There is a growing divide in Europe over the sanctions levied against Russia by the European Union. Despite calls from some member countries for another active push against Russia, an increasingly vocal opposition argues that sanctions are more painful to Europe than Russia. While Russian countersanctions against the European Union did not cause much direct damage to the economy — they affected only about 0.1 percent of European gross domestic product — they have indirectly weakened some already weak economies.
Each European region is playing largely to type in the matter. Poland and the Baltic states fully support more sanctions, releasing defiant messages of how unaffected they are by Russian moves. Central Europe continues to show its ambiguity with public statements designed to appear endearing to Russia. And Western Europe supports central policy by agreeing to bankroll any of the losses suffered by EU states.
It is important to consider whether these differing points of view will cause deeper splits between countries with nominally strong relationships. Poland's Aug. 14 statement that it was considering sanctions on imports of Russian coal could create friction elsewhere in the European Union: Because Poland is one of the world's major coal producers, a Europe-wide ban would harm it the least. However, Finland appears to be struggling under the pressure, prompting its president to make a trip to Sochi and Kiev for talks with Russia and Ukraine. Finland is deep in recession, with a new government that is already unpopular and might not survive until elections in January. A projected 400 million euros (nearly $540 million) of exports are affected by the sanctions, which could be enough to make the country break rank and try to do a deal with Russia to ease the pain.
On a broader scale, these sanctions have the potential to drive a wedge through the very core of Europe. On Aug. 14, Germany blamed its contracted economy on the uncertainty surrounding the geopolitical situation in Ukraine. Declining German numbers contribute greatly to slow growth in the eurozone, leading to calls for the European Central Bank to undertake quantitative easing. The quantitative easing debate has the potential to divide Germany from France and Italy; Berlin is reluctant to transfer money from the center to the periphery, while Paris and Rome have repeatedly requested more leeway.
With such deep divisions in the European Union, a clear decision to incite further sanctions or even repeal them looks equally unlikely. The sanctions are structured in such a way that it would require a unanimous vote from all member countries for them to be repealed. This vote takes place every three months, with the ballot for the latest sanctions due in October. Meanwhile, the situation in Ukraine remains largely static, and Russia will not abandon its imperative to sustain the eastern rebel movement, continuing to apply heavy pressure on Kiev ahead of critical energy negotiations. For better or worse, the Europeans have effectively locked themselves into sanctions with Russia and that will, in turn, continue to corrode the links that bind the European Union together.
