Editor's Note: This is the third of a three-part series on Central Europe's changing views of the European Union and Russia. Part 1 discussed the Central European countries' historical alignments with either Moscow or the West. Part 2 examined the national interests shaping each Central European country's ties with Russia and the West. Part 3 looks at the varying interests that will continue driving Central Europe's policies toward the West and Russia.
In the coming years, individual national interests will be key in shaping Central European countries' approaches to balancing between East and West, despite the European Union's continuing efforts for greater integration.
The Central European countries' individual relationships with Russia and the European Union exhibit significant differences compared to previous periods. The inherent differences that already existed for geographic, demographic and political reasons have only been strengthened as the EU crisis has deepened. This has not only created a divergence in ties with the larger powers but also complicated region-wide integration efforts, particularly in security and economic matters.
One prime example of this is the Visegrad Four, a grouping of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary designed to deepen cooperation and integration on security and economic matters. On the security front, the Visegrad Four's progress has been hampered by the financial crisis and budget cuts, with Poland as the only country in the Central European group to increase military spending in recent years. Moreover, these countries have so far been unwilling to "pool and share" what they deem as strategic military assets. It is therefore unlikely that joint weapons procurements and military-related efforts like the Visegrad Battlegroup will become effective in the near to medium term.
There has been greater progress within the Visegrad grouping on economic matters, particularly energy-related issues. These countries in recent years have been building up regional integration projects, such as pipeline interconnectors to link their energy grids. These will be particularly important once alternative energy supplies in the form of liquefied natural gas and potentially shale gas come online. Additionally, the European Union has had more success in challenging Russia's dominance in the energy market via the Third Energy Package. Central European countries are some of the most dependent on Russia as a total share of energy consumption, given that many are landlocked and within close proximity to Russia. Because Russia has a stake in the distribution sector of many of the Central European state energy companies, this is where unbundling will have the greatest impact, which will make the application of the Third Energy Package increasingly important in the coming years.
However, economic integration on a broader scale has been more difficult for Central European countries due to the countries' different degrees of development and varying levels of integration with the European Union. For example, Poland and the Czech Republic have much higher gross domestic products per capita and are far more industrialized than Romania and Bulgaria. Also, Slovakia is the only Central European member of the eurozone, while Romania and Bulgaria are the only ones that are not party to the Schengen Agreement (and are not likely to be for at least the next year). The various monetary and fiscal policies make regional integration more difficult for Central European countries compared to those countries in the eurozone. The delays in Schengen membership will make freedom of movement for the peoples of Romania and Bulgaria into other EU states more difficult and will serve as an obstacle to regional economic integration.
Despite these differences, the Central European countries still have broad similarities. In the realm of security, all are committed NATO members and seek a strong presence from the alliance in general and from the United States in particular. The realignment from Russia to the West that took place on security matters was far more substantial than the shift that took place in the economic sphere. The transition from a centrally planned communist system to an open capitalist system has thus varied for each country. This has enabled Russia to retain certain economic and business links to each country — something the European crisis has only facilitated. It is likely that Central European countries will continue to share these general similarities and will be driven by their historical interest in balancing effectively between Western Europe and Russia, which has spawned ideas for alignments like the Intermarium, an alliance of countries from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.
However, the way in which Central European countries have balanced between East and West has seen the greatest divergence since the weakening of the European Union and the relative strengthening of Russia. In the absence of a strong outside power able or willing to impose its will on the region, like the Soviet Union or the European Union at their respective peaks, this divergence could grow further in the coming years. Thus, it is likely that the Intermarium will continue making logical, but not historical, sense. There will be certain cooperation efforts on issues like energy that will succeed, but a more ambitious pursuit of a confederation with truly integrated militaries and economies is not likely to materialize any time soon.
In a broader sense, the biggest factor that will affect these countries' relationships with each other and with the larger powers is the internal evolution of the European Union and Russia. A return to full-scale strategic alignment with Russia is unlikely; despite its return to regional power status, Russia is no longer the Soviet Union, and the only time historically these countries have been oriented eastward was out of force. Russia faces its own internal problems, such as stagnating growth, ethnic tensions and an uneasy political transformation that could weaken the country domestically, though Russia's ability to project power traditionally has outstripped its weak economy. However, a committed alignment from Central European countries toward the West is also not a given in light of the deepening problems the European Union continues to experience, an unclear future for NATO and the United States' declining willingness to shoulder burdens.
Moving forward, economic factors will play a significant role in shaping each country's relationship with the European Union and Russia. But economic concerns cannot be separated from security concerns, as has been the case throughout the region's history. The characteristics of the next phase of Central Europe's history as a region are unclear. What is clear, however, is that at least in the near future significant regional cooperation in Central Europe will remain elusive, and when it comes to relationships with the European Union and Russia, national interests will prevail.
