The negotiation group includes representation from the major rebel factions, including the Free Syrian Army, Ahrar al-Sham and Jaish al-Islam. The inclusion of these three factions effectively draws a significant portion of the rebels to the negotiation table. Notably, other anti-loyalist armed factions in the Syrian civil war, including the Syrian Democratic Forces and the extremist Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State, have been excluded from the talks. The group includes a new secretary-general and a new spokesperson, and a supreme commission for negotiation comprising 25 members. However, the actual individuals who will make up the negotiating team have yet to be agreed upon.
The negotiation group coalesced after the opposition groups solidified their positions on the measures they all agree on, including the swift removal of Bashar al Assad as president of Syria. These positions are hard to reconcile with those of the Syrian government and its allies and do not bode well for a successful negotiated outcome to the conflict. For instance, Ahrar al-Sham — one of the most prominent armed rebel groups involved in the negotiating process — stated Dec. 9 that it will stand by "the complete cleansing of the Russian-Iranian occupation of Syrian land, and the sectarian militias which support it." The group also said it will not compromise on its position that al Assad must be forced from power. These policy positions are hardly on the fringe; they are effectively the main stance of the wider opposition.
In fact, Ahrar al-Sham even withdrew from the negotiations temporarily, before being convinced at the last minute to return and sign the agreement. As Stratfor noted, one of the principal obstacles to reaching an agreement was figuring out which rebel groups should lead — let alone be representatives for — the opposition in the talks. It was easier to coerce groups such as the Free Syrian Army and Jaish al-Islam, which depend heavily on foreign patronage, into persevering in the negotiation process despite considerable ideological distance between the largely secular Free Syrian Army and the Islamist Jaish al-Islam. Though supported by Turkey and Qatar and to a lesser degree Saudi Arabia, Ahrar al-Sham has been less willing to succumb to foreign pressure. Indeed, differences between Ahrar al-Sham and foreign mediators were already apparent when the International Syria Support Group decided to exclude Ahrar al-Sham's close ally, Jabhat al-Nusra, from the process. Ahrar al-Sham is concerned with what it perceives as an underrepresentation of rebel factions on the ground, too much influence given to exiled political opposition groups and the presence of factions that are friendly with Russia. It will be difficult to keep the group engaged in the process.
Moreover, the Syrian opposition groups have largely avoided delving into or settling any of the tricky points of disagreement, including the groups' disparate visions for a post-conflict Syria — and this does not even take into account the non-loyalist factions excluded from the talks. For example, the Free Syrian Army has a different view than Ahrar al-Sham and Jaish al-Islam on the extent that religion should play in a future Syria. Even between Ahrar al-Sham and Jaish al-Islam, both strongly Islamist, there are diverging opinions about how much clout each group should really hold.
In the meantime, the factions excluded from the talks are not staying quiet. Jabhat al-Nusra has launched a media campaign to better position itself, announcing Dec. 9 that its commander, Abu Muhammed al-Julani, would soon give a rare press conference. The Syrian Democratic Forces, a coalition of Kurdish and allied fighters prominent in northeast Syria, has created its own political wing, the Syrian Democratic Council as it seeks to temper fears of Kurdish dominance and the People's Protection Units' tendencies toward autonomy.
Ultimately, ending the Syrian civil war will require far more than a successful agreement between the newly created opposition negotiation group in Riyadh and the Syrian government. Various opposition groups have largely come together out of a desire to present a strong front in the negotiation process and avoid being blacklisted. In effect, the disparate opposition groups have yet to make any significant concessions to each other, but if these factions come across as united and active participants in talks, foreign powers — including Western powers — would be more likely to see them as viable. The real test, however, remains whether the opposition can find any common ground with the Syrian regime.
