As the conflict between Israel and the Gaza Strip continues, an allegation focused on the West Bank reveals much about the limits of Israel's historical Palestinian strategy. Israel's internal security service, the Shin Bet, announced Monday that it had uncovered a plot orchestrated by senior Hamas leaders abroad meant to sow discord in the West Bank, topple Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and pave the way for Hamas to fill the ensuing political vacuum. Though Hamas has denied the claims, the reports have nonetheless spread through regional news agencies, prompting Abbas to launch an investigation into the matter.
The Shin Bet reportedly learned of the plot from the interrogations of some 93 Hamas operatives arrested between May and June. The security agency claims that Jordanian couriers had smuggled into the West Bank dozens of small arms and hundreds of thousands of dollars, which were intercepted by Israeli security forces, to carry out the operation. The smuggling operation ostensibly was directed by Hamas leaders based in Turkey, particularly Saleh al-Arouri, one of the founders of Hamas' military wing and the head of the organization's West Bank operations. The ultimate goal of the plot was to attack Israeli targets, with a particular emphasis on Jerusalem's Temple Mount, to provoke a heavy-handed Israeli response, lead to mass civilian casualties and spark a third intifada. The ensuing chaos, it is alleged, would catch Abbas' ruling Fatah party off guard and allow Hamas an opportunity to seize control of the West Bank political apparatus.
Israel's public exposure of the plot, whether or not it was real, fits into its long-standing strategy of dividing the two Palestinian factions. In fact, it employed this strategy in 1993 by signing the Oslo Accords with Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization, whose influence was being increasingly challenged by Hamas and smaller Palestinian militant groups. Israel employed it again in 2005, when former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon unilaterally withdrew from the Gaza Strip — a decision that eventually enabled Hamas to seize control of the territory two years later. More recently, the Israelis launched Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip to prevent Fatah and Hamas from forming a new unity government.
In short, sowing discord between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank prevents the Palestinians from unifying and threatening Israel. So long as the Palestinians are divided, Israel can argue that it does not have a true partner to negotiate with, especially when one is considered a terrorist organization.
But this time, the plan may have backfired. The Palestinians have actually grown closer since the beginning of Operation Protective Edge. For the first time, the Palestinian factions are negotiating from a single front. Fatah leaders have publicly supported Hamas' position and resistance, and thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank have continued to demonstrate in solidarity with their counterparts in Gaza. Both factions seem interested in reconciling as soon as the violence ends. They have insisted that they will jointly reconstruct the Gaza Strip from the apparatus of the future unity government.
From the Israeli perspective, inciting a political dispute between the two sides may accomplish what military means could not. And by including Turkey in the plot, Israel is also trying to limit Ankara's future influence in the territories, particularly in light of Turkey's strong support for the Palestinians in the current peace negotiations.
The allegations against Hamas may or may not be true. Either way, it is unclear how they would affect the reconciliation process. But one thing is clear: Whatever happens with the conflict in Gaza, Israel's security imperative will endure.
