's agricultural land could be scooped up by foreign countries such as China. However, ahead of and during the protests, Kazakhstan cracked down on activists, journalists and protest organizers, blocking communications and social media. Even after Nazarbayev made concessions on the land issue, hundreds of people were reportedly detained in the week leading up to May 21 and several others on the demonstration day itself, showing that the concerns driving the protests go beyond the land issue. In all likelihood they are tied to broader political and economic issues in the country, including government corruption and an economy on the verge of recession.
The protests come only a few months after parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan produced a resounding victory for the ruling Nur Otan party, which took more than 80 percent of the vote. Nazarbayev himself consistently wins presidential elections with an even higher majority — he received nearly 98 percent of the vote in 2015. But such lopsided victories do not mean that the Kazakh government is universally supported. Independent observers have questioned whether elections in Kazakhstan are free and fair. In fact, the very tools Nazarbayev uses to suppress existing opposition — as seen in the May 21 protests — may stir up more public resentment. The country's weak economy only aggravates those tensions; in 2011, for instance, protests mounted by laid-off oil workers in the western city of Zhanaozen became violent, resulting in a number of deaths. That protests have continued in several cities across the country despite some government concessions and efforts to pre-empt unrest is a clear sign that part of the public is deeply dissatisfied with Nazarbayev's rule.
A Show of Consensus in Tajikistan
In the meantime, Tajikistan took the centralization of its political system a step further on May 22, with the constitutional referendum abolishing term limits for Rakhmon and reducing the age limit for presidential candidates from 35 to 30. The latter amendment is widely seen as an effort to allow Rakhmon's eldest son and possible successor, Rustam Emomali, currently 29, to participate in the next presidential elections in 2020, should Rakhmon choose not to run. These amendments, which were reportedly approved by 95 percent of the population (with a 92 percent voter turnout), ensure the continuation of the Rakhmon regime for the foreseeable future and ostensibly point to widespread support for Rakhmon and his son.
However, no independent observers were allowed to monitor the referendum, making its results somewhat suspect. And, as in Kazakhstan, an opposition movement has made efforts to resist the Tajik government. Security forces have periodically clashed with opposing elements in recent years, especially in the eastern part of the country, where conflicts escalated in 2010. Political divisions sewn during Tajikistan's civil war, which took place from 1992-1997, persist in the country and feed friction between Rakhmon's government and its opposition. The Tajik government mounts regular security sweeps against alleged Islamist militants in eastern Tajikistan and has initiated a countrywide crackdown on religious institutions and parties such as the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan. Indeed, one of the items in the May 22 constitutional referendum stipulated the outright banning of religious parties in the country.
High public approval ratings for the governments in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, as elsewhere in Central Asia, do not in fact show universal support for these countries' governments. Large segments of the population may indeed support the rulers, and some may prefer an orderly centralized system to a messier, democratic one. However, many of Central Asia's autocracies still lack the broad consensus that undergirds true and lasting stability. Denied a legal outlet for dissent, the opposition elements within their borders too often resort to violence, meaning the political situation in the region is likely to remain volatile at best.
