The Venezuelan and Colombian foreign ministers met in Cartagena on Aug. 26 to discuss Venezuela's Aug. 20 decision to close the most used border crossing between the two countries. Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro ordered the Cucuta crossing's closure after an attack by unidentified gunmen left three soldiers injured Aug. 19. On Aug. 22, the president declared a state of emergency in six municipalities near the Cucuta crossing in Tachira state, ostensibly to counter the threat posed by Colombian criminals and to curb food and gasoline smuggling to Colombia. Military raids in a makeshift shantytown near the border accompanied the declaration, which resulted in the expulsion of more than a thousand Colombian citizens to Cucuta, Colombia, over several days.

With the state of emergency in place, potential demonstrators must give the government 15 days' notice about upcoming protests. Unauthorized public gatherings are prohibited, residences can be raided without judicial warrants, and security forces can implement unspecified barriers to trade and movement. The declaration effectively gives Venezuelan security forces power to control civilian activities in the area.

It is not necessarily a surprise that Venezuelan authorities chose to deport Colombians and shut the border crossing. Both Maduro and his predecessor, Hugo Chavez, frequently stoked disagreements with neighboring states, particularly Colombia, for propaganda value. And with elections approaching on Dec. 6, it is in the government's interest to influence public opinion by countering (or at least giving the impression of addressing) Venezuela's rampant crime, particularly criminal activity that the government can easily attribute to cross-border mafias.

For nearly a week, Venezuelan officials have taken to government-owned media channels to denounce alleged plots sponsored by nebulous Colombian paramilitary groups purportedly connected to the Venezuelan opposition. Such claims are almost certainly exaggerated or fabricated, but they reveal an important aspect of the border closure and suspension of legal guarantees: The government intends to use this policy decision to promote nationalism ahead of the elections. In fact, the mayor of Libertador (part of Caracas) has called for a demonstration to be held Sept. 2 in support of the government's actions regarding Colombia.

While images and accounts of displaced Colombians fleeing into Cucuta have dominated international media coverage, the most significant consequence of the state of emergency may yet occur in Venezuela. Currently, the declaration affects only six municipalities near the Colombian border. But a state of emergency is not necessarily a logical reaction to longstanding criminal activity or an isolated attack on national guardsmen. While some chavista voters may approve of action against criminal activity on the Colombian-Venezuelan border, such a move is unlikely to benefit the Maduro government in the long term. Rapidly rising food prices fueled by the increasing scarcity of dollars to fund imports will keep potential voters' approval of the government low no matter how many Colombians Maduro expels.

This brings us to the question of exactly why the government decided to implement the state of emergency. According to a Stratfor source, the government may be considering extending similar states of emergency to Zulia state and to the Andean state of Merida. The government's recent actions seem to lend credence to this claim. On Aug. 25, National Assembly speaker Diosdado Cabello said in a televised address that the legislature is ready to approve any additional declarations of states of emergency. 

Extending the declaration of a state of emergency to other areas of the country could serve as a useful propaganda tool in the future, particularly if the government intends to play up the alleged threat of Colombian criminality. But it would also likely be an important tool for dealing with the possibility of major social unrest in coming months as Venezuela's options for funding imports continue to diminish. With Venezuela's crude oil selling at around $35 a barrel, the government is attempting to fund food and consumer goods imports with greatly diminished oil revenue, and consumers are suffering because of it. In Venezuela's peripheral states, shortages have already led to isolated incidents of looting and protest. These incidents have been disorganized and have not coalesced into broader discontent with the government. But there is no easy way out, and oil prices are expected to remain low for the foreseeable future. The Maduro government is likely considering ways to deal with what could be a messy phase of chavista rule. An expansion of the state of emergency could give the government some security ahead of an uncertain future.

Barring a rebound in global oil prices, Venezuela faces a difficult road ahead. The government will likely look at all methods at its disposal to manage the economic crisis until elections or until it can find a way to manage the fallout from the crisis. But a severe social crisis looming, regardless of the outcome of the December vote, will soon force the government to choose how it intends to contain potential violence and dissent. And with last week's declaration of a state of emergency in Tachira, it may have placed one potential option on the table.