The news that the Saudi-led operation against the Houthi movement and forces loyal to ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen has ended and a new operation has begun has led to a feeling in the region — and within Saudi Arabia — that the Saudis have failed in their mission. It is a feeling that has tremendous political consequences and therefore has to be thought about carefully.

We need to begin with language. The senior commanders of the Saudi air force, and many of those beneath them, have trained with and in the United States. At Air University in Montgomery, Ala., and at the Naval Postgraduate School (which is now an all service school), they have absorbed the culture and methodology of the U.S. Air Force.

In the Air Force, certainly since Desert Storm, the term "air campaign" has a specific meaning. It is a multi-phase attack on an enemy force designed to break up intelligence and communications, disrupt logistics and ultimately support ground forces in their attack on the enemy army. Beginning with suppression of enemy air defenses through to airstrikes supporting squad-level combat, the air campaign moves from phase to phase along a prepared route.

The first phase is not expected or intended to force enemy capitulation. It is designed to clear enemy air space of air defenses, cripple communications and so on. It takes from days to months, and then you move on. All that the Saudis were saying Tuesday was that the first phase had ended and that further stages, likely aimed at logistics and interdicting movement of Houthi and Saleh-aligned units, will advance the operation from this point on.

Few are initiated to the language or logic of the U.S. Air Force and its students. The response to the announcement was that the coalition air force had failed, since clearly the Houthis and Saleh-aligned military forces were still in position and fighting. This was a reasonable conclusion. After all, an air campaign had been announced with great fanfare, nothing decisive had been done, and the Saudis were ending the operation, obviously after having failed.

This view has had significant repercussions. The Iranians, sailing ships off the Yemeni coast, might be emboldened. Other members of the Saudi-led coalition might be discouraged. The public on the Arabian Peninsula might see it as an Iranian victory and panic. The consequences of this particular perception go on and on.

There was evidence that the war was not over. While announcing the end of one operation and the beginning of another, the Saudis were simply describing the process the United States had adopted and taught others. It was clear that it was not a capitulation but a shift, likely planned. The public perception was quite different. Therein lies the lesson.

Baseball teams, bond traders and the military all use their own peculiar language. It is useful to have shorthand vocabulary to communicate swiftly. But these organizations interface with the rest of the world on occasion, and then being careful to speak the King's English is necessary. Having mastered a craft, it is comforting to be among the initiates speaking in the secret tongue. It makes you a professional. But it also makes you incomprehensible to the rest of the world. One of the disciplines of a professional is to know when to speak the jargon of the craft and when to speak the common tongue. All professionals have difficulty making the switch, explaining why in most militaries, entire directorates are tasked with just public relations management. But in this case, it was confusion with geopolitical consequences.

This is not to say the Saudis are defeating the Houthis or making any claims at all. It simply means that it is important to understand how air forces allied with or trained by the U.S. Air Force, along with defense ministries, think and talk before drawing conclusions about what they say. The outcome is in doubt, and the air campaign could fail, but declaring the end of one phase and the beginning of another carries with it little information.